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Abstract
Terrorism has become and continues to be one of the biggest threats of our time. Large-scale
attacks like 1995 in Tokyo, 2001 in New York City, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania, 2004 in
Madrid, and 2005 in London are tragic proofs that this is especially true for highly urbanized
areas all over the world. The more prevalent such terrorist attacks happen the more scientific
papers are written about them. Yet, this increased number of scientific engagement has not lead
to more detailed insights into the underpinnings of terrorism. Instead there are many complaints
in the terrorism research community about a lack of quantitative data to corroborate the theories
made by scholars from various engaged disciplines like the political sciences, psychology, peace
and conflict studies, economy, engineering, urban planning, and also geography.
In  this  study  I  introduce  methodologies  for  the  spatio-temporal  micro-scale  analysis  of
terrorism  vulnerability  in  highly  urbanized  areas  to  help  overcome  this  limitation.  The
underlying conceptual framework is based on the selection of appropriate vulnerability factors,
their  operationalization  in  measurable  real-world  phenomena,  the  calculation  of  their  spatial
influence,  and finally  their  weighted  combination  into  an  overall  vulnerability  index.  I  also
present  an exemplar application of this  framework in a case study for an actual  scenario in
Tokyo, Japan. Furthermore I provide an interpretation of the empirical results of the case study,
and  finally  discuss  the  usefulness  of  the  framework  and  its  operationalization  as  well  as
opportunities for possible further studies.
The Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I developed is based on the activities of
people and how these shape the environment into places of different value to them. I argue that
these values are what generates disasters from the threats to these places. This concept represents
the theoretical foundation for the analysis framework, which consists of a number of compo-
nents: multiple sources of “hard”, quantitative data, carefully selected vulnerability factors, the
factors’ spatial  influence,  an important concept that allows for the analysis  of the impact an
object’s vulnerability has on its surroundings, and finally the factors’ weights among themselves.
In  a  case  study for  the  central  part  of  Tokyo,  Japan,  the  Special  23  Wards,  I  show the
application of the aforementioned framework in a real-world example. The vulnerability factors I
employed in this case study are the stationary building population, the pedestrian volumes on the
streets, the passenger volumes of train stations and trains, and the symbolic value of places. I
used a number of micro-scale datasets to operationalize these vulnerability factors, among them
population, employment, and school census data, train passenger volumes, building data, and
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data of the road and railway networks of the study area. Furthermore, the inclusion of a micro-
scale dataset of people’s movements in 1-minute intervals allowed me to enrich the analysis by
the introduction of the temporal dimension. In the course of the study I developed a number of
novel methodologies for the quantification of vulnerability. These involve the spatio-temporal
categorical  estimation  of  building  populations,  the  use  of  network  analysis  methods  for  the
estimation of pedestrian flows, and the operationalization of the objects’ spatial influence using
kernel density estimation and a linear function of the weighted inverse distance.
To my best knowledge this is the first time that such an approach has been developed. It
combines  traditional  terrorism  research  with  a  bottom-up  vulnerability-based  focus  using
spatially grounded analytic tools. The output of the model introduced here are micro-scale maps
of the spatial distribution and agglomeration of vulnerability in highly urbanized areas. These
can help with communicating the abstract concept of vulnerability to the broad public, and also
provide the hitherto missing quantitative data about vulnerability, which can help governments,
municipalities and other involved stakeholders in making educated decisions about the use of
limited fundings for the mitigation of vulnerability and other counterterrorism measure.
The interpretation of the case study’s empirical results revealed several interesting insights
into  the  connection  between  the  urban  spatial  structure  of  Central  Tokyo  and  its  terrorism
vulnerability and the spatio-temporal constraints involved. First and foremost the commuting
movements from the suburban belt into the city center lead to a dramatically higher overall day-
time population. This results in larger areas of higher vulnerability during the day than at night.
Over the course of the day clusters of highest vulnerability develop in areas with many large
office buildings. Second, the concentrated morning commuting period has a strong impact on the
vulnerability levels surrounding the railway transportation network. This effect together with the
generally high  building  populations  and pedestrian  volumes  around larger  train  station  hubs
create the overall highest vulnerability index values. Furthermore, the monocentric urban spatial
structure of Tokyo manifests itself in the agglomeration of most of the places with high symbolic
relevance on the one hand, and most of the office districts with high daytime populations on the
other hand. Based on these observations the conclusions can be made that from a terrorist’s
perspective the most  attractive location for an attack would be in  the city center,  preferably
inside or near a major train station or near railway tracks. The most attractive time would be
during the day, preferably the morning commute.
Keywords: GIS, micro-scale, spatial analysis, terrorism, Tokyo, urban areas, vulnerability
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1 Introduction
On March 11th, 2011 one of the strongest earthquakes ever measured occurred off the coast of
Japan and  caused a  tsunami  that  claimed  more  than  25,000 casualties1 and  caused multiple
reactor core meltdowns and explosions at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant which led
to  a  release  of  more  radioactive  material  than  in  the  case  of  the  reactor  explosion  1986 in
Chernobyl (Japan Meteorological Agency 2012; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012;
International Atomic Energy Agency 2011; von Hippel 2011). Six years earlier on the same day
members of the  Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades,  an Islamic extremist group associated with  al-
Qaeda, detonated ten bombs on crowded commuter trains in Madrid during the morning rush
hour causing more than 2,000 casualties2 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d), and making this the worst terrorist attack
in Europe since the 1988 bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, which killed 270 people
(National  Consortium for  the  Study of  Terrorism and  Responses  to  Terrorism 2013e).  It  is
dramatic events like these that we keep in our minds for a long time, some of them will even stay
with us for the rest of our lives, even though we are not directly affected by them.
I find this especially the case with terrorist attacks as compared to natural disasters. Almost
everybody in the world remembers precisely where they have been and what they were doing
when  the  attacks  on  September  11th,  2001  took  place  in  New  York,  Washington,  DC  and
Pennsylvania, more than twelve years ago at the time of writing. This can not necessarily be said
for enormous natural disasters such as the tsunami following the Indian Ocean Earthquake in
2004,  the  Haiti  Earthquake  in  2010,  or  typhoon  Haiyan/Yolanda over  the  Philippines  and
Vietnam in  2013,  which  are  among  the  deadliest  natural  disasters  of  the  past  ten  years  at
230,000, and 227,898 people killed, respectively (United States Geological Survey 2013; 2010),
each more than hundred times as many as the aforementioned attacks of September 11th. I believe
that this is due to the fact that, while not directly physically affected by a terrorist attack, it can
create  a  feeling  of  anxiousness  and  trigger  thoughts  like  “could  that  have  been  me?”  This
creation of fear is what terrorists generally aim for, hence the name for this phenomenon from
Latin terrere: to frighten. This anxiousness is rooted in the realization that, in contrast to natural
disasters, terrorist attacks do not require certain physical preconditions to occur. Contemporary
modern societies try hard to avoid these potential dangers, for example by not settling in flood-
prone areas or by making buildings earthquake-resistant. Terrorism on the other hand has its
foundation in willfully damaging that which is valued the highest by those under attack, that
which we strive to establish instead of preventing it.
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With this study I hope to be able to contribute in overcoming the scarcity of research and
quantitative data about terrorism. I intend to do this by analyzing terrorism not using a risk-
based,  top-down approach,  but  instead  a  vulnerability-based,  bottom-up approach.  My main
intent is to be able to identify and distinguish areas of low and high vulnerability to terrorism
inside of highly urbanized cityscapes. To do this I refer to a number of vulnerability factors, their
operationalizations as features in the real world and their characteristics as well as the influence
they have on their surroundings. I start by defining and discussing key terms in Chapter 2 before
presenting my research objectives in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 I then develop and explain the main
spatio-temporal analysis framework, which I apply to a case study of Tokyo, Japan in Chapter 5.
I conclude the study by interpreting the results and discussing the frameworks usefulness and
also its shortcomings in the final chapter.
In its  Final  Report  the National  Commission on Terrorist  Attacks  upon the United States
wrote:
The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated simply: in the new age of
terror,  they—we—are  the  primary  targets.  The  losses  America  suffered  that  day
demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist threat and the commensurate need to prepare
ourselves to meet it. The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks
on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented,
civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines. We must plan for
that  eventuality.  A rededication  to  preparedness  is  perhaps  the  best  way  to  honor  the
memories of those we lost that day. (2004, 323)
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2 Definition of Key Terms
Before explaining in detail what I am striving to accomplish with this research, I believe it is
important to provide clear definitions of some of the core terms and principles I use throughout
this study. There is a lot of discussion about the definitions of several of the terms I use, to the
degree that the attempt to develop clear definitions seems to evolve as a self-contained field of
research.
I start with the distinction between “terror” and “terrorism” and a detailed definition of what I
regard as terrorism in the scope of this study. I then introduce the current research landscape
about  terrorism  vulnerability  analysis  and  also  spatial  terrorism  analysis.  In  the  following
chapters I explain what I mean by “hazard” and “disaster” as well as “risk” and “vulnerability”,
including  their  constituents  “probability”  and  “loss”  as  well  as  “exposure”,  “resistance”,
“resilience” and “attractiveness”, respectively. In the course of the individual definitions I set
forth how those components sculpt the overall disaster model I rely on in my research and also
the Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I developed in the course of my research. I
conclude the definitional part of this study by reviewing the current literature about the spatial
analysis of vulnerability and focusing on the significance of vulnerability in urban areas.
2.1. Terrorism
2.1.1. Terror and Terrorism
There are as many varying definitions of “terror” and “terrorism” used in the public discussion as
well as in the scientific literature as there is confusion about what this term actually denotes. A
very extensive collection of definitions and their discussion can be found in Schmid (2011, 99–
157), who summarized more than 250 definitions used by governments, alone 20 of these used
by various departments within the United States government, in an academic context, and in the
public  discussion.  As a  result  I  regard  it  as  imperative  to  clearly define  what  I  refer  to  by
“terror”, “terrorism”, and “terrorist attack” in the context of this study.
Simply put I understand “terror” as the mindset of fear among the victims that is created by
“terrorism”, activities that exert terror on their victims  (Schmid 2011, 41). Those activities are
then called “terrorist attacks”. Wilkinson sums this up concisely: “Terrorism is not a philosophy
or a movement. It is a method.” (Wilkinson 2011, 17)
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But any serious discussion about terror and terrorism also requires a more detailed definition
of what those two terms comprise. It is for example imperative to distinguish “terrorism” from
similar concepts, such as “war” and also “crime”. Kushner (2003, XXIII) identifies unpredictabi-
lity and secrecy as the main differentiators between state terrorism on the one hand and war or
violent law enforcement on the other. Wilkinson lists five characteristics of terrorism:
• It is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear;
• It is directed at a wider target than the immediate victims;
• It inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including civilians;
• It is considered by the society in which it occurs as 'extra-normal', that is in the literal sense that
it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; and 
• It is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments,
communities or specific social groups. (Wilkinson 2011, 4)
In my discussion of factors to operationalize the vulnerability to terrorism in Chapter  5.3 I
return to some of the basic concepts formulated here, namely the targeting of a broad, civilian
audience and the aim for widespread awareness.
More generally the United Nations Security Council established in its Resolution 1566
that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in
the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act,
which constitute offenses within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions
and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations
of  a  political,  philosophical,  ideological,  racial,  ethnic,  religious  or  other  similar  nature.
(United Nations Security Council 2004, 2)
Therein it follows the classification of terrorism being the activity that instills a state of terror
in those under attack, and it also puts terrorist activities in the context of crime.
Several  national  governments  also  incorporated  definitions  of  and  legislation  regarding
terrorism and terrorist activities in their laws, such as the United States in the United States Code
Title 22 Section 2656f(d) (U.S. Government Printing Office 2010), the United Kingdom in the
Terrorism Act 2000 Part 1, 1.(1)–(3)  (The National Archives 2000), and Japan in the  Act on
Punishment of the provision of funds etc. for criminal acts of intimidation etc. of the general
public Paragraph 1 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2002).
Apart from the two main factors discussed hitherto there is a third dimension that helps to
distinguish  terrorism  from  other  crimes,  namely  violence  (Kushner  2003,  XXIII) or  more
precisely the  modus operandi of the perpetrators. Wilkinson  (2011, 17) as well as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2003a) and Willis  (2005) provide lists of modes of
attack that have either been used by terrorists in the past or should be considered to be potentially
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employed by terrorists in the future. Yet, the most comprehensive and methodologically arranged
compilation is the one underlying the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consor-
tium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) as seen in 1. It separates
the attack type from the weapon information, which allows for a more precise classification.
All these aspects considered in this study I am going along with Schmid's Revised Academic
Consensus Definition of Terrorism (Rev.ACDT2011), which he developed in a tedious process
from statements  and assessments  made by 91 subject  matter  experts  from various  academic
fields:
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special
form or tactic of fear generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a
conspiratorial  practice of calculated,  demonstrative,  direct  violent  action without  legal  or
moral  restraints,  targeting  mainly  civilians  and  non-combatants,  performed  for  its
propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. […] At
the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety – spread
among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some
of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic
or  symbolic  quality and disregard  of  the  rules  of  warfare  and the  rules  of  punishment.
(Schmid 2011, 86)
2.1.2. Terrorism Vulnerability Analysis
The  scientific  literature  on  the  analysis  of  vulnerability  towards  the  threat  of  terrorism and
terrorist attacks is significantly smaller than vulnerabilities of natural hazards (cf. Chapter 2.3.2).
LaFree and colleagues cite the lack of available statistical data and its low quality as the reasons.
They claim that  this  is  a  result  of three serious limitations:  extremely narrow definitions  of
terrorism in the data sources; definitions influenced by political considerations, since most of the
data  are  collected  by government  entities;  and the  exclusion  of  information  about  domestic
terrorism from all existing publicly available databases at the time of writing, even though it
greatly outnumbers international terrorism (LaFree et al. 2006, 5). According to them this led to
the fact that “the research literature on terrorism is dominated by books with relatively little
statistical  analysis”  (2006,  4).  I  am trying  to  antagonize  this  lack  of  quantitative  terrorism
analysis with this study. Nevertheless a body of publications is available now, mostly published
after the complaint by LaFree et al. and largely based on the data edited by them.
Laqueur states that
war, even civil war, is predictable in many ways; it occurs in the light of day and there is no
mystery about  the  identity of  the  participants.  Even in civil  war  there  are  certain  rules,
whereas  the  characteristic  features  of  terrorism are  anonymity and the violation of  esta-
blished norms. (Laqueur 2001, 3)
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6Table 1: List of terrorist attack types and weapon information
Attack types Weapon information
assassination biological
hijacking chemical
kidnapping radiological
barricade incident nuclear
bombing/explosion firearms
armed assault explosives/bombs/dynamite
unarmed assault fake weapons
incendiary
melee
vehicle
sabotage equipment
Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (2012, 18–26)
I am convinced that this unpredictability is the best reason against the analysis of terrorism
risk and for the analysis of terrorism vulnerability instead. In my definition of risk in Chapter
2.3.1 I include two components: loss and probability. The latter is very problematic in the context
of terrorism. Since the occurrence probabilities of terrorist attacks are unknown, the risk for the
threat of terrorism can not be determined in a meaningful and reliable fashion. A statement to this
effect by Ezell and colleagues that
while it is perhaps more difficult to spell out [probabilistic] conditions precisely in terrorism
risk analysis, there is no fundamental difference in this type of conditioning compared to
conditioning probability judgments in the case of natural or engineered systems (Ezell et al.
2010, 578)
was strongly refused by other researchers. Brown and Cox (2011) argue
that this is importantly incorrect, and that […] calculations based on this idea can be highly
misleading, rather than useful, for terrorism risk analysis. In particular, […] conditioning risk
estimates  on  knowledge  or  beliefs  about  the  future  actions  of  others,  who  in  turn  may
condition  their  preferences  for  alternative  actions  on  what  they  know  about  our  risk
estimates, leads to new problems in terrorism risk analysis that cannot be solved well, if at
all, by traditional [probabilistic risk assessment]. (2011, 196)
Tetlock (2005) follows a similar rationale in his monograph Expert Political Judgement: How
Good Is It? How Can We Know? On a more statistical note Clauset and Woodard show the
difficulties  in  accurately  estimating  the  probability  of  terrorist  attacks  due  to  the  “large
fluctuations in the [occurrence frequency] distribution's upper tail, precisely where we wish to
have  the  most  accuracy”  (Clauset  and  Woodard  2012,  1),  and  Sandler  and  Enders  (2007)
elucidate on the difficulties and shortcomings of applying statistical methods on the forecasting
of terrorist attacks.
In comparison to the large body of research about vulnerabilities to natural hazards, which I
discuss in Chapter 2.3.2, there is a scarcity of specifically vulnerability-centered research about
terrorism vulnerability.  That  is  even  more  so  in  the  social  sciences.  The  application  of  the
concept of social vulnerability, which I introduce in Chapter 2.3.2, is to my best knowledge and
after  thorough literature research so far  mostly untrodden territory in the realm of terrorism
research.
There are several studies on the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other lifelines to
the threat of terrorism. Especially a group of researchers at the Engineering Systems Division
and  Department  of  Nuclear  Science  and  Engineering  at  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of
Technology (MIT) has published a number of papers about the vulnerability of infrastructures
(Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; Lemon 2004; Michaud 2005; Patterson and Apostolakis 2007)
and nuclear power plants  (Holt and Andrews 2007; Weil and Apostolakis 2001), as did other
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authors  (Davis et al. 2006; Haimes and Longstaff 2002; Hewitt 2002; Wilson 2007) and also
several  governmental  institutions  (Department  of  Defense  2007;  Department  of  Homeland
Security  2007;  Federal  Emergency Management  Agency 2003a;  2003b;  2003c;  2004;  2009;
National Research Council 2002). Yet, all these analyses focus exclusively on an engineering
perspective in the identification of vulnerabilities, disregarding the humans and social systems
involved. Notable exceptions are the papers by Piegorsch et al.  (2007) and only recently Perry
(2013) who attempt to focus on the social aspects of vulnerability to terrorism.
2.1.3. Spatial Terrorism Analysis
Laqueur  (2001,  5) mentions  among  his  six  “main  features  of  contemporary  terrorism”  that
terrorism can occur anywhere. While this statement cannot be dismissed, data about the locations
of past terrorist attacks show unmistakably that they occur more often in some locations than in
others. Hence, a spatial analysis of this fact and the underlying processes should be a matter of
course.  While  Reid and Chen did not  include any publications  about  geographical  terrorism
research in their “systematic view of terrorism research” (2007, 42)3, a number of authors have
concentrated on this aspect of terrorism.
The anthology The geographical dimensions of terrorism by Cutter (2003) is widely regarded
as the starting point of engagement with the topic of terrorism in the spatial and geographical
sciences. It not only summarized the level of knowledge at that point in time, but also helped to
develop the map for future directions of geographical terrorism research. It is also one of the
books that sparked the idea for the research I cover in this study.
It should be mentioned, though, that some researchers had published geographic terrorism-
related analyses before that. Savitch and Ardashev (2001) are to my best knowledge the first to
analyze the social characteristics and target-proneness of cities and compare the past occurrences
of terrorist attacks there. Wisner (2002) asked in a panel presentation at the Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Geographers (AAG)  Is There a Geographical Theory of Terror?,
reflecting on the multi-faceted past of terrorism research and the role geography could play in
this field. It was this panel that formed the group of researchers whose work culminated in the
publication of the aforementioned primer in 2003.
In the same year Flint made a statement for a stronger engagement of political geography in
the  peace  and  conflict  studies.  He  identified  three  intersections  of  geography  and  terrorist
studies:
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The  importance  of  geohistorical  context  in  understanding  the  causes  of  contemporary
terrorism […]; the spatiality of terrorist networks; and […] the potentially negative efficacy
of  existing  counterterrorist  policies  given  the  interaction  of  terrorist  networks  and  state
sovereignty. (Flint 2003, 161)
Mustafa similarly complains that the field of terrorism had so far mostly been covered by non-
geographical studies, while geographical hazard studies only focused on natural disasters. He
emphasizes  that  “terrorism is  a  deeply geographical  phenomenon with  potentially  disastrous
consequences for international peace” (Mustafa 2005, 72) and that “terrorism is a phenomenon
intricately tied to the concept of place” (2005, 79).
Braithwaite and Li (2007) analyzed transnational terrorism hotspots at the country level. They
did  this  on  a  worldwide  scale  to  extend  the  existing  literature  which  only  focused  on  the
distribution and diffusion of terrorism among aggregate regions such as Europe and the Middle
East. Also, for the first time they facilitated localized spatial statistics, such as local Moran's I,
local Geary's C, and Getis and Ord's Gi and Gi*, to study terrorist violence. Doing so they were
able to “identify countries that are located within neighborhoods that are hot spots of terrorist
attacks  and  assess  empirically  the  impact  of  these  hot  spots  on  the  countries'  subsequent
experiences of terrorist incidents.” (Braithwaite and Li 2007, 296)
Piegorsch and colleagues resort to the social vulnerability indices developed in earlier studies
(Borden et al. 2007; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003) which I also introduce in Chapter 2.3.2 in
the context of vulnerability to natural disasters. They used it together with historic data from
terrorism  databases,  such  as  the  aforementioned  GTD,  as  a  “quantitative  methodology  to
characterize the vulnerability of U.S. urban centers to terrorist attack”  (Piegorsch, Cutter, and
Hardisty 2007, 1411).
Patterson and Apostolakis  (2007) used spatial  analysis  to  derive what  they call  the “geo-
graphic valued worth” of elements within an infrastructure system to determine its vulnerability
to terrorism. They do this by assigning them importance measures based on network analysis
after  deriving  the  disutility  of  the  loss  of  each  infrastructure's  resource  (e.g.  gas,  water,
electricity). The geographical aspect of their work lies in the spatial interdependencies of various
infrastructural systems, which can enable a perpetrator to affect multiple systems with just one
attack in a carefully selected location.
Smith et al. analyzed the activities of terrorists, specifically international and environmental
terrorists,  spatially  and  tried  to  identify  spatial  and  temporal  patterns  of  their  pre-incident
behavior.  These  pre-incident  activities  include  criminal  acts  in  the  preparation  of  the  actual
terrorist attack:
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The spatial analysis from which relationships and patterns can be derived consists of the
measurement  of  the  linear  distance  between  points  that  represent  terrorist  activities,
residences, and the location of the terrorism incident itself. (Smith et al. 2008, 40)
Their  analyses  provide  interesting  insights  into  the  spatial  and  temporal  patterns  of  said
behavior.
Rusnak and colleagues (2012) provide a case study of the analysis of terrorism using spatial
techniques in cities in Turkey. They developed location quotients to determine how terrorism risk
in  an  area  compared  to  its  surroundings  in  order  to  assess  the  relative  risk  of  particular
geographic locations. The terrorism risk is operationalized in three dimensions: attractiveness
(using  the  number  of  assembly  members  and  number  of  mosques),  infrastructure  (using
socioeconomic development, net trade, city development, and population), and crime (using the
number of murder convictions). Doing so they could show “that terrorist incidents within Turkey
are  not  randomly  distributed  throughout  the  landscape  but  rather  are  concentrated  in  a
statistically significant way among certain high risk cities.” (Rusnak et al. 2012, 179)
LaFree  and Bersani  (2012) analyzed the  data  from the  GTD in multiple  ways to  answer
questions  about  the  geographic  concentration  of  terrorist  attacks,  the  correlation  between
ordinary crime and terrorism, and whether it  is possible to predict terrorist  attacks using the
traditional predictors of ordinary crime. According to their findings, within the United States
terrorism and ordinary crime often occur in the same areas and can partly be predicted by some
traditional predictors of ordinary crime. Yet, they conclude that “more work needs to be done to
fully understand the relationship between language diversity and terrorism and ordinary crime”
(LaFree and Bersani 2012, 28).
Perry and colleagues  (2013) focused on the prediction of suicide bombing locations in four
Israeli  cities  using  geospatial  methods  and  assessed  the  benefits  of  including  sociocultural,
economic, and political factors in the calculations. While the socioeconomic and demographic
factors  analyzed  are  very  similar  to  those  employed  in  the  development  of  the  social
vulnerability index by Borden et al. (2007), the researchers here also included electoral data, to
include political leanings of the inhabitants of certain areas, and sociocultural precipitants, which
put  terrorist  activities  in  the  temporal  context  of  religious  holidays  or  political  events  (e.g.
negotiations or high-profile meetings). Also, an added insight was provided by including the
spatial  characteristics  of  terrorists'  safe  houses,  their  spatial  distribution,  agglomerations  and
distances from each other. Their study shows that
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socioeconomic,  demographic,  and  political  data  not  only  have  statistically  significant
relationships with the odds of attack within specific neighborhoods but also explain unique
variances in the risk of attack over and above geospatial predictors. (Perry et al. 2013, 53)
Furthermore  a  notable  association  between  driving  distances  to  terrorist  safe  houses  and
attack  probability  and  a  robust  relationship  between  the  attack  frequency  and  some  of  the
sociocultural precipitants could be proven.
Yet,  similar  to  the  studies  about  the  spatial  analysis  of  vulnerability  to  natural  hazards  I
present  in  3 the analyses here are using rather coarse spatial  resolutions.  Braithwaite and Li
(2007) analyze on a country basis, Piegorsch et al. (2007) use cities in the United States, Rusnak
et al. (2012) Turkish cities as their spatial unit of reference. Perry et al. (2013) use a meso-scale
of statistical areas as defined by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
I  believe  that  an analysis  of  terrorism vulnerability  on a  micro-scale  can  provide  further
insight into the spatial distribution of the phenomenon within highly urbanized areas and can
also help policy makers and stakeholders to channel mitigation funds more efficiently. This is
one of the major motivations for this study.
2.2. Hazard and Disaster
2.2.1. Hazard
A problem in the scientific literature is the definition of the terms “hazard” and “disaster”. Many
different definitions and differentiations exist among authors, yet oftentimes they are not clearly
defined at  all  and sometimes even used interchangeably within one publication  (Kaplan and
Garrick 1981). Since there is no universally accepted definition of those two terms that I could
employ, I can ultimately only contribute to the confusion. Hence I believe it  is important to
provide a clear definition of what I mean by “hazard” and “disaster” in the context of this study.
Those two terms are closely related to the two terms “risk” and “vulnerability”, which I talk
about in the following chapter.
Yet,  before  providing  a  differentiation  between  “hazard”  and  “disaster”  I  would  like  to
introduce  another  term,  namely  “threat”.  I  use  it  as  a  synonym  for  “hazard”.  Borden  and
colleagues, while focusing on natural disasters, define a hazard as “the potential threat from an
environmental process, such as a hurricane, tornado, or earthquake” (Borden et al. 2007, 1) and
follow this  synonymous use of the two terms.  Similarly,  Cutter  defines hazard as “threat  to
people and the things they value” (Cutter 2001, 2) and Garrick and colleagues, in the context of
terrorism, describe it as “the potential intent to cause harm or damage to a system by adversely
11
changing its state” (Garrick et al. 2004, 131). All authors refer to the categories of adverse events
(cf. Table 2) that can occur due to certain triggers. Examples are the hazard of an earthquake as a
result of the movements of tectonic plates, and the threat of a terrorist attack due to the activities
of a group in the pursuance of their political goals.
In my understanding every hazard or threat can cause a disaster. Conversely, each disaster is
the materialization of a hazard. Yet not every hazard has to ultimately result in a disaster. Cannon
goes along the same lines when he emphasizes the difference between hazards and disasters in
the context of his thoughts about whether disasters can be natural in the first place, or whether all
disasters  are  fundamentally  caused  by  human  actions:  “The  hazard  is  natural;  a  disastrous
outcome is not, and is in many senses largely caused by the vulnerability conditions generated by
human systems” (Cannon 1994, 20). While it might be disputable whether the cause of a certain
disaster was natural or human-induced (Adger 2006; Cutter 2001; Cannon 1994; World Bank and
United Nations 2010), the underlying hazards can generally be assigned to either group. 2 lists a
variety of hazards for each category.
One  of  the  most  widely  accepted  and  used  definitions  is  that  by  the  United  Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) which defines a hazard as
dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life,
injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and
economic disruption, or environmental damage.  (United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction 2009, 9, emphasis added)
In this study I follow this definition, by putting a main focus on the word “may”. It implies
the  possible  negative  outcome of  the  materialization  of  the  hazard  or  threat,  which  is  then
defined as a disaster.
2.2.2. Disaster
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) defines a disaster as “an
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”
(Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, and Below 2013, 7). Whether such a hazardous event will have a disas-
trous outcome or not is a function of many hazard-related factors: its nature (cf. 2), the scale or
magnitude of the hazard, the place, and the time and duration of its occurrence (Gravley 2001,
4). Borden and colleagues also observed that
variability in natural hazards […] is largely based on site, situation, and the social geography
of  these  places.  Spatial  differences  in  these characteristics  give rise  to  vulnerabilities  to
environmental threats as well as variations in the resilience or the ability to respond and
recover from them. (Borden et al. 2007, 1)
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Table 2: List of natural and anthropogenic disasters
Natural hazards Anthropogenic hazards
earthquake crime
tsunami war
volcano eruption terrorist attack
meteorite impact car accident
tropical cyclone plane crash
tornado train derailment
thunderstorm naval accident
blizzard fire
heavy snowfall explosion
avalanche mining accident
hail structural collapse
torrential rain power outage
drought release of poisonous substance
heatwave release of biological agent
bushfire, forest fire release of radioactive material
landslide
soil liquefaction
flooding
epidemic disease
A small magnitude earthquake for example will most likely not cause a disaster, whereas an
MW 9 (Richter scale) earthquake will. Yet, a MW 7.0 earthquake caused a major disaster in Haiti
in January 2010  (Hayes et  al.  2010; United States Geological Survey 2010) while a MW 7.1
earthquake off Japan in August 2009 caused no significant damage  (United States Geological
Survey 2009). The reasons are to be found in the different locations (ca. 170 km off-coast and
297 km deep in Japan, while only ca. 25 km from the capital Port-au-Prince and 13 km deep in
Haiti) and the different vulnerabilities, both social and in terms of engineering, of Haiti and Ja-
pan against earthquakes of such a magnitude. While both these examples and the aforementioned
definitions refer to natural hazards, I claim that the same is true for non-natural hazards as well.
Once again I follow the widely accepted definition by the UNISDR in this study. It describes
a disaster as “serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving wide-
spread  human,  material,  economic  or  environmental  losses  and  impacts,  which  exceeds  the
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.” (United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2009, 9)
In  summary,  my  definitions  of  “hazard”  and  “disaster”  follow  the  underlying  UNISDR
concept of a hazard being a potential danger or threat, whereas a disaster is the manifestation of
this hazard in the form of a negative event happening. As shown above this also goes along the
lines of a number of scientific publications.
2.3. Risk and Vulnerability
2.3.1. Risk
Equally  unclear  and  disputed  as  the  distinction  between  “hazard”  and  “disaster”  is  the
terminology of “risk” and “vulnerability” in the scientific literature. In fact the term “risk” is
used in a broad range of disciplines, and can carry a variety of meanings (Kaplan and Garrick
1981; Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst 2004). Originally coined in an engineering context the term
has taken on a multitude of meanings once used in different scientific realms, such as the social
sciences,  political  sciences,  economic  sciences,  etc.  (Bouchon  2006,  61).  In  the  hazard  and
disaster context the connotation is exclusively negative (Adger 2006; Bouchon 2006; Kaplan and
Garrick 1981).The UNISDR, on which I relied heavily in my description of hazards and disas-
ters, defines risk as “combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences”
(United  Nations  International  Strategy  for  Disaster  Reduction  2009,  25) Furthermore,  two
distinctive connotations are pointed out:
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In popular usage the emphasis is usually placed on the concept of chance or possibility, such
as in 'the risk of an accident'; whereas in technical settings the emphasis is usually placed on
the consequences, in terms of 'potential losses' for some particular cause, place and period.
(United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2009, 25)
Probability
Many authors focus primarily on the probabilistic aspect of risk.  For example Burby  (1991)
states that every risk implies the possibility of suffering a loss, and Borden and colleagues define
risk as “a measure of the probability a hazard event will occur and adversely affect a population”
(Borden et al. 2007, 1). Yet, oftentimes these probabilities are unknown or at least difficult to
estimate (Apostolakis 2004). Kaplan and Garrick (1981) point out that this discussion involves
the  use  of  many  different  terms  such  as  “frequency”,  and  “uncertainty”  whose  meanings
themselves are sometimes not even clearly separated.
The  former  is  a  mere  equivalent  to  “probability”,  yet  from another  perspective:  While
probability gives information about how likely something is going to happen (e.g. “A fair dice
has a 1/6 or 0.17% probability of rolling a 6.”), frequency indicates how often is is going to
happen within a certain timeframe (e.g. “A once-in-a-hundred-years event.”).
Uncertainty, on the other hand, describes a state of being unclear about something, at least
partly, which De Morgan wrote about in his fundamental 19th century monograph Formal Logic:
We have lower grades of knowledge, which we usually call degrees of belief but they are
really degrees  of  knowledge.  […] It  may seem a  strange thing to  treat  knowledge as  a
magnitude, in the same manner as length, or weight, or surface. This is what all writers do
who treat of probability, and what all their readers have done, long before they ever saw a
book on the subject. […] By degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree
of belief. […] Probability then, refers to and implies belief, more or less, and belief is but
another  name  for  imperfect  knowledge,  or  it  may be,  expresses  the  mind  in  a  state  of
imperfect knowledge. (De Morgan 1847, 172ff, emphasis in original)
These beliefs about probabilities can lead to the underestimation of a threat or its dimensions,
and hence be one of the reasons for a hazardous event to cause a disaster. One example is the
enormous  tsunami—the  estimations  range  from at  least  9 m  (Japan  Meteorological  Agency
2012) to 14 m (World Nuclear Association 2011)—that was triggered by a MW 9 (Richter scale)
earthquake off the coast of Japan (Japan Meteorological Agency 2012; United States Geological
Survey 2011) and led—amongst other widespread destruction—to severe damage and ultimately
a double nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant (International Atomic
Energy Agency 2011; Institute of Electrical  and Electronics Engineers 2011; OECD Nuclear
Energy Agency 2012). The power plant was equipped with protective measures, yet these were
not built to withstand a tsunami of such height and strength, since it was not believed an event
like that could occur (World Nuclear Association 2011). Another example is the terrorist attacks
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of September 11th, 2001, which could only be executed in that dimension because of the use of
commercial airplanes as weapons. No countermeasure to prevent an attack like that was in place,
since it had not been deemed plausible before (Garrick et al. 2004; Savitch and Ardashev 2001).
Conversely, these uncertainties can also have the opposite effect and lead to an overprotective
state of mind which can be perceived as limiting and restricting personal freedoms  (Jenkins
2011; Wilkinson 2011, 75ff).
Especially in the case of large-scale disasters the occurrence probabilities are extremely small.
In some cases they cannot be calculated or estimated at all due to non-existing or insufficient
data  on  past  events.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  those  anthropogenic  hazards  with  an
underlying malignant intention, i.e. crime and terrorist attacks. Here it is often more meaningful
to resort to the attractiveness of a possible target towards the realization of a perpetrator's aims to
draw conclusions about the likelihood of an attack  (Federal Emergency Management Agency
2009, 2). I explain this approach in more detail in Chapter 2.3.2.
Willis differentiates two types of uncertainty. The first is due to the aforementioned problems
introduced by the variability and error in the estimates of the seriousness of a threat and its
vulnerabilities:
Exact knowledge of the threat would require comprehensive intelligence on the plans and
capabilities  of  all  terrorist  groups.  Since  this  level  of  precision  is  not  feasible,  expert
judgments must be substituted for fact, resulting in parameter estimates for threats that are
subject to uncertainty or frank disagreements. (Willis 2005, 13)
The  second  is  related  to  the  values  attacked  by the  perpetrators.  They may not  only be
regarded differently by different evaluations, but are generally hard to put into monetary terms
(e.g. the “cost” of dead versus injured victims):
Because this requires value judgments—and potentially contentious ones—it must ultimately
be discussed by the public and policymakers. Part of an informed discussion of this judgment
rests  on  an  understandable  and  transparent  illustration  of  the  consequences  of  using
alternative values. (Willis 2005, 14)
In his analysis of developments within terrorism and terrorist activities, Jenkins also points
out how the missing information and data about the occurrence frequencies and likelihood of
terrorist  attacks  inevitably  hamper  any  risk-focused,  probability-based  terrorism  analysis  or
prediction of possible future attacks:
Whereas traditional threat-based analysis assessed an enemy’s intentions and capabilities,
today’s vulnerability-based analysis identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a
worst-case  scenario.  Vulnerability  analysis  is  useful  for  assessing  consequences  and
preparedness, but it relegates the terrorist to a secondary role: the scenario is driven by the
vulnerability.  Often,  such  a  scenario  is  reified  and  becomes  a  threat:  it  is  successively
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considered possible, probable, inevitable, and imminent. In vulnerability-based assessment,
consequences trump likelihood. (Jenkins 2006, 120)
Loss
Coburn  and  colleagues  refer  to  the  definition  by the  United  Nations  Disaster  Relief  Office
(UNDRO)  (1979) when they postulate  that  “risk refers  to  the  expected losses  from a given
hazard to a given element at risk, over a specified future time period”  (Coburn, Spence, and
Pomonis 1994, 10), thereby focusing strongly on the losses related to a risk.
When talking about those negative outcome of an event two categories of losses have to be
taken into account: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. The former describes the damage to buildings,
infrastructures  and  machinery,  necessary  repairs  and  rebuilds,  business  interruption,  and
litigation, which can be enumerated in economical terms. Opposed to that, the latter describes the
deaths and injuries of humans, damage to the ecosystem, and other “social costs” (Cohen 2010).
Li et al. (2009, 439) use the terms “structural loss” and “nonstructural loss” to describe the same
circumstances and also point out that the latter is oftentimes greater than the former.
Other authors identified more diverse factors that define risk. For example Chapman (1999)
understands it as function of the probability of a certain (natural) hazard event on the one hand,
and vulnerability of cultural entities on the other hand. These authors specifically pointed out the
importance of vulnerability to determine risk in the context of hazards and disasters  (Cannon
1994).
2.3.2. Vulnerability
Historically the majority of academic work dealt with risk analysis and risk assessment, while
vulnerability-focused endeavors appeared only relatively recently. Cutter (2001, 5ff) provides a
very broad overview of  the  development  from the  so-called  Hazards  Paradigm,  which  was
initialized by Barrows (1923) and later formalized by White (1986) and by the National Research
Council  (1983). It was also enhanced by the human adjustment to the natural hazards model
(Kates 1971) and to the environmental extremes model (Mileti 1980) and ultimately summarized
by White  (1994) in multiple comparative case studies. It was only in the mid-90s of the past
century that researchers started to consider hazards in their social and political contexts and to
emphasize  the  importance  of  vulnerability-based  hazards  studies  (Hewitt  1997;  Kasperson,
Kasperson, and Turner 1995; Wisner et al. 2003).
Many different definitions and understandings of “vulnerability” have been coined over time
(Adger 2006; Cutter 2001; Cutter 1996, 351–532; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; Dow 1992;
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Mileti 1999), which makes a clear definition for the use within this study imperative. In my
understanding risk and vulnerability are two components of any hazard.  I  regard risk as the
active component of a hazard, as risk comprises all dimensions that are directly related to the
hazard and its resulting disaster. Vulnerability on the other hand has a more passive character in
that it describes the characteristics of those assets (humans, built-up structures, and services) that
represent  certain  values  to  those  affected  by the  disaster.  This  definition  of  vulnerability  as
passive component also enables me to establish the hypotheses as proposed in Chapter 3.2 and to
go forward in the operationalization of “vulnerability” as I do in Chapter 5.3.
Several publications use the term “susceptibility” to describe just one component of vulnera-
bility, with “disutility” being the other (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; Karydas and Gifun 2006;
Lemon 2004; Michaud 2005; Patterson and Apostolakis 2007; Weil and Apostolakis 2001). This
connotation  of  disutility  is  rooted  in  the  perceived  value  of  an  object  and  the  negative
consequences its defect or missing would have on the overall system under analysis. This goes
along the lines of Kaplan and Garrick when they write: “Thus risk is relative to the observer. It is
a subjective thing – it depends upon who is looking. Some writers refer to this fact by using the
phrase 'perceived risk.'” (Kaplan and Garrick 1981, 12) Kasperson and Kasperson (2005a, 204)
similarly point out that vulnerability may be differently perceived by the vulnerable themselves.
Yet, as I explain in more detail in Chapter 2.3.1 I consider this perception to be a part of the loss
a disaster causes, and thereby a part of the risk component of the underlying threat.
I  am using  the  terms  “vulnerability”  and “susceptibility”  synonymous  in  this  study.  This
follows the idea underlying the widely accepted definition of vulnerability by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as “the extent to which a natural or social system is
susceptible to sustaining damage” (2001, 89). The aforementioned passive nature of vulnerability
is  also reflected in  the definition by the UNISDR which describes it  as  “characteristics and
circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects
of a hazard” (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2009, 30). It empha-
sizes  the  susceptibility  aspect  but  also  mentions  that  vulnerability  is  affected  by  “various
physical, social, economic, and environmental factors” (2009, 30).
Similarly Borden et al. (2007) focus on susceptibility as a central component when they refer
to vulnerability as “the susceptibility to harm from the risk posed by hazard events at a particular
location as well as the potential for social disruption from such events.” (Borden et al. 2007, 1)
Equally, Cannon understands vulnerability as
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a characteristic of individuals and groups of people who inhabit a given natural, social and
economic space, within which they are differentiated according to their varying position in
society into more or less vulnerable individuals and groups. (Cannon 1994, 19)
Both definitions also emphasize the passive nature of vulnerability in the description of a
hazard.
This passive nature of vulnerability is a focus of O'Brien et al.  (2004) who discuss different
perspectives on and interpretations of the term “vulnerability”. One is what Kelly and Adger
refer to as “end point of a sequence of analyses beginning with projections of future […] trends,
moving on to the development of […] scenarios, thence to […] impact studies and the identifica-
tion of adaptive options.”  (2000, 327, emphasis added)A second considers “vulnerability as a
starting point for analysis. Rather than being defined by future climate change scenarios and
anticipated  adaptations,  vulnerability  represents  a  present  inability  to  cope  with  external
pressures or changes […]. Here, vulnerability is considered a characteristic of social and ecologi-
cal systems that is generated by multiple factors and processes.” (O’Brien, Eriksen, et al. 2004,
2, emphasis added) It is this definition of “contextual vulnerability” (Adger 2006, 270) that I am
referring to in this study.
All aforementioned definitions go along with the “social vulnerability” that has often been
referred to in the realm of vulnerability research (Cutter 2001; Borden et al. 2007; Cutter 1996;
Cutter,  Boruff,  and  Shirley  2003;  Cutter,  Mitchell,  and  Scott  2000;  Eakin  and  Luers  2006;
Kasperson and Kasperson 2005b; Kelly and Adger 2000; Luers et al. 2003; O’Brien, Sygna, and
Haugen 2004; O’Brien, Leichenko, et al. 2004; Piegorsch, Cutter, and Hardisty 2007; Turner et
al. 2003; Uitto 1998; Wisner et al. 2003). It describes both social inequalities, such as poverty,
age, gender, and race; and place inequalities (see Chapter 2.3.4) such as the level of urbanization,
growth rates, and economic vitality (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003, 243) and is rooted in three
main theorems of vulnerability research, that Cutter et al. (2003, 242f) itemize:
• the identification of conditions that make people or places vulnerable to extreme natural
events, an exposure model (Anderson 2000; Burton, Kates, and White 1993)
• the assumption that vulnerability is a social condition, a measure of societal resistance 
or resilience to hazards (Hewitt 1997; Wisner et al. 2003)
• the integration of potential exposures and societal resilience with a specific focus on 
particular places or regions (Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Kasperson, Kasperson, 
and Turner 1995)
Those  definitions  help  to  identify  the  three  components  of  vulnerability  that  define  the
susceptibility: exposure, resistance, and resilience. Cannon  (1994, 19) and Adger  (2006, 270)
also identified those three main components.
In the context of infrastructural systems Kröger and colleagues define vulnerability as
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flaw  or  weakness  (inherent  characteristic,  including  resilience  capacity)  in  the  design,
implementation, operation, and/or management of an infrastructure system, or its elements,
that renders it susceptible to destruction or incapacitation when exposed to a hazard or threat,
or reduces its capacity to resume new stable conditions. (Kröger, Zio, and Schläpfer 2011, 5)
Again the two components of susceptibility and disutility can be found, although Kröger et al.
follow the terminology used by Bouchon (2006, 65) who identified three underlying elements:
loss and damage, the degree of exposure, and the degree of resilience.
Except  the  textbook by Kröger  et  al.  (2011) all  scientific  works  cited  above are  dealing
explicitly with natural hazards and the resulting natural disasters. In this study I apply the same
concepts to all kinds of objects in their spatial context: humans, buildings, and infrastructures. In
Chapter 2.1 I specifically concentrate on the threat of terrorism and the vulnerability of humans
towards  terrorist  attacks.  There  I  also  explain  the  differences  between  natural  hazards  and
terrorism and the implications this has on the analysis of terrorist attacks. One of the peculiarities
of crime and terrorism as opposed to  natural  and even other human-induced disasters is  the
underlying malignancy of the perpetrators, which introduces another dimension of vulnerability:
that of target attractiveness, a central topic of this study.
Before going on to briefly explain these four components I want to mention an issue pointed
out  by Bouchon  (2006, 60).  She remarks that  the need for educated decisions  regarding the
prioritization of grants and loans to developing countries has lead to a bias of scientific papers
about vulnerabilities in these countries. The consequence is a dearth of scientific work about
vulnerabilities in developing and developed countries. With this study I am trying to fill this gap,
by analyzing the vulnerabilities in a highly developed country, namely Japan, and more specifi-
cally one of the most highly urbanized areas of the world, the capital Tokyo (cf. Chapter 5.2.1).
Exposure
Adger (2006, 270) describes exposure as “the nature and degree to which a system experiences
environmental or socio-political stress” and also points out that these are closely related to the
characteristics of hazard or threat under consideration (Burton, Kates, and White 1993; Gravley
2001). Definitions such as Cutter (1996) and Cutter et al. (2003) who regard exposure as the only
aspect of vulnerability appear short-sighted, since they neglect the inherent mechanisms of the
affected environmental or social  systems to cope with the disaster,  their  “resistance”,  and to
recover from its negative impacts, their “resilience”. Adger also points out that “vulnerability is a
dynamic phenomenon […] since the biophysical and social processes that shape local conditions
[i.e. the exposure] and the ability to cope [i.e. the resistance] are themselves dynamic.” (Adger
2006, 274)
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I argue that the dynamic of exposure toward a certain hazard is not only temporal in nature,
but also spatial. In the definition of exposure within this study I once again follow the UNISDR,
which describes it as “people, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that
are  thereby  subject  to  potential  losses”  (United  Nations  International  Strategy  for  Disaster
Reduction 2009, 15) In my  operationalization (see Chapter  5.3) I  also rely on the measures
suggested by the UNISDR, namely the number of people and the types of assets in an area(2009,
15).
Resistance
What I call “resistance” in the scope of this study has also been labelled by many other terms in
the hazards literature. The IPCC speaks of “sensitivity” when referring to “the degree to which a
system will  respond to a  given change in climate,  including beneficial  and harmful  effects”
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001, 89). Adger goes along the same lines when
defining it as “the degree to which a system is modified or affected by perturbations”  (2006,
270). Both definitions focus on the ex post, i.e. changes a system will undergo as a result of the
exposure to a disaster.
Both sources also mention the “adaptive capacity”, which Adger defines as “the ability of a
system to  evolve  in  order  to  accommodate  environmental  hazards  or  policy  change  and  to
expand the range of variability with which it can cope” (2006, 270), while the IPCC speaks of
“the degree to which adjustments in practices, processes, or structures can moderate or offset the
potential for damage or take advantage of opportunities created by a given change in climate”
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001, 89). Here the focus is on the ex ante, i.e. the
preparedness of a system towards a disaster.
In addition I also feel the need for the inclusion of a more engineering-related dimension of
resistance, i.e. the actual structural resistance of an object (e.g. a building, a human, or a lifeline)
towards a certain stress, inflicted by a disaster. The FEMA discusses these topics in great detail,
especially in regard to the threat of terrorist attacks  (Federal Emergency Management Agency
2003a; 2003b; 2004; 2009).
My understanding  of  resistance  contains  all  three  aspects,  the  preparedness  prior  to  the
disaster,  the response afterwards,  and the engineering dimension.  I  therefore define it  as the
degree to which social structure and engineering guidelines can lower the potential for damage
and improve the results of the outcome of a disaster.
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Resilience
“Resilience” is defined by the UNISDR as
the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accom-
modate  to  and  recover  from the  effects  of  a  hazard  in  a  timely  and  efficient  manner,
including  through  the  preservation  and  restoration  of  its  essential  basic  structures  and
functions. […] The resilience of a community in respect to potential hazard events is deter-
mined by the degree to which the community has the necessary resources and is capable of
organizing  itself  both  prior  to  and  during  times  of  need.  (United  Nations  International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2009, 24)
This interpretation aims on the main aspect of restoring the status of a system to that prior to
the disaster impact. It overlaps to a certain degree with “response”, which UNISDR defines as
the provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after  a
disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic
subsistence needs of the people affected. (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction 2009, 24–25)
The focus here is more on the immediate response, whereas resilience relates more general to
the post-disaster recovery process.
Bouchon lists three interpretations of resilience from different scientific fields: in physics and
engineering resilience refers to the physical property of a material to return to its original shape
after deformation; in psychology it is used to describe the ability of people to cope with stress
and catastrophes; and in business terms resilience denotes the ability of an organization to sustain
the impact of a business interruption and to resume operation (Bouchon 2006, 69).
In the scope of this study I understand resilience, following closely the UNISDR definition
above, as the degree to which a social system and its components (humans, built-up structures,
processes) can be restored from the negative impact of a disaster in a short amount of time.
Attractiveness
Natural disasters follow the laws of nature, in their type, location, magnitude and frequency. For
example,  earthquakes  are  more  likely  to  occur  and  generally  stronger  in  tectonically  active
regions, whereas tropical cyclones are more frequent and stronger in the regions 20 degrees north
and south of the equator  (Henderson-Sellers et al. 1998, 21). Also, natural hazards possess no
inherent malignancy, which makes them aim specifically at vulnerable populations or areas. The
mechanisms that cause them are generally well understood and operationalized, which makes
most of them predictable to a certain degree (Burton, Kates, and White 1993, 30ff).
The same can not be said for crime and terrorism on the other hand. Acts of crime are mostly
the result of a decision making process (McCormick 2003) that aims at the maximum possible
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outcome at the minimum necessary investment, both in terms of material value and risk (Ayyub,
McGill, and Kaminskiy 2007). One possible target might be more attractive to a certain terrorist
than another target, due to its characteristics, e.g. easier accessibility or a lower level of security
measures in place (Li et al. 2009; NRC 2002; Ozer and Akbaş 2011; Perry et al. 2013; Rusnak et
al. 2012; Sandler and Enders 2007; Shahar 2005; Tsamboulas and Moraiti 2008). Savitch and
Ardashev use the term “target-proneness”, which they define as “the incentives or values within
a city that make it attractive to attack.” (Savitch and Ardashev 2001, 2525) The concept of “con-
sequences” by Willis as “the magnitude and type of damage resulting from successful terrorist
attacks”  (Willis  2005, 8f) goes along the same lines,  since these consequences  are  what the
perpetrators usually are striving to maximize.
In the context of a screening methodology for buildings to evaluate terrorism risk the FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009) suggests a number of building characteristics
that affect its attractiveness. They are in large parts congruent to what Garrick and colleagues
write about the attractiveness of targets: “to a terrorist, civilian populations; targets of historical,
cultural, and national significance; and infrastructure that underpins the [normal] way of life are
all 'fair game.'” (Garrick et al. 2004, 131)
Paté-Cornell and Guikema point out that determining the attractiveness of possible targets for
terrorist attacks “based on intent, chances of success given intent, and attractiveness from the
point of view of the perpetrators” (Paté-Cornell and Guikema 2002, 5) can be a useful means for
prioritization of mitigation activities and the necessary funding (U.S. General Accounting Office
1998). The same point is argued by Caplan and Kennedy (2010a) in the more general context of
crime when they state that it “is more manageable for police agencies […] to allocate resources
to places that are most attractive to motivated offenders and to where crime is most likely to
occur given certain characteristics of the environment” (2010a, 22).
I argue that regarding the threat of terrorism the attractiveness is the most important aspect of
a target's susceptibility to become the target of a terrorist attack. As I explain in Chapter 2.1.2, I
further believe that it is the most critical dimension in terrorism-related vulnerability analysis.
For the scope of this study I define attractiveness as the characteristics of a potential target that
make it  appear  promising to  the perpetrator  regarding the successful execution of a  planned
attack.
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2.3.3. Disaster Model and Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept
Following the definitions of the core terms of hazard and disaster research in the previous chap-
ter I developed the disaster model as shown in Figure 1. This disaster model is the foundation of
the research within study and will be referred to throughout.
Furthermore I developed a concept of vulnerability that is based on the activities of humans
(Fig. 2).  It  is  a spatially grounded causal loop that  puts humans and threats in  relation.  The
underlying assumption is that humans perform activities which then shape the environment they
are performed in. By doing so, a variety of spaces are created: densely populated urban, sparsely
populated  rural  and  (nearly)  empty  natural  ones.  All  have  some importance  to  the  humans
interacting with them and within them. In other words these spaces start to represent certain
values, which are recognized as such by the humans who created the values by their actions in
the first place. This is the first casual loop within this concept. It is important to notice that these
values are not assigned uniformly to the different types of spaces. Also this assignment of values
can be assumed to differ widely among different groups of humans, based on their cultural and
sociodemographic backgrounds.
On the other hand, the environment is not only shaped by human actions but also affected by
certain threats and hazards. These will also have direct impact on the various spaces created by
the aforementioned human activities. The values that these spaces are believed to represent are
what creates their vulnerabilities. Therefore the generation of a disaster does not only require a
threat or hazard to materialize, but also the existence of values as recognized by the affected
humans. It is only then that these humans are actually put at risk by this particular disaster.
2.3.4. Spatial Vulnerability Analysis
Over the past three decades the interest in the spatial analysis of vulnerability has emerged
and produced a reasonable body of literature. It is based largely on the works of Cutter and
Solecki (1989) who proposed the Hazards of Place Model (Fig. 3) built upon the theory of the
hazardousness of places by Hewitt and Burton (1971). Cutter explains it as
a useful heuristic in understanding the diverse elements that contribute to our understanding
of the vulnerability of places. There is an explicit focus on locality within this conceptual
framework, for it is place that forms the fundamental unit of analysis for any geographer.
(Cutter 1996, 535f)
Cutter and colleagues  (2003, 243) introduced the concept of “place inequalities” which are
reflected in characteristics of communities and the built-up environment and further contribute to
other already well-understood social vulnerabilities. They also fostered the spatial analysis of
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Figure 1: Disaster model used in this study.
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Figure 2: Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept
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Source: Cutter et al. (2003, 244)
Figure 3: Hazards of Place Model
social  vulnerabilities  of  places  in  a  quantitive  way,  and  also  the  comparative  analysis  of
vulnerabilities of various places.
Yet,  all  studies  based  on  the  Hazards  of  Place  Model and  the  aforementioned  place
inequalities have two shortcomings: first,  they are all focused exclusively on natural hazards
(Cutter 1996; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Luers et al.
2003; O’Brien, Sygna, and Haugen 2004; O’Brien, Leichenko, et al. 2004; Peterson 2002) with
the  notable  exception  of  Cutter  and Solecki  (1989);  second,  they used  rather  coarse  spatial
scales, as 3 shows. Cutter and Solecki (1989) even violated the concept of using the place as the
unit of analysis and resorted to an incident-based analysis altogether.
Cutter et al. (2008, 601) also point out the dependency of the scale and unit of analysis of the
underlying processes and hazards and how different spatial scales also require different factors
and data sources to  allow for meaningful  conclusions.  In this  context  Turner  and colleagues
stated that even hazards created by processes on a global scale create locational variations in
vulnerability, which emphasizes the importance of place-based analysis, as it “implies a spatially
continuous  distinctive  'ensemble'  of  human  and  biophysical  conditions  or  coupled  human-
environment systems” (Turner et al. 2003, 8076).
2.3.5. Significance of Vulnerability in Urban Areas
In the explanation of his rationale for a geographical study of vulnerability in urban areas Uitto
points out that such an approach has to utilize knowledge that a multitude of disciplines have
generated in the past, such as urban geography and planning, hazard research, sociology and
anthropology (Uitto 1998, 14). Along the same lines Eriksen and colleagues argue that the key to
understand vulnerability lies in the interaction between social dynamics and a social-ecological
system and that “at the most abstract level, […] vulnerability can be viewed as a function of the
interaction of processes at a given place in time” (Eriksen, Brown, and Kelly 2005, 302).
In accordance to the Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I introduce in Chapter 2.3.3
the most important reason to analyze the vulnerabilities of urban areas in particular is the large
number of values that humans recognize here. The United Nations (UN) Habitat report State of
the World's Cities 2012/13 labelled cities as the “homes of prosperity”:
Cities are where human beings find satisfaction of basic needs and essential public goods.
Where various products can be found in sufficiency and their utility enjoyed. Cities are also
where  ambitions,  aspirations  and other  intangible  aspects  of  life  are  realized,  providing
contentment and happiness and increasing the prospects of individual and collective well-
being. (United Nations 2012, 4)
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Table 3: Different spatial spatial scales of spatial 
vulnerability analyses in the literature.
Publication Spatial resolution
Cutter and Solecki (1989) (event based)
Cutter et al. (2000) US census blocks
Cutter et al. (2003) US counties
Luers et al. (2003) 30 * 30 m matrix
Metzger et al. (2005) 10 * 10 arcmin matrix
0.5 * 0.5 deg matrix
O'Brien et al. (2004) India districts
O'Brien et al. (2004) Norway nation
Norway regions
Norway municipalities
Peterson (2002) 60 * 60 m matrix
All aspects of contemporary life can be fulfilled in cities: to work, to play, and to live. The
“urban millennium” began—at the latest—a few years ago, when for the first time in history
more people lived in cities than in rural areas (UN 2012, 25).
It  should  therefore  not  surprise  that  those  prosperous  urban  agglomerations  and  the
importance they have on our daily lives also introduce a great number of vulnerabilities to a
variety of hazards. It  is  not only the sheer number of objects  at  risk, which carry important
values, but also their spatial layout. As a result I focus on the highly urbanized city centers in this
study. As I explain in Chapter 5.2.1 the study area used in this study is located in one of the most
populous and also most densely populated areas of the world (Tokyo Metropolitan Government
2012, 7). In addition to the large population figures Tokyo plays an important role as political,
economic, and cultural center, not only within Japan but also in the global context of world cities
(Sassen 2001; Sassen 2005).
In the context of terrorism Savitch and Ardashev point out many of the implications that risk
and vulnerabilities have on urban areas, and why “cities have become the stage on which this
tragic drama is played” (Savitch and Ardashev 2001, 2516). They mention the target-richness of
cities; their role as economic, communication, and transportation network hubs; the social plural-
ism of  heterogenous  social  groups in  close  proximity;  and also  their  symbolic  value  as  the
underlying reasons. Statistical analyses show that there have been more terrorist attacks in urban
than in rural areas, but that they have also been more violent in terms of injuries, fatalities and
structural damage. In the postscript to their paper Savitch and Ardashev aptly sum up the terrorist
attacks of September 11th 2001 in New York:
All told, the terrorists had killed more than 5500 people; they injured many more thousands
and they wrought incalculable damage. […] they managed to shut down the stock market for
the longest period in its history. For a time, Lower Manhattan was left without telephone
service and without water, gas and electric power. The nation's air transport was paralysed
and pushed to the brink of bankruptcy;  stock markets around the world accelerated their
downward spiral and economies faltered. The President of the United States declared the
attack to be 'an act of war' and mobilised military forces for action abroad. […] The attack on
just 16 acres of one of the world’s greatest cities made this possible and its shock waves
changed the course of international events. (Savitch and Ardashev 2001, 2530f)
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3 Research Objectives
In this part of the study I make an attempt to explain the objectives of my research about the
vulnerability to terrorism in urban areas. I first give a summary of the original problem state-
ment: What are the reasons for starting this research? What are the questions I want to answer,
the problems I want to solve? I then state the three basic hypotheses I postulate in this study
before setting the aims of this research and covering what I expect to be the outcome of this
research. Finally I provide my assessment about which audiences it is targeted at and how they
can benefit from it.
3.1. Problem Statement
As I explain above there is a scarcity in scholarly debate and publications about the geographical
analysis  of  vulnerabilities  as  well  as  of  terrorism in general.4 The  two most  comprehensive
analyses  of the research literature about  terrorism are the report  by Lum et  al.  (2006),  who
surveyed over 14,000 relevant publications, and by Schmid (2011, 457–474). They showed “that
only 3-4% of them were based on studies that employed some type of empirical analysis on
terrorism data or information” (Cynthia Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006, 491f) and pointed out
that “in the absence of empirical data, much of the literature is purely speculative and relies on
secondary sources, which are often unreliable […]. Theory is hampered by inability to utilize
much closed-source data.” (Schmid 2011, 468)
This is even more so in the field of geographical analysis of terrorism. Schmid mentions,
among many other  shortcomings  and  research desiderata that  “there is  an  essential  need to
understand the terrorists' operational environment (to know their modus operandi and targeting
patterns)” (Schmid 2011, 468). Moreover, to my best knowledge the topic of terrorism vulnera-
bility has not been discussed hitherto from a spatial perspective, at least on a micro-scale within
urban areas. Notable exceptions are the recent papers by Rusnak and colleagues (2012) and Perry
et  al.  (2013),  who analyzed terrorism and the underlying processes on finer  spatial  scales.  I
believe that there are certain characteristics of terrorist attacks that make an analysis on even
more  precise spatial  resolutions  necessary and meaningful.  These are  rooted in  the decision
making  process  that  precedes  all  terrorist  activities.  First  is  the  perpetrator's  motivation.
McCormick  cites  two  essential  types  of  terrorism  movements  from  the  historic  terrorism
research literature: the “rationalists”, who regard terrorist attacks a means to an end, a tool to
communicate  their  matter  and  raise  attention  to  their  cause;  and  the  “expressionists”,  who
understand terrorism as a way for individual expression and redemptive act (McCormick 2003,
31
477). Both mindsets require a clearly defined goal which it is imperative to reach, and an enemy
whom it is essential to fight and ultimately to conquer.
Second  is  the  image  and  the  communicative  dimension  of  terrorism.  An  early  French
anarchist is quoted by Leites  (1979, 3) saying “if my protest does not attract a scandal which
forcibly attracts attention to my grievances, it is as if I am not complaining at all”. Similarly,
Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri,  then  al-Qaeda's operational and strategic commander,
purportedly wrote in a letter to al-Qaeda's head in Iraq at the time: “I say to you, that we are in a
battle. And more than half of this battle is in the battlefield of the media.”  (RAND Center for
Terrorism Risk Management Policy 2011, from 29:58). These quotes show the importance of the
symbolism of terrorist attacks, and also how well understood it is by the perpetrators. From the
earliest beginnings of terrorism it played a central role what Chaliand and Blin describe as the
“psychological element” in their view of terrorism as a strategy of insurgence: the propaganda of
the deed:
This meant that the terrorist act was the best herald of the need to overthrow the regime and
the torch that would light the way to doing it. The revolutionary terrorists hoped that their
attacks  would  thus  transform  them  from  a  small  conspiratorial  club  into  a  massive
revolutionary  movement.  […]  Whereas  the  earlier  practitioners  were  careful  to  choose
symbolic targets, such as heads of state and infamous oppressive governors and ministers, in
order to draw attention to the justification of their cause, the more recent brand has turned to
indiscriminate attacks aiming to cause multiple casualties. In doing so, they have exchanged
the  propaganda  value  of  justification  for  greater  shock  value,  ensuring  massive  media
coverage. (Chaliand and Blin 2007, 33)
Lastly, it must not be forgotten that terrorists do not have unlimited resources at their hands,
no different from national governments and supra-national organizations:
Terrorist  groups  are  small.  Their  membership  ranges  from a  few  individuals  to  several
thousands, and the majority number from the tens to a few hundreds. Even the weakest of
governments  has  a  fighting  force  immensely larger  than  that  of  the  terrorist  insurgents.
Under such circumstances, the insurgents cannot expect to win the struggle in any physical
way. (Chaliand and Blin 2007, 33)
This calls for an organized strategy and well-planned activities on the part of the perpetrators.
Yet, from the perspective of those under attack it also means that the actions of the terrorists
might not be as unpredictable as they are often believed to be. If their goals and their  modus
operandi are understood, it should be possible to make educated assumptions about their most
likely next targets.
I  believe  that  these  three  underlying  aspects  of  the  terrorists'  decision  making,  the
communicative dimension of terrorism, and the terrorists' limited resources can be employed in
the context of the  Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I introduce in Chapter  2.3.3. I
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further believe that any spatial analysis of a vulnerability grounded in this value-based frame-
work has  to  be  performed on a  micro-scale  basis  in  order  to  be  meaningful.  These  beliefs,
together with my academic background in the spatial analysis of human-induced processes in
urban areas led me to the three hypotheses I am postulating in the following chapter.
3.2. Hypotheses
(1) Vulnerability is not distributed equally over space and time.
I earlier quoted Laqueur's  (2001, 5) opinion that terrorism can occur anywhere in Chapter
2.1.3 and also made my point why I do not believe that this is correct. It certainly  can occur
anywhere, but chances are it will not. This is a result of the three aspects of terrorists' decision
making, which I explain in the previous chapter. Based on these, some locations make–from a
terrorist's  point  of  view–“more  sense”  to  place  an  attack  than  others.  As  a  result,  a  varied
landscape of vulnerability exists, which contains both places with high vulnerability and places
with low vulnerability.
(2) Factors exist that enhance or mitigate vulnerability.
The aforementioned aspects that structure the terrorists' decision making process are reflected
in the values of those under attack (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). If the aims, strategy and abilities–finan-
cially and in terms of possible attack types–of a certain terrorist group are known, those values
can  be  evaluated  as  “vulnerability  factors”.  Furthermore,  these  vulnerability  factors  can  be
operationalized as attributes of the objects at risk: humans, buildings, and infrastructures (cf.
Chapter 4.1).
(3) Vulnerabilities of objects influence their spatial surroundings.
Especially when working on a small spatial scale it is imperative to regard all objects not only
in their semantic, but also in their spatial context. It would be misleading to evaluate a single
object detached from its systemic and spatial environment. Rinaldi and colleagues define four
types of interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographic, and logical (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and
Kelly 2001, 14ff). Some of these only occur within infrastructural networks, but every object in
space is affected by objects in its surroundings and will reciprocally also affect objects in its
surroundings. This is what Caplan and Kennedy termed “spatial influence” in the formulation of
their  Risk Terrain Modeling methodology  (Caplan and Kennedy 2010a; Caplan and Kennedy
2010b) I adopted the use of this term, which I explain in great detail in Chapter 4.2.3.
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3.3. Research Aims
The starting point for this research was the desire to develop a methodology to quantify how
prone a location is to a certain kind of terrorist attack (cf. Chapter 4.2.1 for the definition of these
scenarios), as a result of the attributes of the objects at this location. I believe that there is, on the
one hand, a need for such insight, especially on a fine spatial resolution, and on the other hand a
scarcity of scientific activity in this direction (cf. Chapter 3.1).
Many risk-based analyses, both in the context of natural and man-made hazards, follow a top-
down approach.  They start  from the assumption of a certain disaster and its  occurrence and
recurrence probabilities, and continue with an assessment of the losses that can be expected in
the case of such a disaster at a certain location. One popular end product of such analyses are the
widespread hazard maps that show the spatial characteristics of a certain disaster, for example a
tsunami or an earthquake. I believe that these top-down approaches, while certainly having their
right to exist, can only provide limited information about the actual situation of a location facing
a certain hazard. This is due to the fact that this approach requires  a priori knowledge about
where  and  when  the  disaster  will  strike  and  detailed  information  about  its  magnitude  and
duration. As I explain in Chapter  2.1.2, this kind of probabilistic information is generally not
available in the context of crime and terrorism.
Therefore I am proposing a bottom-up approach in this study, following the ideas of Bran-
tingham and Brantingham  (1995; 1981) of an “environmental backcloth”,  which I explain in
detail in Chapter 4.1. The unit of analysis in my research is therefore the geographical space, not
the specific outcome of a singular disastrous event. I operationalize the vulnerabilities of loca-
tions using the characteristics of the objects that define these locations.
Also, in the course of this research I expect to gain insight in the definition of these object
attributes and factors that affect terrorism vulnerability in urban areas. Similar analyses have
been undertaken in the realm of spatial  crime risk analysis  by Caplan and Kennedy  (2010a;
2010b) in the course of their proposed Risk Terrain Modeling methodology. Similar to the risk
terrain  maps  by  Caplan  and  Kennedy  my  research  allows  for  the  creation  of  micro-scale
vulnerability maps to visualize the spatial distribution of single vulnerability factors as well as
overall terrorism vulnerability in highly urbanized areas.
The main goal of this study is to develop both a theoretical framework for the analysis of ter-
rorism vulnerability in highly urbanized areas and quantitatively rooted spatio-temporal metho-
dologies that allow to operationalize terrorism vulnerability for subsequent empirical analyses.
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3.4. Target Audience
The  outcome  and  insights  gained  in  this  study  are  of  interest  for  a  number  of  audiences:
academia, involved stakeholders, and the general public.
As I illustrate in the preceding chapter, this research, while grounded in existing theories,
research practices and methodologies, is novel in its combination of a bottom-up vulnerability-
based approach, terrorism vulnerability analysis and the application of spatial analysis tools. This
unique  combination  provides  an  interesting  synthesis  of  urban geography,  social  geography,
behavioral studies, political studies, and hazard, disaster, risk and vulnerability studies. I hope
that this interdisciplinary character will allow for anybody involved in one of the aforementioned
realms to gain a more holistic view on this important yet academically underrepresented topic.
In Chapter 3.1 I mention the limited resources at the hands of the perpetrators that affect their
decision making. The same is true for the opposite side, too, where those in responsibility for
objects, that might become the target of a terrorist attack, have to decide how to use their limited
funds to the optimal effect. As Willis writes:
Ultimately, efficient allocation of homeland security resources would be determined based
upon assessment of the cost effectiveness of alternative risk-reduction opportunities. After
potentially first addressing obvious and easily mitigated risks, this requires understanding the
cost effectiveness of different types and amounts of investment. Neither the methods nor the
data are available to answer questions about  the effectiveness of available risk-reduction
alternatives or to  determine reasonable minimum standards  for  community preparedness.
Until these questions are answered, allocating homeland security resources based on risk is
the  next  best  approach  since  areas  at  higher  risk  are  likely  to  have  more  and  larger
opportunities for risk reduction than areas at lower risk. That is, resources would be allocated
roughly proportionally to  the  distribution  of  risk  across  areas  receiving  funding.  (Willis
2005, xvf)
I believe that the vulnerability-based approach presented in this study can help mitigate the
shortcomings  of  current  risk-based  analyses.  This  would  allow governments,  municipalities,
building owners and network providers to identify the most vulnerable elements and start miti-
gating those attributes that cause the vulnerabilities. Previous studies have shown the effective-
ness of such an approach (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; Karydas and Gifun 2006; Lemon 2004;
Michaud 2005; Morgan et al. 2000; Patterson and Apostolakis 2007).
Lastly, yet equally important, I believe that the vulnerability maps produced in the course of
this research can be beneficial in the task of communicating the abstract concept of vulnerability
to a broad audience in the general public. As the proverb goes, “a picture says a thousand words”
I hope to be able to provide an opportunity for insight into the processes that create vulnerability
to terrorism and how it is distributed in space to the general public.
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4 Analysis Framework
In this chapter I introduce the conceptual framework for the  spatio-temporal terrorism vulne-
rability analysis, which also forms the theoretical underpinnings for the applied study I present in
Chapter 5.
Before discussing the individual components of the framework I present the objects that this
framework covers in Chapter 4.1 and the resulting spatial scale of my analysis. I go on to point
out the importance of the definition of attack scenarios as a prerequisite of using the analysis
framework in  Chapter  4.2.1.  I  then describe in  more detail  my spatial  vulnerability analysis
framework and its different components: starting from the idea of vulnerability factors, which I
briefly introduce in the context of my hypotheses in Chapter  3.2, I discuss their selection in
Chapter 4.2.2, I continue with explaining the concept of spatial influence in Chapter 4.2.3 before
finishing with a description of both the process of assigning weights to represent the varying
importance of the single vulnerability factors, and visualizing their spatial distributions as well as
that of overall vulnerability using maps in Chapter 4.2.4.
4.1. Objects and Spatial Scale
The main purpose of the framework I introduce in this study is to put the abstract concept of
terrorism vulnerability into its spatial context in the real world and to make it quantifiable. As I
mention in the context of my three main hypotheses in Chapter  3.2 I do this by analyzing the
attributes of real-world objects to operationalize certain vulnerability factors.
Many of the ideas and methods as well as the underlying thought processes and assumptions I
am relying on and using in my framework have been developed in the sociological and (later)
geographical  analysis  of  crime.  Since terrorist  attacks  constitute  a special  type of crime (cf.
Chapter 2.1), this is a legitimate deduction.
The idea of analyzing crime in the context of space rather than individual criminality is not
new: for example Shevky (1972) wrote about the application of social area analysis to the task of
assigning social  attributes  to  urban areas  in  order  to  be  able  to  describe  their  propensity to
disorder and crime. Similarly Abbott pointed out
that Chicago [i.e. the Chicago School of sociology] felt that no social fact makes any sense
abstracted from its context in social (and often geographic) space and social time. Social
facts are located. [...] Every social fact is situated, surrounded by other contextual facts and
brought into being by a process relating it to past context. (Abbott 1997, 1152)
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Following this idea, many scholars have emphasized the place-based nature of criminogenic
opportunities under different names: “routine activity theory”, “opportunity theory”, “environ-
mental backcloth”, and “criminal event perspective” (Block and Block 1995; Brantingham and
Brantingham 1995; Cohen et al. 1981; Eck 2001; Eck 2006; Mears, Scott, and Bhati 2007; Sacco
2002). In my framework I am following the rationale by Brantingham and Brantingham which
Caplan and Kennedy summarize as follows:
They referred to the “environmental backcloth” that emerges from the confluence of routine
activities and physical structures overlaying urban areas. The Brantinghams suggest that this
backcloth is dynamic and, importantly, can be influenced by the forces of “crime attractors”
and “crime generators”—both of which contribute to the existence of hotspots. Attractors are
those specific things that attract offenders to places in order to commit crime. Generators
refer to the greater opportunities for crime that emerge from the collection of more people
into areas simply as a result of the increased volume of interaction taking place in these
areas. (Caplan and Kennedy 2010b, 11–12)
Accordingly, the vulnerability factors that my framework uses are operationalizations of these
crime attractors and crime generators, only in the specific context of terrorist activities.
Caplan and Kennedy (2010a; 2010b) and their research group at the Rutgers Center on Public
Security (RCPS) at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice in Newark, NJ, have also
been amongst the first to approach these concepts and empirical findings by the use of geospatial
data and geographic information systems. In the course of this research they developed a crime
analysis methodology called Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM), which they describe as
an approach to spatial risk assessment that utilizes a geographic information system (GIS) to
attribute qualities of the real world to places on a digitized map. It operationalizes the spatial
influence of crime factors to common geographic units, then combines separate map layers
together  to  produce  risk  terrain  maps  showing  the  compounded  presence,  absence,  or
intensity of all factors at every location throughout the landscape. Risk terrain maps show
places where conditions are conducive for certain events to occur in the future based on the
environmental context for criminogenesis. (Caplan and Kennedy 2010a, 11)
The RTM methodology allows for better strategic decision-making and operational policing
by the involved stakeholders than any retrospect approach such as hotspot maps of crimes or
terrorist activities ever can, due to the forecasting character of its output. This especially useful
in  the  case  of  terrorism,  which  tends  to  happen  only  rarely  and  hence  does  not  produce  a
significant number of past data to elaborate on. This is one of the most critical aspects of the
approach  I  also  employ in  this  study:  “While  prediction  methods  focus  on  the  presence  or
absence  of  an  event,  risk  assessments  using  RTM  focus  on  the  dynamic  conditions  of  the
environment where a crime could occur. The unit of analysis is the geography, not the event.”
(Caplan and Kennedy 2010b, 29)
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As I  point  out  in  Chapter  2.3.4 previous  attempts  to  spatially analyze  vulnerability  have
always used rather coarse spatial resolutions (cf.  3). Since my analysis is supposed to provide
insights  into the vulnerability distribution inside highly urbanized areas (cf.  Chapter  5.2.1) I
decided  that  it  would  only  make  sense  to  do  so  on  a  micro-scale.  Caplan  and  Kennedy
recommend a cell size of 100 * 100 ft (30.48 m) as reasonably small regarding the application
purpose while accommodating computational limitations:
100x100 foot cells were the smallest area that our computers could process reasonably fast
and, for the purposes of this risk terrain model, if a risk terrain map could assess the risk of
shootings at small (but reasonable) geographic units (e.g. 2 inches would be unreasonable
since a person cannot even fit in that space), it would provide the most utility for operational
policing compared to larger, less specific, units of analysis. (Caplan and Kennedy 2010b, 48)
I decided to use 10 * 10 m grid cells in my analysis, since I believe that this allows for a more
meaningful analysis in my highly urbanized and densely built-up study area (cf. Chapter 5.2.1).
My Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept (cf. Chapter  2.3.3) postulates that the vul-
nerability  factors  themselves  are  spatial  operationalizations  of  the  underlying  processes
happening within urbanized areas as result of the activities that people pursue there. It therefore
suggests itself  to  perform an analysis  of  these activities  on a  per-person basis  to  derive the
inherent processes. The activities themselves manifest in the real world both in the form of a
precise geolocation of each person, i.e. a pair of X- and Y-coordinates, and by the places that
these people populate. Since detailed data about the exact positions of all people within a fairly
large study area is impossible to obtain and impractical to process, I resort to more generalized
spatial units instead: buildings on the one hand and public space like streets or the train network
on the other. Stationary activities, i.e. such that require the actor to stay in one location for a
certain elongated period of time, generally take place inside buildings. Examples are “being at
home” and “working at the office”. In contrast, transportation activities and short-term activities
tend to take place in public space.  Examples here are “commuting on the train” or “grocery
shopping at the supermarket”.5
In addition to the spatial dimension of crime and the underlying criminogenic factors Caplan
and Kennedy also elaborate on the temporal dimension: “Risk terrain modeling makes it clear
that understanding the spatial-temporal interaction effects of certain qualities of space is key to
assessing emergent criminogenic risks.” (2010a, 19) Thereby they refer to the changes that the
criminogenic factors undergo over the course of time, which makes it necessary to revisit the
same forecasting analyses time and time again. In my analysis I go even further in accommo-
dating temporal variations by introducing a temporal dimension into the vulnerability factors
themselves (cf. Chapters 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 5.3.3).
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4.2. Components
Figure 4 shows the complete framework for the spatial analysis of vulnerability as a flowchart.
Before explaining all the single components in detail in the upcoming chapters, I want to point
out four peculiarities first.
First, I formulated the framework itself and the single components as generic as possible. This
also shows that while the framework has been developed in the context of terrorism vulnerability
analysis, it is also applicable to the analysis of vulnerabilities to other threats, such as earth-
quakes, tsunamis, crime, etc.
Second, the flow chart reveals two different types of data sources: “hard” data and “soft” data.
The former comprises all kinds of qualitative and numeric data that can be stored in some kind of
digital file or database system. The latter describes input at the discretion of the analyst. These
decisions are based on subjective judgements, but affect the computational process significantly.
The thought process behind the selection of vulnerability factors is explained in Chapter 4.2.2,
the definition of the type and range of spatial  influence in Chapter  4.2.3,  and the weighting
involved in the vulnerability  mapping step is presented in Chapter  4.2.4. In addition, Chapters
5.3.1,  5.3.2,  5.3.3,  and  5.3.4 show the development  of actual  terrorism vulnerability factors,
Chapter  5.3.6 the  calculation  of  their  respective  spatial  influences,  and  Chapter  5.3.7 the
vulnerability mapping process in the course of an applied case study.
Third, the different representations of the factor maps in Figure 4 originate from two types of
vulnerability factors: those with a temporal dimension and those without. While the former (e.g.
factor 2) will produce only one vulnerability factor map, which is valid irrespective of the time
of day, the latter (e.g. factor 1) will produce a number of vulnerability factor maps, depending on
the selected temporal granularity. In the scope of the case study in Chapter 5, three factors have a
temporal dimension (stationary building population, mobile pedestrian population and mobile
railway population), while one factor does not (symbolic value).
Last, the number of data sources is not limited in any way, it is determined by the type and
complexity of the operationalized vulnerability factors. The same holds true for the number of
vulnerability factors, with certain limitations, as I explain in Chapter 4.2.2.
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Figure 4: Spatial vulnerability framework developed in this study as stylized workflow.
4.2.1. Scenario
Caplan and Kennedy mention in their introduction to the RTM workflow that
risk terrain modeling is a form of spatial risk assessment that is specific to the outcome event
of interest. […] This might sound impractical, but it is reasonable. For example, the causes
of bicycle thefts most likely differ from the causes of shootings, so you would not generally
combine bicycle theft and shooting events together to identify mutual risk factors. More
generally, it would not be reasonable to use a risk terrain map of murders to forecast the
locations of bicycle thefts because the risk factors for each differ.  (Caplan and Kennedy
2010b, 72)
The same holds true for the analysis  of terrorism vulnerability,  too. It is easy to see how
terrorist activities are always heavily influenced and determined by three factors, as I explain in
Chapter 2: 1) the goals of the terrorists as well as 2) the values of those under attack affect the
selection of targets for terrorist attacks; in addition, 3) the available means of the perpetrators
define their possible modus operandi, therefore limiting the number of outcome scenarios. The
determination of an attack scenario therefore has to be the very first step in the application of my
vulnerability  analysis  framework.  This  scenario  comprises  two  dimensions:  a)  the  exact
perpetrator and b) the mode and scale of attack. It heavily influences the input variables marked
as “soft” data in Figure 4, which I explain in detail in the following sections.
4.2.2. Vulnerability Factor Selection
The first step is the selection of meaningful vulnerability factors to operationalize the various
values  that  make  up  possible  attack  targets  for  the  respective  perpetrator.  For  example,
religiously  motivated  terrorists  might  be  interested  in  attacking  facilities  of  other  religious
organizations which they perceive to be infidels or profane. Opposed to that, environmentally
motivated activists might be aiming at offices or infrastructures by corporations they believe to
be  acting  in  ways  harmful  to  the  environment  or  responsible  for  an  environmental  disaster.
Accordingly, a suitable vulnerability factor for the former would be “existence of facilities of
hostile  religious  organizations”,  while  for  the  latter  it  would  be  “existence  of  buildings  or
infrastructures belonging to or related to malicious corporations”.
A number of points have to be kept in mind when selecting appropriate vulnerability factors
(Caplan and Kennedy 2010b, 77–84):
1) Only the most relevant vulnerability factors should find their way into the final analysis
process so not to generalize the outcome result too much.
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2) Vulnerability factors can be either  aggravating or  mitigating,  hence amplify an objects
vulnerability or ameliorate it.
3) The vulnerability factors have to be independent from each other, so as to avoid a bias or
overrepresentation of certain influences.
4) Sufficient quantitative data from reliable sources is necessary to successfully operationa-
lize the vulnerability factors (cf. Chapter 5.3).
I agree with all of these and put great attention to following these guidelines in the selection
and development of the vulnerability factors I used in the case study in Chapter 5.
4.2.3. Spatial Influence
The definition of the spatial influence of these vulnerability factors then allows to accommodate
for the varying spatial effect radii of different modes of attack and their scale. For example the
release of a poisonous substance will generally be confined to a certain area, mostly defined by
the existing air provision and ventilation systems.6 Outdoors the diffusion will be affected by
climatic conditions such as the wind speed and direction, and by the dilution characteristics of
the CBRN agent used as well as the released amount. Similarly an attack using explosives will
gain a different outcome according to the amount of explosives used (National Counterterrorism
Center 2012). In addition, the outcome result generated by an attack involving the release of a
poisonous substance will differ greatly from that involving the detonation of explosives.
Caplan and Kennedy advocate GIS as a tool to visualize the spatial influence of criminogenic
factors as “visual narratives of how environmental settings become conducive to crime” (2010a,
22). This allows analysts  to abandon the understanding of crime being initiated by the mere
existence or non-existence of a certain crime attractor or crime generator, as Brantingham and
Brantingham (1995; 1981) originally postulated, and instead to account for the influence of these
features to their environment:
The best  way to map crime factors  for the articulation of criminogenic  backcloths is  to
operationalize the spatial influence of each factor, acting as crime generators, throughout a
common landscape rather than atheoretically mapping the factors as points, lines or polygons
in  a  manner  that  keeps  them disconnected  from their  broader  social  and  environmental
contexts. (Caplan and Kennedy 2010a, 23)
Since the actual location of a terrorist attack does not necessarily have to coincide with the
exact pinpoint location of the vulnerable object I follow the suggestions by the original authors
of the RTM methodology to use one of two operationalizations of a factor's spatial influence: a)
spatial concentration and b) spatial proximity (Caplan and Kennedy 2010a, 25–26).7
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The former takes into account the fact that the spatial agglomeration of vulnerable objects
tends to increase the overall vulnerability of the space they comprise. In the context of terrorism
the presence of multiple attractive possible targets amplifies the attractiveness of this location,
and hence makes it more vulnerable to a terrorist attack. It is implemented in the computation
process as a kernel density estimation (KDE) to estimate the probability density function of the
vulnerable  objects.  The  search  bandwidth  of  the  KDE needs  to  be  chosen according to  the
respective vulnerability factor and can be defined separately for each factor.
The latter comes down to the effect radius of the chosen modus operandi as I outlined in the
beginning of this chapter. From the perpetrators' perspective a location is only suitable for an
attack if it is close enough to the actual target to affect it in the intended way and to the planned
degree. In GIS terminology this equates to the calculation of a buffer zone of a certain euclidian
distance from the vulnerable object. This distance needs to be chosen according to the respective
vulnerability factor and can be defined separately for each factor. Deviating from the original
RTM approach  I  decided  to  implement  gradually declining  buffers  instead  of  the  simplistic
dichotomous buffers  that  Caplan and Kennedy  (2010a;  2010b) use,  since this  represents  the
correlation  of  distance  and  vulnerability  more  accurately  than  a  pure  reproduction  of  the
presence or absence of a vulnerable asset within a certain radius.
4.2.4. Vulnerability Factor Weighting
The last aspect is the appropriate weighting of the single vulnerability factors according to their
assumed importance in the perpetrators' decision making process. This regards the selection of
their  targets  as  a  result  of  optimal  pursuance  of  their  goals  on the  one  hand,  and the  most
effective use of their available means on the other hand.
Since the RTM methodology employs raster maps to represent the spatial influences of the
single vulnerability factors, simple raster algebra can be used to combine the vulnerability factor
maps into one overall vulnerability map for the study area. I developed the following equation to
combine  the  factors  while  keeping  intact  their  temporal  dimension  and  at  the  same  time
assigning weights:
v t=∑
i∈F
w i⋅nSI i , t (1)
where vt is the total vulnerability value, F is the set of selected vulnerability factors,
wi is the weight of vulnerability factor  i,  nSIi,t is the normalized spatial  influence
value of vulnerability factor i at time t.
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This  helps  to  more  accurately  reproduce  the  underlying  decision-making  process  of  the
terrorists and the resulting choices made in the course of their selection of attack targets.
Four important points are to be kept in mind here:
1) This calculation has to be performed for all cells of the raster grid that makes up the study
area.
2) The weights wi of the vulnerability factors have to sum up to a total of 1 or 100%.
3) The calculation of the spatial influence of the single vulnerability factors might generate
results on different scales, i.e. the range of cell values of the resulting raster grids can vary.
Therefore they need to be normalized to a common scale. The range of this scale can be
chosen freely, i.e. [0,1], [0,100], and [0,255] are all valid choices.
4) In the case of vulnerability factors without a temporal dimension the vulnerability factor fi,0
has to be used for all time steps, representing the stationarity of the vulnerability factor it
operationalizes.
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5 Spatio-Temporal Analysis of Terrorism Vulnerability 
in Central Tokyo, Japan
5.1. Terrorism in Japan
Japan is unarguably not the first country that comes to mind when speaking about terrorism.
Before explaining the research I have undertaken in the course of this study in this chapter I will
therefore briefly explain my bipartite motivation for doing so nonetheless, by looking at the past
on the one hand, and at the present and (possible) future, on the other hand.
5.1.1. The Past
Japan has seen terrorist activities in the past and has even suffered from a number of attacks. The
START GTD  (National  Consortium for  the  Study of  Terrorism and Responses  to  Terrorism
2013f) lists  a  total  of  386  terrorist  incidents  in  Japan  between  1970  and  2009.  A temporal
analysis reveals five distinct eras of terrorism in Japan (cf. Fig. 5):
1) The years 1974 and 1975 were marked by 12 attacks by the  East Asia Anti  Japanese
Armed  Front  (EAAJAF),  a  leftist  group  inspired  by  anti-Japanese  anarchism.  They
conducted mainly smaller bombings of police facilities. Their  most atrocious and well-
known attack was the bombing of the Tokyo head office of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
which left eight dead and almost 400 injured.
2) The years 1977 through 1980 were also dominated by leftist groups. Most notable are the
Revolutionary  Workers'  Council  (Kakurokyo) and  the  Japan  Revolutionary  Communist
League  National  Committee  (Middle  Core  Faction,  Chukakuha),  purportedly  the  most
powerful Japanese anti-Stalinist far-left revolutionary groups, who organized violent riots
and whose terrorist activities consisted mainly of sabotage attacks and assassinations.
3) 1990  was  dominated  by  25  attacks  by  the  Japan  Revolutionary  Communist  League
National  Committee  (Middle  Core  Faction,  Chukakuha),  mainly  incendiary  attacks  on
transportation infrastructure and governmental institutions.
4) The highest number of victims in terms of both dead and injured occurred in the years
1994 and 1995 by the hand of  Aum Shinrikyo, a spiritual doomsday sect. Their deadliest
and  most  well-known  attack  happened  on  March  20th,  1995,  when  five  perpetrators
synchronously released poisonous sarin gas in subway carriages in the city center of Tokyo
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Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013f)
Figure 5: Number of terrorist incidents and the resulting numbers of fatalities and injured in Japan per 
year (1970-2009).
during the morning rush hour. This attack left 12 people dead and approximately 5,500
people injured (START 2013g). Yet, in the previous year they were also responsible for the
release of a smaller amount of sarin gas in the city of Matsumoto, which killed seven and
left 500 people injured.
5) The  peak  in  the  number  of  incidents  in  the  year  2000  originates  from a  number  of
radiological incidents that happened in June of that year. A single perpetrator by the name
of Tsugio Uchinishi mailed envelopes containing a radioactive substance to ten official
addresses in Tokyo: the Japanese Imperial Household Agency; the National Police Agency
(NPA); the National Public Safety Commission; the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT); the Ministry of Defense (MOD); the Japan Science and
Technology Agency (JST); the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE); the
Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA); the official residence of then Prime Minister
Mori; and the then Japanese Home Affairs Ministry (now Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications). The sender intended to warn government officials about illegal exports
of uranium to North Korea (Pate, Ackerman, and McCloud 2001).
Figure 6 shows the different target types that were affected by terrorist incidents, according to
the  GTD.  The  two  largest  groups  are  governmental,  and  military  targets  including  non-
governmental institutions (NGO) and the police (marked in blue), which together account for
43%  of  all  attacks,  and  infrastructural  targets  (airports  &  airlines,  food  or  water  supply,
telecommunication, transportation, and utilities) which account for 26.1% in total (marked in
orange).  Attacks  on  religious  organizations,  private  citizens,  the  media  and  educational
institutions appear to have played minor roles in the pursuance of the goals of terrorists in Japan.
One  finding  from the  GTD data  is  that  home-grown terrorism appears  to  have  been the
prevalent threat in the past: all but 201 attacks that are registered with an unknown perpetrator
have been committed by Japanese terrorist groups. The data also shows that only a few groups
have  been  declared  responsible  for  a  greater  number  of  attacks:  the  Japan  Revolutionary
Communist  League  National  Committee  (Middle  Core  Faction,  Chukakuha) committed  61
(15.8% of all attacks in Japan), the Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo) 24 (6.2%), the
East  Asia  Anti  Japanese  Armed  Front  (EAAJAF) 12  (3.1%),  and  the  doomsday  sect  Aum
Shinrikyo and Battle Flag (Senkiha), another left-wing terrorist group, eight attacks each (2.1%).
When  investigating  the  most  prevalent  modus  operandi of  terrorists  in  Japan  attacks  on
infrastructures and facilities and bombings are by far in the majority (Fig. 7). Correspondingly,
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Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013f)
Figure 6: Number of terrorist incidents in Japan (1970-2009) per target type.
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Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013f)
Figure 7: Terrorist incidents in Japan (1970-2009) by attack type.
incendiary devices  and explosive  materials  represent  the  majority of  weapons used in  these
terrorist attacks (Fig. 8). The fact that the use of CBRN weapons (6.2%) outnumbered the use of
firearms (4.1%) in the past is a worrisome development that should be monitored closely and
accounted for in future research and counterterrorism measures.
A geographic  analysis  by  place  name  of  the  attacks8 (4)  reveals  that  the  major  urban
agglomerations of Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama and Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe account for the majority
of incidents, namely 58.7% and 8.7%, respectively. Other populous cities, such as Nagoya and
Fukuoka also appear in the top ten of the list. Narita, the third-most attacked, is the municipality
that  contains  Narita  International  Airport. Its  construction  and  the  related  relocations  and
expropriations of local resident homeowners caused a large number of protests and violent riots.
Yokosuka, the ninth-most attacked, contains the  United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka, home
port for the United States Seventh Fleet and a military port by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force  (JMSDF),  which provoked terrorist  activities  by anti-US radicals,  mainly in  the early
1990s.
These descriptive analyses show that Japan is far from the widespread crime- and terrorism-
free image. In addition, Matsumoto  (2003, 28–29) and Hirose and Miyasaka  (2010) provide a
Japanese perspective on the history of terrorism in Japan. This eventful history over the past 40
years leads to the conclusion that there is a possibility of terrorist activities in the future, too. The
next section focuses on this outlook.
5.1.2. The Present and Future
The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) writes in an estimation on the threat of international
terrorism that Tokyo had been named by Osama bin Laden a possible target for Islamist terrorists
due to the large number of US-related institutions.9 In addition it deems the high number of
foreigners living in and traveling though Tokyo as a potential opportunity for Islamist extremists
to exploit the international community to procure funds and equipment for terrorist activities and
for the radicalization of young people  (Metropolitan Police Department 2012a) As a result the
Anti-Terrorism Partnership  Tokyo  (ANTEP)  was  founded  in  2008  to  foster  collaboration  of
administrative  organs  and private  corporations  in  the  prevention  of  terrorist  activities  in  the
Metropolitan Area (Metropolitan Police Department 2012b). Its six main goals are:
1) the implementation of joint training, 
2) the implementation of joint patrol campaigns, 
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Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013f)
Figure 8: Terrorist incidents in Japan (1970-2009) by weapon type.
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Table 4: Terrorist incidents in Japan (1970-2009) by location.
City Incidents % City Incidents %
Tokyo 199 54.1 Isesaki 1 0.3
Osaka 21 5.7 Ishibayashi 1 0.3
Narita 17 4.6 Ishikawa 1 0.3
Yokohama 14 3.8 Iwakuni 1 0.3
Kyoto 11 3.0 Izumo 1 0.3
Nagoya 8 2.2 Kamagaya 1 0.3
Chiba 6 1.6 Kariya 1 0.3
Nara 6 1.6 Kashihara 1 0.3
Yokosuka 6 1.6 Katsuta 1 0.3
Fukuoka 5 1.4 Komaki 1 0.3
Omiya 4 1.1 Kumamoto 1 0.3
Kawasaki 3 0.8 Matsudo 1 0.3
Mito 3 0.8 Matsumoto 1 0.3
Nagasaki 3 0.8 Miyaura 1 0.3
Narashino 3 0.8 Mutsuzawa 1 0.3
Okinawa 3 0.8 Okubo 1 0.3
Atsugi 2 0.5 Onjuku 1 0.3
Kimitsu 2 0.5 Sagamihara 1 0.3
Naha 2 0.5 Saitama 1 0.3
Otsuki 2 0.5 Sapporo 1 0.3
Ryufukuji 2 0.5 Takasaki 1 0.3
Tsukuba 2 0.5 Tendo 1 0.3
Urasoe 2 0.5 Tokaimura 1 0.3
Ushiku 2 0.5 Tokushima 1 0.3
Akita 1 0.3 Tomisato 1 0.3
Ashikaga 1 0.3 Urayasu 1 0.3
Gose 1 0.3 Yamatotakada 1 0.3
Hakodate 1 0.3 Zama 1 0.3
Ise 1 0.3 Unknown 25 6.8
Data source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2013f)
3) the implementation of investigative commissions, workshops, etc., 
4) the establishment of a terrorism information network, 
5) the construction of a video transmission system for times of emergencies, and 
6) the conclusion of a mutual agreement for counter-terrorism.
This shows that the TMG perceives the risk of terrorism in Japan as a realistic threat that
justifies a significant investment in funds and engagement by all related actors.
Similarly, the Japanese public has a high awareness of the risk of terrorism. In an opinion poll
about crisis management in relation to terrorism in 2007 the MPD asked over 2,500 citizens and
managers of facilities that could be a target of terrorism about their concerns about terrorism and
crisis  management  with  the  aim  to  reflect  the  various  security  measures  in  the  future
(Metropolitan Police Department 2007).
While a majority of 53.4% of the citizens named earthquakes as their greatest fear, 17.6% said
they were most afraid of terrorism, which therefore came out to be the second most feared threat,
together with street crime also at 17.6% (Fig. 9). In fact more than two thirds said they were
seriously concerned, almost 50% at least somewhat concerned about terrorism (Fig. 10a). On top
of  that,  more  than  one  quarter  consider  the  occurrence  of  terrorist  attacks  in  Tokyo  highly
possible,  over 50% somewhat possible (Fig. 10b). More than half  of the respondents believe
strongly or at least somewhat that there is a risk of becoming a victim of terrorism in Japan
(Fig. 10c). Among the facility managers a slightly higher number named terrorism their greatest
fear, again only exceeded by earthquakes (Fig. 9). They were significantly more concerned about
terrorism than the citizens with over 90% seriously or at least somewhat so (Fig. 10d). More than
one third strongly believe in the possibility of terrorist attacks in Tokyo, while more than half
somewhat think so (Fig. 10e). Two thirds of the respondents are afraid to become a victim of
terrorism in Japan, 10% even strongly so (Fig. 10f).
These results  show clearly that  the threat  of terrorism is  a  topic  of  concern for Japanese
citizens and facility managers and warrants a scientific discourse. The aforementioned study also
revealed that young Japanese have a greater anxiety of terrorism, which might seem puzzling,
since their generation has not experienced terrorism at home, as opposed to the older population.
I understand this as the manifestation of the awareness that Japan in its role as a tantamount
member of the global society has inevitably also brought it into the focus of international terror-
ism. An example is the involvement in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
53
54
Data source: Metropolitan Police Department (2007)
Figure 9: Result of an opinion poll for citizens and facility managers about crisis management in relation 
to terrorism: “Which incident are you most afraid of?”
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Data source: Metropolitan Police Department (2007)
Figure 10: Results of an opinion poll for citizens (a-c) and facility managers (d-f) about crisis 
management in relation to terrorism: “How concerned are you about terrorism?” (a, d); “Do you think 
that there is a possibility for terrorist attacks to occur in Japan in the future?” (b, e); “Do you think it is 
likely for you to become a victim of terrorism in Japan?” (c, f)
(Ministry  of  Defense  2007;  2008).  While  the  JMSDF  are  not  participating  in  ground
activities10, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet
2001) issued  in  2001,  and  the Replenishment  Support  Special  Measures  Law (Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs 2010a) from 2007 defined the deployment of Japanese vessels in the Arabian Sea
with the exclusive purposes of refueling and water supply11 for allied countries' vessels. Midford
notes in this context that
an unarmed or lightly armed Japan was believed the best way to discourage others from
targeting or  attacking the nation.  This view implied that  the  more Japan armed itself  or
involved  itself  with  supporting  U.S.  military power,  the  more  likely it  was  to  provoke
military responses from others [...]. Finally, dispatching the SDF overseas for any purpose
was believed to endanger civilian control [...] and likely to provoke other nations, especially
those in East Asia with memories of Japan’s invasion and occupation [...]. (Midford 2006, 4)
Other possible trouble spots are the ongoing territorial  disputes with a number of Japan's
neighboring  countries,  which  could  possibly escalate  in  military conflicts  as  well  as  violent
activities, i.e. terrorist attacks:12
• the Kuril Islands, also known as Chishima Islands or Northern Territories in Japanese
• the Liancourt Rocks, also known as Takeshima in Japanese, and Dokdo in Korean
• the Senkaku Islands, also known as Diaoyu Islands in Chinese
In addition,  several  authors  pointed  out  that  a  number  of  politically and environmentally
motivated movements still exist to this day in Japan  (Kotani 2006; Library of Congress 2010;
McKean 1981; Miyasaka 2009; National Police Agency 2003; Steinhoff 2007). While it would
be unjustified to assume a priori that these will resort to violent measures, the pure possibility of
such home-grown terrorism can not be dismissed, as the past has shown.
5.2. Study Area and Attack Scenario
5.2.1. Study Area
In the upcoming chapters of this study I demonstrate the practical application of the analysis
framework I  introduced  in Chapter  4.  I  selected the area of the 23 Special  Wards of Tokyo
(Fig. 11) as my study area for a variety of reasons which I will explain in this section.
First and foremost, as mentioned in Chapter  2.3.5, urban areas combine a large number of
values that humans recognize for all aspects of contemporary life and hence introduce a great
number of vulnerabilities to a variety of hazards, terrorism being one of them. It is therefore only
logical to apply the analysis framework to a highly urbanized area.
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Figure 11: Location of the study area, which comprises the 23 Special Wards of Tokyo, within the Tokyo 
Metropolis and Japan.
The Japanese capital Tokyo plays a major role, not only in the national system of Japanese
cities, but also in the global context of world cities (Sassen 2001; 2005). This materializes in a
large number of local, prefectural, national and also foreign administrative institutions inside the
city, all of which are potentially interesting targets for terrorist activities.
Tokyo, including the surrounding Metropolitan Area, is one of the most populous and most
densely populated areas of the world (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2012, 7). This means that
any disaster occurring in the city will undoubtedly affect a large number of people, either directly
by becoming a victim (e.g. getting killed or injured), or indirectly by suffering from the damage
caused and the resulting constraints in infrastructures and services (e.g. provision with electricity,
water,  or  interruptions  in  the  transportation  networks).  The  23  wards  of  Adachi,  Arakawa,
Bunkyo, Chiyoda, Chuo, Edogawa, Itabashi, Katsushika, Kita, Koto, Meguro, Minato, Nakano,
Nerima, Ota, Setagaya, Shibuya, Shinagawa, Shinjuku, Suginami, Sumida, Taito, and Toshima
cover 627 km2 which makes up 31% of the total area of the Tokyo Metropolis.13 In contrast,
according to the 2010 population census they are home to 8.94 million people, which accounts
for 66.8% of the total 13.38 million people inhabiting the Tokyo Metropolis. In other words, two
thirds of the population of the Tokyo Metropolis are living on only one third of its area. This fact
also reflects in the high population density, which amounts to 14,195 ppl/km2 for the study area,
more than four times higher than the 3,231 ppl/km2 for the remainder of the Tokyo Metropolis.
As I show in Chapter  5.3.1, the study area is also very diverse in its land uses. Pronounced
residential areas, office clusters, as well as entertainment and shopping districts can be identified
and are distributed across the study area (cf. Fig. 14). In addition, the population densities and
building types also vary significantly among the 23 wards (Fig. 12 and  5), which allows for
interesting comparative analyses of the results the framework produces.
Other  factors  for  choosing  Tokyo  over  other  possible  study  areas  are  the  abundance  of
available data about the Tokyo Metropolitan Area and my physical proximity to the city, which
allowed for easy data collection and validation by fieldwork as well as personal contact with
local experts.
5.2.2. Attack Scenario
The attack  scenario I  examine in  this  study is  that  of  a  small  explosive  attack.  This  was a
conscientious decision, based on two facts: First, a study by the MPD revealed that this is the
most feared mode of attack: 79.8% of the citizens and 86.3% of the managers of facilities that
could be a target of terrorism believe it to be the most likely modus operandi.
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Data source: Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications (2010)
Figure 12: Population densities of the 23 Special 
Wards of Tokyo as per the 2010 population census.
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Table 5: Population figures for the 23 Special Wards
of Tokyo as per the 2010 population census.
Ward Population Area in km2
Population 
per km2
Chiyoda 47,231 11.36 4,156
Chuo 122,762 10.92 11,240
Minato 200,776 20.02 10,030
Shinjuku 326,309 18.27 17,860
Bunkyo 206,626 11.37 18,174
Taito 175,928 10.09 17,443
Sumida 247,606 13.74 18,020
Koto 460,814 39.73 11,600
Shinagawa 365,301 22.42 16,295
Meguro 268,330 14.84 18,079
Ota 693,373 72.96 9,504
Setagaya 877,138 58.12 15,092
Shibuya 204,492 15.12 13,526
Nakano 314,750 15.59 20,195
Suginami 549,569 33.92 16,200
Toshima 284,678 12.97 21,953
Kita 335,544 20.49 16,373
Arakawa 203,296 10.23 19,877
Itabashi 535,824 32.19 16,645
Nerima 716,124 48.14 14,877
Adachi 683,426 53.25 12,834
Katsushika 442,586 34.82 12,710
Edogawa 678,644 49.33 13,756
μ 388,744.7 27.4 15,062.6
σ 217,943.3 17.8 3,964.2
Data source: Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications (2010)
Second, an attack using a small explosive device is the most meaningful scenario regarding
the spatial analysis of its vulnerability. This stems from the fact that the effect radius is limited,
hence the exact location of the blast will be chosen very carefully by the perpetrators. The same
can not be said about attacks using large amounts of explosives, the release of CBRN material,
incendiary  attacks,  or  shootings.14 Other  terrorist  activities,  such  as  sabotage  of  equipment,
kidnappings,  hostage  takings,  barricades,  and  assassinations  follow  a  completely  different
reasoning process, since the attack targets in these cases are more confined to single persons or
small groups of people, but not the general public. Other forms of terrorism do not have any
spatial representation at all, such as cyberterrorism.
Also, for the sake of simplification I decided to assume perpetrators who do not target one
specific institution or organization, but who generally regard affecting (i.e. killing or injuring) as
many people as possible twice as important as generating attention for their actions.
5.3. Terrorism Vulnerability Evaluation
Any meaningful  analysis  of  terrorism vulnerability  and  terrorism risk  requires  detailed  and
verifiable knowledge about the ideology and goals of the perpetrators as well as information
about their available means in terms of money, weapons and intelligence, and their possible and
most likely modus operandi. Therefore an overarching, universal analysis of terrorism vulnera-
bility per  se  is  an  impossible  undertaking,  which  would  introduce  more  generalizations  and
uncertainties than clarity about the actual vulnerability situation.
Instead, it is advisable to focus on one specific perpetrator, e.g. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese
Red Army, al-Qaeda, etc.) after performing an ex ante analysis of their short- or long-term goals,
available means and characteristics of previous attacks. This allows for a precise formulation of
vulnerability factors for this specific terrorist group and eliminates most uncertainties regarding
their selection of targets for future attacks.
Another option is the analysis of multiple actors that follow certain types of terrorism, e.g.
nationalist-separatist, religious, left-wing anarchist, etc. (European Police Office 2013). Although
this introduces a higher level of generalization into the analysis, the main motivations and attack
scenarios will mostly be similar within these aforementioned groups. This will also allow for the
formulation of vulnerability factors that apply to all perpetrators of the respective category.
The  vulnerability  analysis  framework  I  present  in  Chapter  4 allows  for  a  theoretically
unlimited  number  of  vulnerability  factors  to  be  involved  in  the  calculation.  Chapter  4.2.2
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mentions  some  criteria  that  should  be  considered  in  the  selection  of  factors  and  also  their
number. The model can be highly specialized, to apply for single perpetrators or certain terrorist
types if the necessary information and knowledge are available.
This information is mostly collected and developed in military and governmental institutions,
crime and anti-terrorism organizations or affiliated think tanks. As a result it is at least difficult,
yet mostly impossible to obtain outside of these realms. This unfortunately holds true for me and
my analysis, too, which means that I am not able to provide a detailed and fact-based vulnera-
bility analysis for a certain perpetrator at this point in time. I am convinced, though, that analysts
at institutions that do have access to such data can utilize my framework to perform meaningful
analyses of those terrorist threats they find necessary.
In the case of this study, I had to resort to rather broad assumptions about terrorism vulnera-
bility and factors that increase or mitigate it in the real world. These have to be general enough to
apply for most, if not all, types of terrorists and terrorism ideologies. I identified two core ideas
that form the foundation of terrorism as “propaganda of the deed”,  a concept I  introduce in
Chapter 3.1:
1) Terrorists aim to affect as many people as possible.
2) Terrorists strive to create attention with their actions.
Based on these two ideas I set out to identify possible quantifiable operationalizations.
Obviously, the first idea assumes that areas with large populations, and hence high population
densities, are more attractive for terrorists, since an attack with a certain magnitude will affect
more victims there than in sparsely populated areas:
There is a logical link between population-based indicators and terrorism risk. An argument
can be made that consequences are correlated with population. However, terrorism risks to a
population of 100,000 are clearly different if that population resides in a dense urban area
rather than if it is spread across a larger rural area because of the higher probability of many
high-profile targets and more people within any given attack footprint.  Density-weighted
population, i.e., the product of a region's population and its population density, offers one of
many possible simple risk indicators that account for this difference. Just as population can
be considered correlated with consequences,  so too is  population density correlated with
threat. For example, a terrorist targeting 1,000 people might be more likely to attack a group
when they are all within the same city block than if they are dispersed across the country.
(Willis 2005, 21f)
Accordingly, the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), a grant program by the US Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS), is using a population-based approach to distribute funds for
counter-terrorism  activities  in  American  cities  and  urban  agglomerations  (Department  of
Homeland Security 2013).
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The second idea is based on the assumption that terrorists are also interested in the publicity a
successful attack can generate for their cause. The psychosocial approach to explain terrorism
and terrorist activities argues that “terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome but as a method of
social and political influence” (de la Corte 2007, 2):
Many minority groups conduct terrorist  activities as a way to bring about social change.
(Kruglanski  and Webster  1991).  Usually,  these groups represent  beliefs and positions on
political and religious issues which are not readily accepted by the majority. These terrorists
are  what  some  social  psychologists  define  as  'active  minorities'  (Moscovici  et  al.  1991;
Moscovici et al. 1996). According to research conducted by experimental social psycholo-
gists, minorities attempt to gain influence by persuading majority members to consider their
point  of  view.  Effective persuasion depends  on  the  minority member's  ability to  clearly
communicate their positions over several different occasions. Through such persistence, a
minority may be able to change or influence the majority position. Terrorism is not much
different from this process because the spreading of fear or terror through violence has a
communicative dimension. Remember the relationship between terrorism and propaganda:
after all, terrorist violence is a means to direct people's attention to certain problems (real,
exaggerated or fictitious) and publicize the terrorist's political or religious demands.  (de la
Corte 2007, 2)
I therefore argue that terrorists will select their targets with certain symbolic connotations in
mind, as this will give their deeds the aspired attention.
For  the  scope  of  this  study  I  defined  four  factors  to  operationalize  the  aforementioned
generalized terrorism vulnerability within highly urbanized areas:
1) the number of people inside buildings15, 
2) the number of people populating the urban space outside of buildings as pedestrians, 
3) the number of people within the public railway transportation network, and 
4) the symbolic value of places.
As population figures in highly urbanized areas vary significantly over time, I incorporated
the temporal dimension in the calculation of the first three factors. In contrast,  the symbolic
value of an object does not change over the course of one day, so it was not necessary to consider
this additional dimension in the case of the fourth factor.
The operationalization methodologies for these four factors constitutes the core objective of
this study. I will therefore discuss them in great detail in the upcoming sections. The central
focus while doing so is on the spatial characteristics of urban space that determine the emergence
of vulnerability. To my best knowledge this has not been done in the past, which underlines the
originality of my scientific approach.
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5.3.1. Stationary Building Population
Introduction
Detailed population information is crucial for the micro-scale modeling and analysis of human
behavior and processes in urban areas. Ideally it should be based on individual persons, yet, for
privacy reasons such data is generally not available. Therefore it has become necessary to derive
estimated data from aggregated datasets such as census data.
Wu et al.  (2005) provided an extensive summary of a variety of approaches and methodolo-
gies that have been published in the past. Since it has now become somewhat outdated, I first
provide a brief overview of some of the major achievements in the field of population estimation
methodologies and focus on those studies that have been the most influential in the development
of the approach I developed in the course of this study.
Tobler et al.  (1997) suggest their  Gridded Population of the World as a macro-geographic
approach for population estimation on a global scope. They argue that “the average daily activity
space of individuals is dependent upon culture, environment, social, and urban-rural status, but
averages more than 15 km in western societies.”  (Tobler et al. 1997, 207) In their calculations
they  rely  on  population  data  aggregated  on  secondary  administrative  levels  and  ultimately
produce worldwide population figures “interpolated to a 5- by 5-minute grid using a smoothing
algorithm developed by Tobler (1979).” (Sutton et al. 2003, 546)
The LandScan Global Population Project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratories (Bhaduri et
al. 2007; Dobson et al. 2000) also attempts to provide worldwide population figures, albeit on a
finer spatial scale of 30 by 30 second grid cells, and more recently even with a 90 by 90 m
resolution for the USA. They do this by improving the pycnophylactic and dasymetric inter-
polation algorithms that had traditionally been employed, using additional ancillary spatial data,
such as roads, slope, land use, urban areas, nighttime lights  (Elvidge et al. 1997; Sutton et al.
2001), and coastlines. In addition, they also incorporate diurnal nighttime and daytime popu-
lations to account for the variations in population distributions as a result of different underlying
activities.
Similarly, McPherson and Brown (2004) focus on the shifts in populations in their work at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory. They argue that “the 1-kilometer resolution used in that [i.e.
the LandScan] dataset is insufficient for urban exposure analyses.” (McPherson and Brown 2004,
2) and provide nighttime residential, daytime residential, and daytime workplace population data
on a 250 by 250 m grid for the continental United States and Hawaii. In their model they rely on
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a number of datasets, including nighttime population census data,  a business directory and a
Census County to County Journey to Work dataset by the US Census Bureau containing the
numbers of people moving from their  homes to their  workplaces.  This approach bears some
similarity to the one I introduce in this study, but it is more simplistic and uses a coarser spatial
scale.
Along the same lines  Martin  (1996) and Martin  et  al.  (2009) developed a  model  for  the
estimation of
24-hour  gridded population models of  the UK [...]  based on an existing adaptive kernel
density approach for building gridded population models (Martin 1996), which is now being
extended to become a spatio-temporal kernel density estimation method. (Martin et al. 2009,
1)
To my best knowledge this marks the first attempt to overcome the diurnal model of daytime
and  nighttime  populations  and  to  provide  an  insight  into  the  differences  in  population
distributions  over  the  course  of  a  day.  They achieve  this  by not  relying  exclusively on  the
available  census  data,  but  by incorporating  additional  secondary datasets,  such as  employee
numbers, traffic and passenger flow data, as well as counts of prison inmates, hospitalized people
and tourists (Martin et al. 2009, 3). This is a fundamental parallel to the methodology I present in
this  study,  but  my approach overcomes the limitations regarding the availability of dynamic
population data that Martin and colleagues deplore.
Ahola et al. (2007) attempt to overcome the coarse spatial resolutions of the aforementioned
studies, which preclude their application in the micro-scale context of highly urbanized areas.
They were able to do this by using population census data on the building level for their case
study.  In  order  to  represent  the  dynamic  characteristics  of  the  population  distribution  they
employed a spatial  decision support framework  (Malczewski 1999) using several data and  a
priori assumptions:
(1)  basic  static  data  on  the  population  and  infrastructure  (municipal  and  governmental
registers); (2) time-series data on the trends in various phenomena (data from the statistics);
(3) spatio-temporal knowledge (spatio-temporal model of population); and (4) strategies on
preparedness (governmental  statements about  the threats and the preparedness for them).
(Ahola et al. 2007, 938)
They identified  14  individual  time  periods  over  the  course  of  a  week as  a  result  of  the
modeled activities, but mention that “more detailed information about the temporal behaviour of
different population groups could also improve the quality of the model.”  (Ahola et al. 2007,
952) This one of the major aspects I pursued with the development of the estimation approach
introduced in this study.
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As Martin and colleagues remark
grid-based population models have considerable advantages for population representation,
offering more meaningful representation of settlement and neighbourhood pattern, including
the  geography  of  unpopulated  areas,  and  providing  stability  through  time.  As  a  result,
gridded  models  have  seen  extensive  use  where  population  must  be  integrated  with
environmental phenomena. (Martin et al. 2009, 1)
On the downside these grids are normally too generalized in their spatial resolution to be able
to adequately represent facts and processes within highly urbanized areas. Another shortcoming
of the models introduced above is the temporal scale, which is either left out completely, or
defined as a two-stage process that opposes the situations during the day and at night. A notable
exception is the approach by Martin et al. (2009), but their assumption of all people of a certain
demographic  group  being  engaged  in  a  certain  activity  (and  hence  being  present  at  certain
corresponding locations) at a certain time appears me to be too generalizing, which again makes
spatio-temporal micro-scale analyses unreliable.
Two approaches  have been published recently that  attempt to ameliorate  these two short-
comings. Lwin and Murayama  (2009) suggested a variety of calculation methods to estimate
populations on a building basis, including areametric and volumetric approaches. In addition
Horanont  (2012) suggested  and  exemplified  the  use  of  person trip  data  in  the  modeling  of
dynamic populations.
In  this  part  of  my  study  I  present  a  novel  approach  for  a  spatio-temporal  micro-scale
population estimation on a building basis. It incorporates multiple datasets, namely population
census data, employment data, student data, address point data and, following Horanont's (2012)
suggestion, movement data. As a result the model provides fine-grained results of the estimated
populations within different usage categories for each building on a given time-scale.
I  first  explain  the  necessary  data  and  describe  the  datasets  I  employed  in  the  exemplar
calculations for my study area (cf. Chapter 5.2). I then explain and discuss the basic methodo-
logy, which builds the foundation for my enhanced approach, as well as the extensions I made to
the model. I then go on to explain in detail the newly introduced dimensions of usage categories
and temporal fluctuations derived from movement data. In addition I discuss the validation of the
model as well as its output, before summarizing and pointing out some shortcomings in the final
section.
Data
All datasets required for the estimation calculation I propose here together with their required
attributes are shown in 6.
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Table 6: Necessary datasets for the spatio-temporal building population estimation methodology and 
datasets used in this study.
Dataset Attributes Dataset name and source Date
building data footprint area
number of floors
Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
census data residential population (i.e. 
population census information)
Population census by the Statistics Bureau at 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications
2010
employment population (i.e. 
business or economic census 
information)
Employment census by the Statistical Institute 
for Consulting and Analysis
2009
student population (i.e. school 
census information)
School census by the Department of Statistics 
Population at the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Bureau of General Affairs
2010
address point data spatial location of each address 
point
category of the person or 
business represented by each data
point
Telepoint Pack! by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2011
population 
movement data
spatial location of each individual
at each time step
trip purpose / activity
means of transportation
PersonFlow data by the University of Tokyo 
Center for Spatial Information Science
2008
Since I am aiming to derive population figures for single buildings, detailed data about these
buildings is necessary. The 2008/09 Zmap-TOWNII data by Zenrin Co., Ltd., one of the biggest
Japanese providers of geospatial data16, contains exact building footprints and information about
the number of floors for most buildings. It has to be mentioned, though, that this data is by no
means complete and free of errors: of the 1,899,953 buildings in the study area, 67.8% do not
contain floor data, hence I had to perform all calculations using the remaining 571,922 buildings.
Their area can be easily determined in GIS software from their footprint polygons.
A second source of data for my population estimation model are census datasets. These data
can be obtained easily in most parts of the world. Their respective aerial unit refers to the level of
aggregation of the underlying population data. It depends on the dataset used and can range from
large-scale units like states or metropolitan area to smaller units like census tracts or even micro-
scale units like census blocks or building blocks. In this study I used the population census data
collected by the Statistics Bureau at the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communi-
cations for the year 2010 on the spatial aggregation level of census tracts.
While  its  general  availability is  a positive aspect  of  population census  data,  two obvious
shortcomings are its exclusive focus on residential populations, discounting other activities such
as working or studying, and its missing temporal scale. Many authors have emphasized how
census  data  does  never  portray the  actual  population  distribution,  but  can,  at  its  best,  only
represent the so-called “nighttime population” (Ahola et al. 2007; Bhaduri et al. 2007; Dobson et
al. 2000; Martin et al. 2009; McPherson and Brown 2004; Schmitt 1956). In this context Wu and
colleagues  note that  census  data  are  “mainly concerned with residential  populations and the
daytime population distribution can be very different from that described by the census.” (2005,
70) Thus the data will be especially misleading in areas with minor residential use and a great
number  of  other  usages.  Prime  examples  are  highly  urbanized  city  centers,  which  have
undoubtedly high populations during daytime, but almost no residents. Whether or not they are
completely deserted during the night depends on the presence of employees at night, for example
due to globalized business activities at all times, and on the existence of other land uses, such as
entertainment facilities.  Figure 13 shows a map of the central part of the Tokyo Metropolitan
Area  with  the  residential  population  density  figures  for  each  census  tract  according  to  the
aforementioned 2010 census data. It is obvious how the population density in the core city of
Tokyo is significantly lower than in the surrounding suburban belts, which reach far into the
neighboring prefectures of Saitama to the north, Chiba to the east and Kanagawa to the south.
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Data source: Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2010)
Figure 13: Population density per census tract as per the 2010 population census dataset for parts of the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
It  is  imperative  to  amend  these  two  shortcomings,  the  exclusive  focus  on  residential
populations and the missing temporal scale of all population datasets, in order for micro-scale
population data to be useful for my vulnerability assessment. Sutton and colleagues argue that
“useful measures of population density must be made at appropriate, application specific, spatial
and temporal  scales.”  (Sutton  et  al.  2003,  545) Hence  it  was  necessary to  utilize  additional
datasets to incorporate both the multiple usage categories and the inherent temporal differences
that affect building populations in highly urbanized areas in my enhanced model.
Similar to the normal population census data, which represents the residential or “nighttime”
population,  employment census data contains information about the number of employees in
different business categories. In this  study I used the employment census data on the spatial
aggregation level of census tracts by the Statistical Institute for Consulting and Analysis, which
had originally been collected by the Statistics Bureau at the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications for the year 2009. This dataset contains detailed data about the number of
employees and businesses, together with some socio-demographic details about the employees.
The data are grouped in 16 employment categories, which are originally defined by the Japanese
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. In order to be able to combine them with other datasets,
I generalized the 16 categories from the original dataset to five usage categories, which 7 shows.
I  developed  these  five  non-residential  usage  categories  by defining  all  activities  that  are
pursued in urban areas. I did this by largely emulating the classifications by Axhausen et al.
(2002), Bowman and Ben-Akiva (2001), and Jiang et al. (2012). Since these activities have to be
mapped to multiple other datasets from different sources in the course of the modeling process, I
formulated them as general  as possible  while  keeping intact  their  distinct  characteristics.  To
derive them I used a dataset of address points, which contained not only the spatial location but
also an indicator of the usage for each data point. Starting from a total of 2,208 indicators I
aggregated them to these six categories for use in this study, as 8 explains. The colors for these
six usage categories are used consistently throughout this study.
In addition  to  these  two census  datasets  I  also used  the  2010 school  census  data  by the
Department of Statistics at the TMG Bureau of General Affairs. In contrast to the two aforemen-
tioned datasets, this data is only available at the spatial resolution of wards. It contains a number
of attributes about the numbers of schools, students and teachers for ten different school types, of
which I only implemented the number of students in this model as  9 shows. The teachers are
already represented by the employment census in the category “education” (cf. 7).
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Table 7: Assignment of the original employment categories in the employment census data to the 
generalized usage categories used in the population estimation model.
Employment categories as per 2009 employment census dataset Usage category
Agriculture & forestry business & office
Fisheries
Mining and quarrying of stone and gravel
Construction
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, heat supply and water
Information and communications
Transport and postal activities
Finance and insurance
Real estate and goods rental and leasing
Government, except where classified
Scientific research, professional and technical services education
Education, learning support
Wholesale and retail trade retail & service
Living-related and personal services and amusement services
Compound services
Accommodations, eating and drinking services leisure & hotel
Medical, health care and welfare public institution
Services not elsewhere classified
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Table 8: Six usage categories used in the population estimation model and some exemplar real-world 
usages from the address point dataset.
Category Exemplar usages as per address point dataset
1 home private households
2 business & office all types of offices and places of manual labor (e.g. factories, agricultural, forestry and 
fishery) excluding those aiming predominantly at service tasks
3 education kindergarten, elementary schools, junior high schools, senior high schools, vocational 
schools, schools for the disabled, universities, research institutes, libraries
4 retail & service all types of shops, department stores; all types of service institutions (e.g. gas stations, 
cleaning shops, branch banks, post offices, etc.)
5 leisure & hotel restaurants, coffee shops, entertainment facilities (e.g. bars, movie theaters, concert 
halls, etc.), sports facilities, hotels
6 public institution police departments, fire departments, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, public assembly halls
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Table 9: Number of students for different school types per ward in the study area as per the 2010 school 
census dataset.
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Chiyoda 1,057 4,578 7,117 11,166 857 17,563 136,151 2,889
Chuo 1,399 4,631 1,404 959 876 509
Minato 2,658 7,422 9,057 12,881 270 4,112 25,162 335
Shinjuku 2,244 8,825 6,120 7,751 34 28,401 73,274 617
Bunkyo 2,775 9,636 8,731 15,834 798 358 5,477 75,337 535
Taito 2,341 6,437 2,985 4,867 3,768 3,162 65
Sumida 1,786 9,606 5,336 5,803 249 2,717
Koto 4,691 19,821 7,761 6,747 407 2,204 4,206 129
Shinagawa 4,015 13,237 8,194 9,058 45 1,726 14,487 119 1,595
Meguro 3,312 9,461 4,510 8,644 785 1,348 7,317
Ota 9,244 29,123 10,873 9,848 553 8,073 1,258
Setagaya 10,694 36,043 19,509 25,550 448 4,308 69,488 2,824
Shibuya 1,908 7,325 4,934 9,019 22,264 28,502 3,672
Nakano 3,002 9,629 5,569 9,595 706 326 5,809 190 803
Suginami 6,407 19,020 10,270 16,254 537 3,239 6,889 1,289
Toshima 1,509 8,633 7,773 12,185 162 14,669 35,771 560
Kita 4,906 12,965 7,434 10,392 619 3,559 670
Arakawa 1,177 8,018 4,200 2,759 2,963 1
Itabashi 6,440 22,918 11,963 11,178 561 3,329 31,643 1,846
Nerima 10,672 35,124 15,366 9,127 443 463 989 5,594
Adachi 9,678 32,343 14,643 8,504 519 595 1,183
Katsushika 6,454 20,796 9,400 5,193 589 1,711 559
Edogawa 11,338 38,087 16,572 9,058 589 7,131 101
μ 4,769.8 16,246.8 8,683.5 9,668.4 717.8 395.8 6,384.0 26,034.2 1,096.9 1,595.0
σ 3,423.4 10,952.0 4,516.5 5,013.8 162.8 189.0 7,333.3 36,240.9 1,166.7 ./.
Data source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of General Affairs (2010)
To account for the temporal fluctuations in the distribution of populations it is necessary to
obtain spatio-temporal data representing the movements of people in the respective study area. In
the case of this study I included the 2008 PersonFlow data by the University of Tokyo Center for
Spatial Information Science (CSIS), which contains movement data of 576,806 individuals in the
Greater Tokyo Metropolitan Area. It comprises the Tokyo Metropolis, the prefectures Kanagawa
and Chiba, as well as Southern parts of Saitama and Ibaraki prefectures, an area of 15,712 km2.
Since, according to the 2010 census, this area is home to 41,371,181 people, the sample repre-
sents 1.39% of the total population. The underlying data were originally collected by the Tokyo
Metropolitan  Area  Transportation  Planning  Council  using  paper  questionnaires.  The  dataset
contains not only the location and time stamp of the start and end of trips, but also the mode of
transportation, the purpose of the trips, and several socio-demographic details about the indivi-
duals, such as gender, age, and occupation  (Tokyo Metropolitan Area Transportation Planning
Council 2013). I reclassified the 15 trip purposes as per the questionnaires to match the afore-
mentioned six usage categories, as 10 shows.
The data were collected on Thursday, October 1st, 2008, and hence represent a regular wor-
king day during the week, outside of all relevant holiday or festival periods. Also, the AMeDAS
weather data provided by the Japanese Meteorological Agency shows no precipitation during the
day and comfortable temperatures ranging from 17.3ºC to 20.9ºC (Japan Meteorological Agency
2008). The data from the questionnaires had been further processed using various multi-modal
routing  algorithms  by a  research  group at  CSIS,  who were  able  to  synthesize  it  into  point
positions in one minute intervals from 12am to 11:59pm (Sekimoto et al. 2011; Usui et al. 2009).
This results in 1,440 point positions per individual, amounting to 830,600,640 datasets in total.17
While this massive person trip dataset allows for the analysis of person flows and single trips,
I  filtered  it  for  the time spans  of  stationarity between trips,  where  the  individuals  were not
moving in space. Since these stationarity events themselves were not assigned a purpose in the
dataset,  I  classified them according to  the purpose of  the immediately preceding trip.  If  for
example an individual started a trip with the purpose of “going to work”, then I classified the
subsequent stationarity event as “work” activity, if it was “going home”, I classified it as “home”
activity. This allowed me to extract the number of people in each location at each point in time
pursuing in each of the six usage categories. One data issue were the first stationary events in the
morning, as they were coded “other, n/a” for all individuals. A quick analysis revealed that only
3,704 of the sample individuals (0.64%) indicated “going home” as the purpose of their second
trip (i.e. their first non-stationary event). I therefore assumed for the remaining 573,102 persons
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Table 10: Assignment of the trip purposes in the Person Trip questionnaire data to the generalized usage 
categories used in the population estimation model.
Trip purposes as per 2008 Person Trip questionnaire dataset Usage category
going home home
going to work business & office
delivery purpose (work)
business purpose (work)
service purpose (work)
agricultural purpose (work)
other work related purpose
going to school education
going shopping retail & service
going for meal, leisure, social interaction leisure & hotel
sightseeing
going to hospital public institution
running an errand
dropping somebody off
other, n/a ./.
Note:
Italics mark usage categories that are not incorporated in the spatio-temporal building population estimation 
calculation due to their transient character (cf. Chapter 5.3.5).
that they were at home at midnight and assigned the respective usage category to these stationary
events. The remaining persons, most likely coding errors or people working in night-shifts, kept
the purpose “other, n/a” and were not included in the population estimation process until their
first meaningfully encoded trip started.
It is important to note here that in the spatio-temporal stage of the estimation process three
activities represent the six categories I defined above: the activity “home” corresponds to the
usage category “home”, the activity “work” contains the employees of all five remaining cate-
gories ("business & office", "education", "retail & service", leisure & hotel", and "public insti-
tution"), and the activity “education” contains the students present at educational institutions.
People engaging in these activities outside of their occupation, for example as customers of a
shop or guests at a restaurant, can not be captured by this method and are therefore not contained
in the resulting population estimation figures (cf. Chapter 5.3.5).
Methodology
The population estimation methodology I developed in the course of this study is an extension of
the paper by Lwin and Murayama  (2009).  There the authors introduced both areametric and
volumetric methods for the estimation of residential building populations. Both methods assume
an equal distribution of the population over the available floorspace within all the residential
buildings in a study area, but they differ in the method to derive this total floorspace area: while
the areametric method refers exclusively to the buildings' footprint areas, the volumetric method
takes the number of floors per building into account in addition to that. The former is owed to the
possible unavailability of comprehensive data about the number of floors per building. While it
still allows for an estimation of the building populations, the authors remark that “the Areametric
method is suitable for low-rise buildings especially in rural areas while the Volumetric method is
suitable for high-rise buildings, especially in downtown areas.” (Lwin and Murayama 2009, 404)
A shortcoming of their approach is the exclusive focus on residential buildings, which neglects
all other building uses, such as offices, shops, schools, etc. This limitation is especially striking
in highly urbanized areas, such as my study area, which are characterized by a mix of usages
over space (cf. Fig. 14) and sometimes even within buildings.
The volumetric building population estimation methodology introduced by Lwin and Mura-
yama (2009) uses equation (2) to calculate population figures for all buildings. They point out
that buildings with non-residential use and reasonably small footprint areas have to be excluded
from the calculation. They also statistically derived the optimal minimum footprint area to be
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Data source: Zenrin Co., Ltd. (2011)
Figure 14: Spatial distribution of the six usage categories within the study area as per the 2011 Telepoint!
Pack dataset.
25 m2, which “is probably the average single-unit living space in the study area.”  (Lwin and
Murayama 2009, 410)
BPi=( CP∑
k=1
n
BAk⋅BF k )⋅BAi⋅BF i (2)
where BPi is the estimated population of building i, CP is the population of the aerial
unit that contains building i, BAi is the footprint area of building i, BFi is the number
of floors of building  i, and n is the number of buildings that meet the user-defined
criteria regarding residential usage and minimum footprint area and that are located
inside the same aerial unit as building i. (modified from Lwin and Murayama 2009,
403)
A validation  in  the  original  study showed a  statistical  correlation  between the  calculated
building populations and the actual  building population figures  of R2 = 0.94.  This  led me to
believe  that  the  underlying  assumption  of  the  population  being  equally  distributed  over  the
available total floorspace allows for a sufficiently precise estimation of building populations. Yet,
the limitations in the suggested method regarding the usage types (the authors only accounted for
the residential population) and the missing temporal dimension incited me to extend and further
develop their basic approach into an enhanced methodology that can represent more realistically
the  underlying  real-world  processes  that  are  the  result  of  the  human  actions  happening,
especially in urban areas.
Hence I developed the enhanced spatio-temporal building population estimation methodology,
which equation (3) shows in a formalized fashion. In the course of this section I will explain the
underlying assumptions, datasets and calculation steps in great detail.
SBPi , c ,t=( APAi ,c , t∑
k∈Ai , c
BAk⋅BF k )⋅BAi , c⋅BF i (3)
where SBPi,c,t is the stationary population of building i in category c at time t, APAi,c,t is
the total population of category c at time t of the census tract that contains building i,
A is the set of all census tracts,  BAi is the footprint area of building  i,  BAi,c is the
footprint area of building i in category c, BFi is the number of floors of building i.
The calculation process itself  is  split  into two main parts:  first  the categorical volumetric
building  population  estimation  process,  which  estimates  the  building  population  per  usage
category.  This  part  of  the  estimation  process  produces  meaningful  results  on its  own,  if  the
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additional temporal dimension is not of interest or the necessary data are not available. In this
case, equation  (3) has to be applied without the notation of the time  t, producing SBPi,c as the
stationary population of building i in category c. The actual spatio-temporal volumetric building
population estimation process,  which includes the temporal dimension, is  explained in detail
afterwards.
Categorical Volumetric Building Population Estimation Process
Categorical  Volumetric  Building Population Estimation Process. I  first  assigned the total
number of address points as well as the number of address points in each of the six usage cate-
gories to each building. Figure 14 shows that the different usage categories are not distributed
equally within the study area and instead reveal several patterns: the aforementioned suburban
residential belt can be seen spreading from just outside the tracks of the Yamanote Line loop.18 In
contrast, the center-most area is dominated by business and office usage, starting roughly near
Iidabashi Station north of the Imperial  Palace grounds and stretched alongside the Yamanote
Line tracks until Shinagawa Station and from the eastern side of Tokyo Station northwards until
Ueno Station. The business areas along the coast of Tokyo Bay are dominated by logistics and
cargo  companies  and their  warehouses.  The  largest  shopping  areas  can  be  identified  in  the
northeast of Shibuya Station, where the upscale Omotesando Street and the alternative Harajuku
quarters are located, as well as in the Ginza neighborhood, south of Tokyo Station, and around
Akihabara Station, which is dominated by electronics and duty-free shops. The agglomerations
of  restaurants  and  entertainment  facilities  around  practically  all  train  stations  shows  the
importance these transportation hubs have in the day-to-day lives of the Tokyoites. In addition,
the infamous entertainment quarters of Kabukicho, northeast of Shinjuku Station, as well as in
Shibuya and Roppongi can be seen.
A closer look at the area inside the loop of the Yamanote Line tracks in  Figure 15 reveals
some residential clusters on the small artificial island of Tsukishima southeast of Tokyo Station
and in south-western Minato ward, northwest of Shinagawa Station. Also, the agglomeration of
offices to the west and to the east of Shinjuku Station are visible. Additional clusters of leisure
facilities south of Ueno (Ameyayokocho),  in Yurakucho and Akasaka,  south of Hibiya Park,
around Ebisu Station and Gotanda Station between Shibuya and Shinagawa on the Yamanote
Line,  as  well  as  in  Kinshicho  and  Nakano  on  the  eastern  and  western  edges  of  the  map,
respectively.
Due to the mix of usage categories prevalent not only over space but even within buildings in
highly urbanized areas, it was necessary to implement these mixed uses in the estimation model.
An analysis of the dataset used in this study revealed that 35% of all buildings contained address
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Data source: Zenrin Co., Ltd. (2011)
Figure 15: Spatial distribution of the six usage categories within the central part of the study area, inside 
the tracks of the Yamanote Line loop as per the 2011 Telepoint! Pack dataset.
points  of  more  than  one  category.  Since  detailed  information  about  the  actual  floorspace
occupancy per category within a building is usually not available, the model uses the relative
ratio of address points per category per building as an approximation. Figure 16 shows examples
of this relative ratio of usage three exemplar usage categories in a small portion of the study area
around Tokyo Station. The numbers show the percentage of floorspace of each building that is
occupied  by  a  certain  usage  category.  The  Kyobashi  Plaza  Building  for  example,  which  is
marked in Figure 16, contains 19 address points over all six categories on its 19 floors, eleven of
which are “home”, four are “business & office”, and one each is “education”, “retail & service”,
“leisure  &  hotel”,  and  “public  institution”.  Therefore,  category  “home”  is  assigned  57.9%,
“business  &  office”  21.1%,  and  the  other  categories  5.3%  each  of  the  total  floorspace  of
46,064 m2.  It is obvious how the relative occupation of residential use is decreasing towards
Tokyo Station, while the office occupancy rate per building is high across this part of the study
area. Again, the main shopping area of Ginza is easily identifiable in the southwestern corner of
Figure 16c. Also, the big Takashimaya Department Store in Nihombashi north of the center of
the map as well as the numerous shopping opportunities in the highrise office buildings west of
Tokyo Station are clearly visible.
Next I derived the total floorspace in m2 for each building from its footprint area and the
number of floors as suggested in the preliminary approach by Lwin & Murayama  (2009). In
addition I was able to calculate the absolute floorspace occupied by each usage category within
each building, using both the information about each building's total floorspace and the relative
ratio  of  usage  per  category within  each building  based on the  existent  address  points.  This
introduces two possible errors that will ultimately also affect the building population figures.
First,  missing  address  point  data  can  skew  the  floorspace  percentages  per  usage  category
significantly. If for example a building with a total floorspace of 300 m2 contains one address
point each for “home” and “business & office” use, both categories would be assigned 150 m2
floorspace each. A missing address point in either category, for example another office, would
mean a significant deviation from these numbers, since in this case the actual floorspace would
be 100 m2 and 200 m2, respectively. The model would thereby over- respectively under-estimate
the floorspace by 50 m2. Second, my approach assumes an even split of the available floorspace
area within a building between the existing usage categories. This can be problematic in cases
where one category occupies a larger portion of the space than others. If for example a building
with five floors at 100 m2 each contains one office and one convenience store, both categories
would be assigned 250 m2 each. Yet in reality the convenience store only occupies the ground
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Data source: Statistical lnformation Institute for
Consulting and Analysis (2009)
Figure 16: Floorspace occupancy ratios for the 
usage categories a) “home”, b) “business & 
office”, and c) “retail & service” in a small part of 
the study area derived from the 2009 employment 
census.
floor, whereas the office spreads across the other four floors, amounting to an effective split of
100 m2 and 400 m2, respectively, which again introduces significant over- and under-estimations
of the two categories. While I am aware of these shortcomings I have been unable to ameliorate
them given the available data.
In order to match the floorspace per category per building with the categorical population data
as introduced in the original estimation model I then calculated the total floorspace per category
for all buildings within each census tract. Doing so I relied on the aforementioned assumption of
assigning the population of each census tract to the buildings it contains according to their ratio
of floorspace in the cumulative floorspace of all buildings within it. My enhanced model does
this separately for each of the six usage categories. To achieve this I used different data sources
for the calculation of the populations within each usage category, as mentioned above: while
regular  population  census  data  represents  the  residential  population,  also  known  as  the
“nighttime  population”,  the  employment  census  contains  information  about  the  number  of
employees in the five different business categories (cf. 7). This allowed me to put the number of
employees per category per census tract into context with the relative floorspace ratio of each
category across each building within this census tract. In addition, the use of the school census
dataset  allowed me to  account  for  the  number  of  students.  Accordingly,  the  aforementioned
building population estimation formula has to be employed once for the residential population
(usage category “home”), once for each of the five remaining categories (“business & office”,
“education”, “retail & service”, “leisure & hotel”, “public institution”), and once for the student
populations using the respective population figures and floorspace ratios. As a result,  I could
then assign an estimated population per usage category to each building. In this context it should
be mentioned again,  that  the current  estimation model  does only account  for  the number of
residents,  employees  and  students  within  the  buildings,  but  not  for  the  number  of  people
pursuing other  activities  there.  Other,  more  transient  populations  like  customers,  guests  and
visitors can not be estimated in this fashion, and are therefore left out of the calculation.
Since the number of employees per category varies both per building and per census tract, it is
necessary to perform the aforementioned calculations for all five employment categories and
once  each for  the residential  and student  populations.  This  way the connection  between the
address point dataset and the residential, employment, and student census datasets, respectively,
is  maintained  throughout  the  model.  It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  due  to  the  separated
calculation processes for the different usage categories (residential, non-residential, education)
the spatial  representations (e.g.  “census tracts”) of the underlying population datasets  do not
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necessarily need to be identical and can vary in their levels of generalization. This is true since
all upcoming steps of the modeling process will work on the building level.
I would also like to point out another shortcoming of this estimation process here, which is a
result of the available datasets. With the assignment of residents, employees and students to the
buildings based on the percentage floorspace ratio within their respective census tract we assume
that all occurrences of a usage category accommodate an equal number of people per m2. In
reality there are quite big variations in the space requirements even within usage categories. For
example, some offices are rather cramped and hold a large number of employees on little space,
while others have rather spacious layouts and house fewer employees. The same holds true for
different forms of residential units (e.g. single-room apartments, mansions, lofts, etc.). They are
all assumed to be equal by my estimation process, which can potentially introduce significant
errors. With the available data I have not been able to circumvent this shortcoming.
In a last step these categorical building population figures can then be summed up to the total
estimated building population of each building.  Figure 17 shows the result of this final step.
These numbers can be understood as SBPi,c, the estimated total stationary building population of
building i in category c. They represent the maximum number of people that, according to the
underlying  assumptions  and  data  sources  used  in  the  modeling,  are  present  within  each
respective building. This figure does most likely not reflect reality, as can be easily understood
by the example of a building containing both residential and commercial use: while the residents
are likely to leave their homes during the course of a day and tend to return in the evening, the
employees would rather enter the building in the morning and leave in the late afternoon, as I
will prove in the upcoming section. As a result it is highly unlikely that 100% of the populations
of both categories would be present in the building at the same time. This renders the current
model  output  questionable,  since  it  grossly  overestimates  the  actual  building  population.  I
therefore deemed it imperative to include the temporal dimension into the estimation process.
Adding the Temporal Dimension
Adding the Temporal Dimension. The outcome so far extends the original methodology by
Lwin and Murayama  (2009) by the introduction of five additional usage categories over their
one-dimensional approach of residential populations. As mentioned above, this does not account
for the fact that populations are not stationary over time, but move in space according to the
routine activities performed by people in the urban space.
To account for this it was necessary to obtain spatio-temporal data representing the move-
ments of people in the respective study area. In the case of this study I used the aforementioned
CSIS PersonFlow dataset (Center for Spatial Information Science 2008).
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Figure 17: Estimated total stationary building population SBPi,c for all buildings in the study area. The 
data is the result of the stationary building population estimation methodology using a number of data 
sources from 2008-2011.
Due to privacy reasons the team at CSIS had to anonymize the exact spatial locations of the
addresses provided in the original questionnaires. Therefore I was not able to assign the locations
of  the  stationarity  events  (or  the  last  location  of  the  preceding  trip)  to  the  exact  building
locations, which would have made the subsequent population estimation process significantly
simpler. Instead, the stationarity locations of all individuals within one areal unit, the so called
“person flow zones”, had been generalized to random locations within that areal unit. It is worth
mentioning  that  these  person  flow zones  are  not  identical  to  the  census  tracts  used  by the
population and employment census datasets, or the wards used by the school census dataset, and
are generally larger in area than the former but smaller than the latter. Again, the fact that at this
point in the estimation workflow I had already established categorical population figures for each
single building makes the use of such different spatial units possible.
In order to make the information about the stationarity events useable in the context of my
estimation  methodology I  aggregated  the  number  of  distinct  stationarity  events  within  each
person flow zone to hourly time steps, ranging from 0 to 23. I did this by counting each event
from the time step it started in until the time step it ended in. If for example an event started at
12:15pm and ended at 5:45pm it is represented in my aggregated data as lasting for six time steps
from 12 through 17. These aggregated data can be understood as an hourly census of people
within the sample population pursuing each activity within each person flow zone.
By defining the maximum population per category and person flow zone over 24 hours as a
100% index I went on to calculate which proportion of this maximum population was present in
each person flow zone at each given time step. This relative population ratio can then be plotted
as a graph showing the temporal fluctuation of population within each person flow zone, census
tract or even building, per activity over time.  Figure 18 shows an example of such data for a
census tract on the artificial island of Tsukishima, which is characterized by a comparatively
large residential population. It clearly shows how most people leave their homes in the morning
between 7am and 9am and return in the evening starting from around 5pm. It also reveals the
main working hours from roughly 8am and 9am to between 5pm and 7pm and thereby proves
both assumptions I made at the end of the previous section.
In the second to last step I combined the output data of these calculations with the output
result of the penultimate step from the previous section. I assumed that the temporal variations of
the proportional populations for each category, which I just calculated, are valid for everything
within the respective person flow zone. In other words, if a person flow zone has its maximum
working population at 10am and only 50% of that population at 5pm, the same is assumed to be
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Figure 18: Temporal fluctuation of the populations within the two activity categories “home” and 
“work” for an exemplar census tract within the study area.
the case for all  buildings within this person flow zone.  In terms of calculation I applied the
percentage of the total population per activity at each time step within each person flow zone to
the estimated categorical population figures of each building. If for example a building has been
estimated with a residential population of 100 people at the end of the previous section, and the
calculation  above  has  shown  that  the  equivalent  of  20%  of  the  daily  maximum  “home”
population within the respective person flow zone are present at 1pm, then this building would
be assigned a temporally corrected estimated building population of 20 people at 1pm. Figure 19
shows the results for the activities “home” and “work” at two different times of the day for a
small part of the study area.19 It clearly reveals that a large number of people enters the study
area during the day to pursue work there.
In a final step I then added up the temporally corrected estimated population figures of the
three activities “home”, “work”, and “education” for each building and each time step. This
makes it possible to analyze the estimated total number of people per building over time. Figure
20 shows an example of a map of the total estimated stationary building population within the
study area at 1pm. Appendix A contains the maps for all 24 time steps.
Validation
Since no data about the actual building populations are available, the model output is difficult to
validate. The only viable option appeared to be a manual count of the numbers of people entering
and leaving a number of selected buildings,  which allows for the calculation of the building
populations. Performing this strategy for several buildings within the study area produced the
results  shown in  Figure  21.  The  graphs  show the  absolute  numbers  of  people  entering  and
leaving the buildings within each hour as bars. The cumulative building populations based on the
count at each time step are shown as solid lines, while the dotted lines represent the numbers
derived by the estimation model. In addition I also included the absolute number of people that
the model overestimated (positive numbers) or underestimated (negative numbers).
The data were collected for seven hours each, between 7am and 2pm on July 2nd (buildings A
and B) and 3rd (building C),  2013. All  three buildings are located in the area around Tokyo
Station. In their selection I paid close attention to the number and locations of entrances, i.e. the
number of doors as well  as the existence of underground passageways and parking garages.
These features, more precisely their non-existence, severely limited the number of applicable
buildings. Also the small number of buildings as well as the brief observation times are owed to
the  limited  time  and resources  available.  Even  with  those  limitations  I  deem the  validation
imperative for a meaningful discussion of the usefulness of my proposed estimation approach. To
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Figure 19: Comparison between the estimated building populations for the activity categories “home” 
(left) and “work” (right) for 5am (top) and 1pm (bottom) for a part of the study area. The data is the 
result of the stationary building population estimation methodology using a number of data sources from 
2008-2011.
90
Figure 20: Total estimated stationary spatio-temporal categorical building population within the study 
area at 1pm. The data is the result of the stationary building population estimation methodology using a 
number of data sources from 2008-2011.
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Figure 21: Validation of the stationary building population estimation methodology using door counts for
three exemplar buildings within the study area.
my  best  knowledge  this  is  the  first  published  validation  of  a  spatio-temporal  micro-scale
population estimation model.
Building A (Fig. 21a) is a pure office building with one tenant over ten floors and only one
door. Building B (Fig. 21b) is an eight-story mixed use building with five offices, one retail store
and a restaurant and has a total of three doors. Building C (Fig. 21c) is a highrise office building
with 26 floors, containing 39 offices, five shops, six restaurants, and  a total of six doors. It is
worth noting that I purposefully did not include buildings that contain residential uses, since the
number of people inside the building at the start of our counting period (7am) would not be
obvious. The same holds true for employees who worked overnight or arrived before 7am, but
due to the domestic nature of the companies in these three buildings I deem this effect negligible.
While the model overall produces results close to the actual measured building populations, there
are some obvious variances, which I discuss in the following section.
The employees of all buildings arrive later for work than my model predicted, mostly between
7am  and  8:59am,  therefore  the  model  overestimates  the  number  of  people  present  in  the
buildings for those times greatly. As Figure 22 shows, the deviations are at 340%, 3,600% (not
shown in the graph), and 503%, respectively. I attribute this to the fact that the movement data I
used had originally been collected using paper questionnaires. The given start and end times of
trips  therefore  do  not  necessarily  represent  the  precise  times  in  reality,  but  rather  the  more
generalized perceived or memorized times. This becomes obvious in an analysis of the structure
of the timestamps that represent the start of work for the sample individuals. A detailed analysis
of the underlying data shows that 88% of those stationary working activities supposedly started
at round numbered minutes such as “:00”, “:10”, “:15” etc. 27% were apparently started exactly
at the full or half hour marks. This becomes especially problematic when these numbers are
grouped by hour, as is the case in my methodology. If for example an employee started working
at 8:47am but entered 9:00am in the questionnaire, he would fall into the 8am group in my door
count, but in the 9am group in the movement data.
Buildings A and C show comparatively high numbers of people leaving these buildings during
the whole observation period and from as early as 9am. These numbers can be attributed to
short-term visitors, who entered the buildings for the purpose of business meetings or deliveries.
In the case of building C another major factor is the existence of a convenience store and a coffee
shop on the ground floor, which attracted large numbers of customers starting from 8am. None of
these populations are captured in the estimation model.
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Figure 22: Overestimation of the stationary building population estimation model for three validation 
buildings.
Figure 22 shows the over- and underestimation of the model in percent compared to the
actually observed numbers for all three buildings. In comparison to the other two, building B
shows generally a higher deviation. This can be attributed to the comparatively small number of
people in the building, which amplifies the model's uncertainties. The other two sample buildings
are within 60% deviation from 9am and below 25% after 10am (building C even below 5%) with
the  exception  of  the  lunch  hour  between  12pm  and  1pm.  Here  building  A  is  greatly
overestimated (+121%), which can be attributed to the coarse temporal resolution of hourly steps
in the modeling process. People who leave and reenter the building within a short timespan (such
as a 30 minute lunch break) can not be covered by the model, which looks only at the two
activities of “home” and “work”. If for example employees leave their workplace at 12:30pm
they would be counted pursuing activity “work” for the hour from 12:00pm to 12:59pm. If they
return  by 1:15pm they would  again  be  counted  pursuing activity “work”  for  the  hour  from
1:00pm to 1:59pm. The fact that they have actually left the building in the meantime is not
reflected in the model,  but only in  the door count.  The same effect  can also be seen in the
numbers of building B, albeit in the opposite direction: here I counted a great number of people
entering the building in the time from 12pm to 1:59pm to have lunch in the restaurant there.
Since these customers do not show up in the model, it underestimates the actual number by 12%.
Building C does not show either of these two effects to a greater degree, since the number of
employees leaving the building during lunch time and the number of customers entering the
building to have lunch in one of the building's restaurants almost even each other out.
Ahola  et  al.  mention  that  “more  detailed  information  about  the  temporal  behaviour  of
different population groups could also improve the quality of the model.”  (2007, 950–951) I
believe  that  the  inclusion  of  spatio-temporal  movement  data  of  a  large  sample  population
achieves this improvement, as it provides data about the exact locations of each individual at any
time and ameliorates the a priori assumptions that Ahola and colleagues had to rely on in their
modeling approach. I therefore believe that my model can indicate the actual changes in building
populations over time more precisely than previous approaches had been able to. Nevertheless,
the modeling accuracy could be further improved by using a finer time scale, e.g. 30 minutes, 15
minutes or even 1 minute intervals, and by including short-term populations from the remaining
four activities in the modeling process, such as customers, guests and visitors.
Summary
The  enhanced  spatio-temporal  building  population  estimation  approach  I  introduce  in  the
preceding  section  can  be  used  to  produce  a  variety  of  output  data  and  products.  First,  the
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geolocated  address  point  data  allow for  an  overview of  the  spatial  distribution  of  different
activity categories and the locations that facilitate these activities (Figs. 14 and 15). While this is
not an outcome of the estimation model as such, I want to emphasize how even the simple first
step of defining broad activity categories and the visualization of just one dataset can provide a
meaningful  insight  into  the  urban  structure  defining  the  spatio-temporal  effects  the  model
elaborates on in its further steps.
Second, the first part of my proposed model extends the preliminary estimation approach by
Lwin and Murayama (2009) by a number of usage categories over the one-dimensional focus on
residential building populations. This alone can help to get a more realistic representation of the
population of each building in a study area. As mentioned above, this is especially important
when analyzing areas whose primary land use is not residential. A prime example are highly
urbanized city centers, which are characterized by a multitude of different land uses gathering in
close spatial proximity to each other, and often even mixed within single buildings. My enhanced
approach  covers  these  peculiarities  and  maps  the  underlying  real-world  processes  to  the
buildings under analysis. A closer look at the spatial distribution of buildings with a high number
of usage categories reveals that they are mainly clustered in the business districts, which are also
the locations of most of the highrise buildings in the study area (e.g. in Marunouchi west of
Tokyo Station, around Shinbashi, Mita, and Shinagawa Stations, as well as west of Shinjuku
Station, east of Ikebukuro Station and in Akasaka in northern Minato ward). These agglome-
rations  of  multiple  usage  categories  can  be  understood as  a  result  of  the  need for  multiple
activities in the close surroundings of the workplace. They allow employees to perform all their
daily routine activities within one building, which is convenient in terms of both travel time and
cost.
Third, the introduction of the temporal dimension to the estimation of building populations
allows for a micro-scale analysis of the actual population figures according to the underlying
human activities and the datasets used in the process. I believe that this is the most interesting
characteristic of the proposed estimation methodology, since for the first time it allows for a
reliable estimation of building populations even for large study areas with justifiable require-
ments  in  terms  of  both  necessary  input  data  and  computational  expense.  I  formulated  the
calculations  shown in  the  two sections  above  as  a  series  of  SQL statements  that  process  a
multitude of tables within a PostgreSQL database with the PostGIS extension installed to make
use of geographical functionalities.
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The output result of the spatio-temporal model can be used in a multitude of ways. Examples
for visualizations are graphical representations of the population figures over time for single
buildings or aerial units (Fig. 18), and maps of the population distribution at a certain point in
time (Fig. 19 and 20) or as time series maps (see Appendix A). In addition the output data can be
used for further quantitative analyses, such as population density calculations for certain points
in time. In this study I use it as a factor that heightens the vulnerability to terrorist attacks, based
on  the  assumption  that  highly  populated  places  have  a  greater  attractiveness  for  attacks  by
terrorists (cf. Chapter 5.3).
Other than that, these micro-scale building populations could be used in a risk and hazard
context  to  identify  realistic  starting  scenarios  for  multi-agent-based  tsunami  evacuation
simulation models like those introduced by Mas and colleagues (Mas, Adriano, and Koshimura
2013; Mas et al. 2013). It can also be used as input for other quantitative models, such as traffic
volume estimations  in  an urban planning or  risk assessment  context  (cf.  Chapters  5.3.2 and
5.3.3), or customer volume estimation models in an economic geographical context.
The population  estimation  approach  I  introduce  has  several  shortcomings  inherent  in  the
model, that have to be kept in mind when using the output data in further analyses. So far the
spatio-temporal model does only take into consideration three activities: “home”, “work”, and
“education”. All other daily routine activities pursued by the people in highly urbanized areas,
such as shopping, recreation, daily errands, etc., are not reflected. This effect became obvious in
the  low accuracy during the office  lunch time hours  between 12pm and 1:59pm, where the
populations of the three sample buildings were greatly under- or overestimated according to the
existence or non-existence of restaurants in the respective buildings. So far the model focuses
only on the long-term activities,  where people would stay within the same building over an
extended amount of time. These populations can be called “stationary populations”. Short-term
activities  such  as  the  aforementioned  are  completely  neglected,  the  respective  “transient
populations” are not reproduced in the model. Therefore the main amendment to the model has
to  be the inclusion  of  the remaining transient  population  categories,  i.e.  “shopping”,  “enter-
taining”, and “errand” (cf. Chapter 5.3.5).
Also, model inaccuracies in the morning hours can be attributed to the collection method of
the underlying movement data. Since these were obtained using paper questionnaires, a strong
tendency to round number minutes in the time stamps was introduced. In connection with the
coarse  temporal  resolution  of  our  population  model,  this  led  to  severe  estimation  errors.
Therefore, two more modifications to improve the model accuracy have to be 1) the use of more
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temporally  precise  movement  data,  possibly  collected  in  an  automated  process  using  GPS-
enabled devices, and 2) the use of a temporal scale finer than the hourly intervals I used in this
study. I also want to mention that the nature of the data used in this paper did not allow for a
comparison of different temporal cycles, such as weekdays as opposed to the weekend, holiday
periods  versus  normal  school  and  working terms20,  or  seasonal  changes21,  which  would  un-
doubtedly all  provide  further  interesting  insights  into  the  spatio-temporal  changes  in  human
activity patterns.
On a different note, some shortcomings of the model in regard to the modeling precision can
be attributed to the underlying data and their deficiencies. While all datasets used in this area are
amongst the best available in their respective realms, they impaired the model calculation by
missing and incomplete data. Especially missing address points, buildings with missing attribute
information  and  the  aforementioned  flaws  of  the  person  trip  data  have  had  significant
implications on the overall model output. I am confident that it can be improved significantly if
these  deficiencies  were  amended.  Also,  several  generalizations  in  my estimation  model  can
possibly  have  an  effect  on  the  calculation  results.  These  generalizations  are  inherent  in  the
assumptions of 1) an equal split of a building's floorspace among the contained usage categories
and 2) equal floorspace use within each usage category, neglecting differences among various
residential types, as well as office and store layouts. Both can lead to skewed distributions and
therefore biased outcomes but are impossible to quantify or eliminate given the available data.
5.3.2. Mobile Pedestrian Population
Introduction
In the preceding chapter I introduce a spatio-temporal methodology to quantify the estimated
number of people inside buildings at various time of the day. This comprises people being at
home, working at their workplace (e.g. an office, factory, shop, or entertainment facility), and
studying at school or university.22 In addition to people sojourning inside buildings people also
spend time outside of buildings, in public places such as streets and parks and in transportation
means.
I believe that this mobile population is equally important for identifying the most populous,
crowded places, since it helps to identify vulnerable places inside urban areas regarding one of
the  three  generic  goals  of  terrorist  perpetrators  I  present  in  the introduction of  Chapter  5.3:
crowded places.  It  can be seen as the logical extension of the spatio-temporal  estimation of
stationary building populations I introduce in the preceding chapter.
97
The reason to focus this estimation process exclusively on pedestrians (cf. this chapter) and
railway passengers (cf. Chapter 5.3.3) is to be found in the modal split of transportation within
my study area and the composition patterns of transportation chains (Tables 11 and 12). Of the
almost 900,000 single trips within the study area over the 24 hours of data collection 82.5% have
been taken either by foot or on trains (i.e. monorail, railway, and subway), with the majority of
51.9% on foot. All individual modes of transportation (i.e. moped, motorcycle, car, and minivan)
together only account for 4.9% of all trips, about half of the amount of bicycle trips. Other public
modes of transportation also play only minor roles in the composition of traffic within the study
area, with taxis under 1% and buses (private and public) at only 3%. This can be explained by
the very convenient provision of public transportation railway services in the study area, which is
characterized by a dense network of stations, manifold and redundant connections between train
lines and a high service frequency and succession of trains.
Most trips do in fact consist of a number of different modes of transportation, they are so-
called multi-modal trips. For example a person might ride a bicycle from their home to the train
station, ride a train and ultimately walk to their office. This constitutes a multi-modal trip using
three different  modes of transportation:  bicycle,  railway,  and walking.  A detailed analysis  of
these trip chains showed that the largest number of transfers happened between the “walking”
and “railway, subway” modes of transportation: 80.6% of the people walking boarded a train
afterwards, while 80.3% of train passengers continued their trip on foot (cf. 12).
These data led me to the conclusion that the majority of people in public spaces are either on-
board trains or walking. In this chapter I introduce my methodology for the micro-scale spatio-
temporal modeling and estimation of mobile pedestrian populations on the streets within the
study area. In the following chapter I introduce a similar methodology for the micro-scale spatio-
temporal  modeling  and  estimation  of  mobile  railway  populations  (cf  Chapter  5.3.3).  The
outcome  of  both  models  are  fine-grained  results  of  the  estimated  populations  for  all  road
segments and railway links within my study area on a given time-scale. I have to mention here
that the resulting figures do not reflect the absolute numbers of pedestrians or passengers, but an
index of how crowded each road segment or railway link is. To my best knowledge there have
been no published attempts to perform such an analysis on the fine spatial and temporal scales I
present  here.23 Therefore,  I  introduce  a  novel  approach  for  a  spatio-temporal  micro-scale
population estimation on a  street  segment  basis  in  this  part  of my study.  It  builds  upon the
estimated building population figures I produce in Chapter 5.3.1 and a number of other datasets,
which I describe first. I then explain and discuss the methodology I employed in my model. I
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Table 11: Modal split of trips within the study area 
over 24 hours.
Mode of transportation Trips Percent
walking 463,411 51.9%
bicycle 69,416 7.8%
moped 2,832 0.3%
motorcycle 3,128 0.4%
taxi 6,143 0.7%
car 33,998 3.8%
minivan 3,666 0.4%
lorry 8,748 1.0%
private bus 3,604 0.4%
bus 23,028 2.6%
monorail 2,828 0.3%
railway, subway 271,760 30.4%
total 892,562 100%
Data source: Center for Spatial Information
Science (2008)
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Table 12: Matrix showing the composition patterns of transportation chains as transfers of modes of transportation within the study area over 24 hours.
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walking 1,317 143 59 320 2,142 341 88 1,373 68,311 4,007 324,372
bicycle 1307 14 4 9 107 30 19 172 787 375 31,633
moped 143 6 2 7 4 3 2 34 6 2,037
motorcycle 74 7 4 1 4 2 2 6 4 353
taxi 224 13 1 5 4 36 7 1,239
car 2,567 130 15 3 3 5 8 102 172 58 7,970
minivan 408 30 5 1 1 3 3 20 30 6 972
lorry 91 18 3 1 1 4 4 4 1 122
private bus 1,339 155 1 2 3 81 16 1 157 38 4,156
bus 68,388 733 35 6 91 140 22 2 149 217 31,962
monorail 3,976 359 10 6 14 44 9 1 43 210 2,862
railway, subway 324,730 29,362 1,894 342 2,466 5,468 762 70 4,161 32,094 2,835
Data source: Center for Spatial Information Science (2008)
then go on to explain in detail the temporal fluctuations derived from the movement data, before
summarizing and pointing out some shortcomings in the final section.
Data
All datasets required for the estimation calculation I propose here together with their required
attributes are shown in 13.
The methodology builds  upon the estimated  building  population figures  generated  by the
estimation model introduced above. In addition it requires the numbers of passenger transfers at
each train station within the study area. I obtained these in the form of the numbers of daily
passenger  transfers  per  train  station  from  the  MLIT  National  Land  Information  Division,
National and Regional Policy Bureau. This dataset from 2010 is derived from the same OD data
by the  Tokyo  Metropolitan  Area  Transportation  Planning Council  (Tokyo  Metropolitan  Area
Transportation Planning Council 2013) that was used by CSIS to synthesize the point positions
in one minute intervals (Sekimoto et al. 2011; Usui et al. 2009). The numbers therefore do not
show the actual passenger counts per day, but the number of sample individuals passing through
each respective train station. In addition the data itemizes the numbers of transfer processes by
the mode of transportation the respective person changed to or from at this station. This allowed
me to extract only the number of pedestrians. Since the data are not broken down into temporal
units, I had to once again make use of the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow data.
Lastly I also needed data showing the train stations in their spatial context, which I was able
to obtain for 2011 from the MLIT National Land Information Division, National and Regional
Policy Bureau, and detailed street network data to perform the pedestrian volume analysis on.
For this purpose I used the 2010  Advanced Digital Road Map Database (ADF)  by Sumitomo
Electric System Solutions Co., Ltd., which is a comprehensive digital road network dataset for
all of Japan. It contains 96 attributes for the street segments (links) and 90 attributes for the
nodes in the network spread out over a multitude of files. Of these attributes I only used the
information whether a road segment is accessible to pedestrians or not, thereby filtering out all
city highways in my study area. I also created a logical routing network for use in ESRI ArcGIS
using the Network Analyst extension.
Methodology
The process of estimating the degree of pedestrians traffic per street segment contains a total of
three steps, which I explain in detail in the upcoming sections:
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Table 13: Necessary datasets for the spatio-temporal mobile population estimation methodology and 
datasets used in this study.
Dataset Attributes Dataset name and source Date
building data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
footprint area
number of floors
Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
census data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
residential population (i.e. 
population census information)
Population census by the Statistics Bureau at 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications
2010
employment population (i.e. 
business or economic census 
information)
Employment census by the Statistical Institute 
for Consulting and Analysis
2009
student population (i.e. school 
census information)
School census by the Department of Statistics 
Population at the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government Bureau of General Affairs
2010
address point data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
spatial location of each address 
point
category of the person or 
business represented by each 
data point
Telepoint Pack! by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2011
population 
movement data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
spatial location of each 
individual at each time step
trip purpose / activity
means of transportation
PersonFlow data by the University of Tokyo 
Center for Spatial Information Science
2008
railroad data spatial locations of all train 
stations
Railroads (time series data) by National Land 
Information Division, National and Regional 
Policy Bureau
2011
road network data linear representations of all road 
segments
accessibility of road segments for
pedestrians
spatial locations of all road 
network nodes
Advanced Digital Road Map Database (ADF) 
by Sumitomo Electric System Solutions Co., 
Ltd.
2010
traffic flow volume
data
number of daily passenger 
transfers per train station
Traffic flow volume (passenger transfers at 
stations) by National Land Information 
Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau
2010
Note:
Italics mark datasets explained in detail in Chapter 5.3.1, since they are necessary for the calculation of the 
building population figures.
1) calculation of building access
2) calculation of train station usage, and
3) calculation of road network betweenness centrality
Calculation of building access
Calculation of building access. The aim of this first preparatory step is the assignment of each
building to the street segment that provides access to the building. Since the 2008/09 Zenrin
Zmap-TOWNII building dataset does not contain information about the locations of entrances of
the buildings, and the total number of buildings was too large for a fieldwork data collection, I
needed  to  approximate  the  most  likely  entrance  locations.  I  did  this  by  implementing  the
simplified assumption that every building is  accessible from the street network closest  to it,
which has been employed in previous studies (Sevtsuk and Mekonnen 2012b).
Obviously this introduces some error, since in some cases a building might be located closer
to  a  street  from where  it  is  not  accessible.  This  has  also  been pointed  out  by Sevtsuk and
Mekonnen  (2012b),  but  I  was  able  to  improve  the  rate  of  correctly  assigned  buildings  by
referring  not  only  to  the  building  centroids,  as  they  did,  by  analyzing  the  actual  building
footprints. Yet, this still does not solve the issue of wrongfully assigning buildings with multiple
entrances. These are very common in highly urbanized areas like my study area and therefore
introduce a quite significant source of error.
Figure 23 shows examples for both issues: the buildings marked green have their entrances to
the larger connector street, also marked green (example A), the buildings marked blue have their
entrances to the main street marked blue (example B). In addition all three buildings marked blue
(example B) have secondary entrances to the connector streets and backstreets. Without additio-
nal data, i.e. a detailed database of building entrance location, I will not be able to overcome this
error.
In my estimation model the centrality calculation itself will not be performed for the single
buildings, but for each street segment. The estimated stationary building populations developed
in the preceding chapter will be used as weights for the centrality calculation. Therefore the
population figures need to be assigned to their adjacent street segments in this first step. Hence
the sum of the absolute estimated populations of all buildings that are accessible from a certain
street segment are assigned to this street segment. The centrality calculation algorithm, which I
present in detail in the section after the next, requires weighted point locations as input data. This
can be achieved by assigning half of the “virtual” population of each street segment to its two
constituent nodes, as equation (4) shows:
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Figure 23: Example of erroneous assignments of 
buildings to street segments based on shortest 
straight-line distances.
VP n , t=
∑
l∈Ln
∑
b∈Bl
SBP b , t
2
(4)
where Vpn,t is the virtual population of road node n at time t, Ln is the set of road links
that connect to road node n, Bl is the set of buildings that are adjacent to road link l,
SBPb,t is the estimated stationary building population of building b at time t.
This process allows for the provision for the temporal dimension in the stationary building
population and creates virtual accumulated road node populations for all time steps. These time
steps have to be either the same or a subset of those selected during the building population
estimation process.
Calculation of train station usage
Calculation  of  train  station  usage. As  I  mention  in  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  the
passenger transfer data do not account for temporal fluctuations during the day and provides only
the total number of transfers over the course of 24 hours. Therefore I had to offset it against the
population movement data from the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow dataset.
I did this by extracting all those point locations from the database that met the following three
criteria:
• final point location of one subtrip, starting point of another24
• ending mode of transportation is “railway, subway” or “monorail”25
• starting mode of transportation of the subsequent subtrip is “walking”
This produces a table of point locations where people from the sample population got off
trains  and started  walking.  Since the  PersonFlow data  carries  time stamps this  allows for  a
temporal analysis of transfers per train station per time step. In order to do so I performed a
spatial join between these transfer points and the train station point locations to assign them the
respective station names. This allows to derive the number of total transfers as well as the hourly
transfers per station regarding the sample population.
I then calculated how much percent of the total number of passenger transfers, as per this
data, took place within each hour and assigned the respective percentage from the 2010 MLIT
data. If for example the PersonFlow data showed 1,822 transfers from “train” to “walking” for
Kanda Station of which 765 were registered between 8:00am and 8:59am, this means that 42.0%
of the daily passenger transfer volume there took place during this hour. In contrast, only 50
transfers were registered there between 3:00pm and 3:59pm, which equates to 0.3% (Fig. 24). As
we know the total number of passengers at each station from the MLIT data, it is then possible to
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Data sources: National Land Information Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau (2010),
Center for Spatial Information Science (2008)
Figure 24: Hourly passenger transfers and cumulative passenger transfer ratio at Kanda Station.
calculate the temporally corrected number of pedestrians leaving the train stations by referring to
the aforementioned percentage. In the case of Kanda Station this means that 42.0% of the total
109,811 passengers who leave by foot over the course of the day, did so between 8:00am and
8:59am, namely 46,106 people. In contrast,  between 3:00pm and 3:59pm it were only 3,013
people.
In my model I do account only for those pedestrians that start from a train station and walk
towards  a  building,  not  the other  way around.  This  is  possible  because  the  model  does  not
calculate the actual number of pedestrians per street segment, but the mere degree of pedestrian
traffic. Hence the directionality of the walks has no impact on this calculation.
I also had to account for the fact that the passenger transfer data shows only one figure per
train station, even if the station itself consists of a number of affiliated stations (cf.  14). Since
there is no data available about the distribution of passengers on the different affiliated stations, I
had to assume an even distribution. This is most likely a wrong assumption, but since I have no
numerical way to ameliorate the falsifying effect, I have to accept the error it introduces into the
calculation.  Hence I  divided the  result  from the previous  calculation  step by the number of
affiliated stations for each train station. Of the 457 train stations within the study area, 91.3% had
only  one  or  two  affiliated  stations,  which  should  keep  the  emerging  error  small,  but  these
together account only for 64.8% of the total number of passenger transfers. In contrast, Tokyo
Station and Shinjuku, the only train stations with eight affiliated stations, represent only 0.4% of
the total number of train stations, but together account for 6.5% of all passenger transfers in the
study area.  This is  especially significant as both stations extend widely with their  connected
underground walkways, which spread their respective exits over large areas.
Calculation of pedestrian traffic volume
Calculation of pedestrian traffic volume. In order to calculate the volume of pedestrian traffic
per street segment I avail myself of a methodology from graph theory, namely the betweenness
centrality. It is one of a multitude of centrality measures, which Freeman generally defines as “a
function of the sum of the minimum distances between [a] point and all  others”  (1977, 35).
Centrality  measures  are  used  in  all  types  of  network  analyses,  from  social  networks  to
communication  networks,  organizational  networks,  urban growth and,  as  in  my case,  spatial
networks  (Bavelas  1950;  Beauchamp  1965;  Moxley  and  Moxley  1974;  Porta  et  al.  2009;
Sabidussi  1966).  In  the  aforementioned  article  by  Freeman  he  introduced  the  betweenness
centrality as a new methodology to measure the betweenness of points, building on the works of
Shaw  (1954) and  Leavitt  (1951),  who  started  regarding  the  physical  distances  between  the
network nodes as determinants in their centrality to the whole network.
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Table 14: Distribution of stations with multiple 
affiliated stations and respective passenger 
transfers.
Affiliated
stations
Stations within 
study area Passenger transfers
absolute relative absolute relative
1 344 75.3% 4,684,026 43.0%
2 73 16.0% 2,372,967 21.8%
3 22 4.8% 1,344,692 12.4%
4 10 2.2% 693,883 6.4%
5 4 0.9% 516,820 4.7%
7 2 0.4% 570,946 5.2%
8 2 0.4% 704,025 6.5%
Data source: National Land Information
Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau
(2010)
In  my  model  I  use  the  implementation  of  the  betweenness  centrality  by  Sevtsuk  and
Mekonnen (2012a) in their Urban Network Analysis (UNA) toolbox for ArcGIS. It uses a highly
optimized algorithm by Brandes (2001) to calculate the betweenness centrality measure, which is
defined as “the fraction of shortest paths between pairs of other buildings in the network that
pass by building i” (Sevtsuk and Mekonnen 2012a, 11, emphasis in original). Equation (5) shows
the mathematical implementation.
BTW i , t
r = ∑
j , k∈G−i , d [ j , k ]⩽ r
n i , j , k
n j , k
⋅w j , t (5)
where BTWi,tr is the betweenness of building i at time t within the search radius r, ni,j,k
is the number of shortest paths from node j to node k that pass by node i, nj,k is the
total number of shortest paths from node j to node k,  wj,t is the weight of node j at
time t, with nodes j and k lying within the network radius r from node i.  (modified
from Sevtsuk and Mekonnen 2012a, 11)
As Sevtsuk and Mekonnen (2012a) mention, this betweenness centrality measure can be used
to estimate the potential of passersby at different buildings on the network. Since it allows to
introduce the weights wj,t in the calculation it is possible to represent the temporal fluctuations in
the passenger flows over the course of a day. This time dimension is my addition to the model by
Brandes (2001) and thereby represents to my best knowledge the first spatio-temporal between-
ness centrality measure.
The resulting values represent a  dimensionless indicator of the estimated pedestrian traffic
volume on each street segment based on the aforementioned assumptions and specifications.
While the values for the single street segments are comparable amongst each other for the same
time step, the same is not the case across multiple time steps. Therefore the data need to be
normalized.26 In  order  to  do  so I  queried  the  database for  the  greatest  value  over  all  street
segments and all 24 hours and calculated each value's percentage of that maximum value. I label
the resulting figures the normalized spatio-temporal betweenness centrality measure (NSTBCM)
for the street segments (Fig. 25). Appendix C contains the maps for all 24 time steps.
Summary
The spatio-temporal mobile population estimation approach I introduce in the preceding section
can  be  used  to  calculate  an  index  showing  the  pedestrian  traffic  volume  on  single  street
segments, divided into deliberately chosen time steps. This is especially useful in the spatial
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Figure 25: Normalized spatio-temporal betweenness centrality measure (NSTBCM) for all street 
segments within the study area at 9am.
context  of  highly  urbanized  areas,  as  it  provides  the  populations  in  public  space  as  a
complementary element to the figures of the population inside buildings (cf. Chapter 5.3.1).
I  achieve  this  by  employing  a  graph  theory  methodology,  namely  that  of  betweenness
centrality, on a number of datasets that provide information about building populations and train
station passenger transfers segregated both spatially and by time.
The introduction of the temporal dimension to the estimation of populations in public space
allows for a micro-scale analysis of the actual population figures according to the underlying
human activities and the datasets used in the process. I believe that this is the most interesting
characteristic of the proposed estimation methodology, since for the first time it allows for a
reliable estimation of mobile populations even for large study areas with justifiable requirements
in terms of both necessary input data and computational expense.
The  output  result  of  the  spatio-temporal  model  can  be  used  to  visualize  the  amount  of
pedestrians on the streets of a chosen study area. While the data do not represent the absolute
numbers  of  pedestrians,  they  do  reflect  the  traffic  volume  and  allow  for  a  comparison  of
crowdedness among all street segments within the study area. In addition the output data can be
used for further quantitative analyses, such as population density calculations for certain points
in time. In this study I use it as a factor that heightens the vulnerability to terrorist attacks, based
on  the  assumption  that  highly  populated  places  have  a  greater  attractiveness  for  attacks  by
terrorists (cf. Chapter 5.3).
Yet, the population estimation approach I introduced has several shortcomings inherent in the
model, that have to be kept in mind when using the output data in further analyses. Since I
currently do not have access to the exact numbers and locations of building entrances I had to
make the a priori assumption that every building is only accessible from the street segment that
has  the  shortest  straight-line  distance  to  the  building's  footprint.  This  can  obviously lead  to
erroneous assignments of building populations to wrong street segments. Without the availability
of such a dataset it is impossible to overcome this shortcoming, which led me to conscientiously
accept the introduced error.
Also,  since  the  volumes  of  passenger  transfers  were  only  given  per  train  station  in  the
available dataset, I had to make the generalizing assumption that these passenger volumes are
distributed equally to all affiliated train stations. This does not reflect the reality and will greatly
over-  and  underestimate  certain  train  stations,  but  is  impossible  to  overcome  without  the
introduction of additional data.
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As I use the same population movement dataset as in the preceding chapter, the same resulting
model inaccuracies can be attributed to this data as explicated in Chapter 5.3.1. Generally, most
shortcomings of the model in regard to the modeling precision can be attributed to the underlying
data and their deficiencies. While all datasets used in this area are amongst the best available in
their respective realms, they impaired the model calculation by missing and incomplete data. I
am confident that it can be improved significantly if these deficiencies were amended.
5.3.3. Mobile Railway Population
Introduction
In the introduction to the preceding chapter I explain in detail my reasoning behind employing
the  volumes of  pedestrians  on the  streets  and passengers  in  public  railway transportation  to
identify crowded and therefore vulnerable places. At 271,760 subtrips the usage of railway is
second only to the number of pedestrian subtrips (cf.  11). Therefore the number of people on
board the trains poses a significant factor in the identification of populated places in addition to
the estimated pedestrian traffic flows (cf. Chapter 5.3.2).
In 2007 the MPD asked over 2,500 citizens and facility managers in an opinion poll about
their concerns about terrorism and crisis management. There 62.5% of the citizens noted that
they use trains on a daily basis (Metropolitan Police Department 2007, 16) and 59.5% expressed
their fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack while on a train (2007, 21). This shows the
value  and  importance  of  public  railway  transportation  to  the  people  in  the  study area  and
underlines that it is of critical importance in the process of the identification of crowded and
hence vulnerable places.
Data
All datasets required for the identification of the spatial distribution of symbolic value together
with their required attributes are shown in  15. A search for exact, time-stamped trips by train
within my study area unfortunately did not produce any results. Due to the widespread use of
rechargeable contactless IC smart cards in Japan, such data is constantly being collected in the
form of ticket gate readings by the railway corporations and has already been used in scientific
publications  (Yabe  and  Kurata  2013).  While  I  had  been  able  to  contact  the  authors  of  the
aforementioned journal article and also a contact person at East Japan Railway Company (JR
East), I have not been able to obtain the data on the grounds that these are confidential and only
to be used in-house by JR East and affiliated research groups. As a result I had to resort to the
movement data of train passengers in the 2008 CSIS  PersonFlow dataset and the 2010 traffic
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Table 15: Necessary datasets for the spatial identification of railway link importance and datasets used in
this study.
Dataset Attributes Dataset name and source Date
building data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
footprint area
number of floors
Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
underground 
passage data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
footprint area Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
population 
movement data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
spatial location of each 
individual at each time step
trip purpose / activity
means of transportation
PersonFlow data by the University of Tokyo 
Center for Spatial Information Science
2008
railroad data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2)
spatial locations of all train 
stations
Railroads (time series data) by National Land 
Information Division, National and Regional 
Policy Bureau
2011
traffic flow volume 
data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2)
number of daily passenger 
transfers per train station
Traffic flow volume (passenger transfers at 
stations) by National Land Information 
Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau
2010
Note:
Italics mark datasets explained in detail in preceding chapters.
flow volume data  by the MLIT National  Land Information Division,  National  and Regional
Policy Bureau in my modeling process.
The traffic volume dataset contains the names of the train stations and the number of people
getting on or off trains at each train station according to the CSIS PersonFlow data (cf. Chapter
5.3.1). The figures therefore do not represent the actual numbers of passenger transfers but allow
for a comparison of the passenger volumes among all train stations contained in the dataset. The
numbers are divided into 14 modes of transportation that passengers arrived by at the stations or
by which they continued their trips on from there: bus, car, light automobile, truck, private bus,
taxi,  motorcycle,  motorized  bicycle,  bicycle,  walking,  aircraft,  ship,  other  and unknown (cf.
Chapter 5.3.2 and 11).
The 2011 railroad dataset by the MLIT National Land Information Division, National and
Regional Policy Bureau consists of two datasets, one about train stations and one about railroad
tracks.  The former  contains  the spatial  locations  of  all  train  stations  and a  large  number  of
attributes,  such as  the  name of  the  station,  name of  the  serving train  line,  the  name of  the
operational company, and the years that service was commenced or ended.27 The latter contains
line features  representing the  course of  the railroad  tracks  as  well  as  the same attributes  as
mentioned above. Since unfortunately the railroad dataset and the traffic volume dataset do not
contain a common identifier for the train stations, I had to join them based on the station names.
Methodology
I split the estimation of the mobile railway population in two parts: the usage of train stations on
the one hand, and the ridership of railway links on the other hand. This comprises all types of
rail-bound passenger traffic, including heavy rail, light rail, and monorail, both track-bound and
on rubber tires.
Train Station Usage
Train Station Usage: The train stations within the study area consist of both overground and
underground  portions,  which  are  oftentimes  combined  to  larger  train  station  complexes.  In
several cases these station complexes comprise multiple separate train stations with differing
names in addition to the affiliated train stations serving multiple train lines under the same name.
All these combinations had to be taken care of in the calculation of the populations present
within each train station complex over the course of the day. To do this I relied on the 2010
traffic  flow  volume  data  by  the  MLIT  National  Land  Information  Division,  National  and
Regional Policy Bureau and the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow dataset, a process I describe in detail in
Chapter 5.3.2.
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In order to assign these hourly passenger volumina I also had to delineate the aforementioned
train station complexes from the 2008/09 Zenrin Zmap-TOWNII dataset, which contains both the
building  footprints  and  the  footprints  of  underground  passages  including  underground  train
stations. Yet, since the datasets do not contain the information about the affiliation of certain
buildings or underground passages to a train stations, I had to do this manually for all 405 unique
train stations in the study area. After doing so I ended up with two datasets: one with the train
station  buildings,  and  another  one  with  the  underground  train  stations,  both  including  the
information about their affiliation to a certain train station. I was then able to merge these two
datasets and dissolve the resulting polygon features, which resulted in a dataset with one polygon
feature per train station as Figure 26 shows for a detail of the study area.
In cases where one underground passage is used by two or more train stations this process
ended up with multiple congruent polygons. In Chapter  5.3.6 I introduce the methodology of
estimating the spatial influence of this vulnerability factor which ensures that these congruent
polygons  mutually  aggravate  their  importance  regarding  the  vulnerability  of  the  respective
places. I then joined these polygon features with the hourly passenger flow figures I derive in
Chapter  5.3.2. This allows me to generate a map showing the estimated usage for each train
station complex in the study area for each time of the day. It is important to note that the resul-
ting figures do not represent the actual number of passengers but an index value indicating the
relative usage of each train station in comparison to the others within the study area. Figure 27
shows the resulting data for 8am. Appendix E contains the maps for all 24 time steps.
Railway Link Ridership
Railway Link Ridership: Since railway trips have to start and end at train stations I define a
railway link as the direct connection between two train stations. Since unfortunately no detailed
data about the actual number of passengers between train stations are available I had to resort to
the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow data for this vulnerability factor as well. I did this by evaluating the
closest railway link for each point location in the  PersonFlow dataset that indicates the use of
public  railway transportation  in  its  “transportation  mode”  attribute.  As the  PersonFlow data
contains a point location for every individual in 1-minute intervals I then had to aggregate the
number of points per unique person and hour for all railway links in the study area. This allows
for the creation of maps of the estimated railway link ridership as shown in  Figure 28. It is
important to note that the resulting figures do not represent the actual number of passengers but
an index value indicating the relative usage of each railway link in comparison to the others
within the study area. Appendix G contains the maps for all 24 time steps.
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Data source: Zenrin Co., Ltd. (2008)
Figure 26: Train station complexes including overground buildings and underground passages around 
Tokyo Station as per the 2008/09 Zenrin Zmap-TOWNII dataset.
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Figure 27: Estimated train station usage at 8am. The data is the result of the train station usage 
estimation methodology using a number of data sources from 2008-2011.
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Figure 28: Estimated railway link ridership at 8am. The data is the result of the railway link ridership 
estimation methodology using a number of data sources from 2008-2011.
Due to the dense network of train lines there are many instances of two or more of them
running in parallel over extended sections. In my calculation process I handle these as separate
from each other. The methodology of estimating the spatial influence of this vulnerability factor
in introduce in Chapter  5.3.6 ensures that these spatially adjacent yet logically separated train
lines mutually aggravate their importance regarding the vulnerability of the respective places.
Summary
In the preceding section I introduce two novel spatio-temporal approaches for the estimation of
the mobile population within the railway network of a study area. It contains two components:
the train station usage and the railway link ridership.  Both can be used to  calculate  indices
showing the traffic volumes within single train station complexes and on single street segments,
respectively, divided into deliberately chosen time steps. In the same way as the estimation of the
mobile pedestrian population (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) this is especially useful in the spatial context of
highly  urbanized  areas,  as  it  provides  the  populations  in  another  public  space,  i.e.  public
transportation, as a complementary element to the figures of the population inside buildings (cf.
Chapter 5.3.1).
I achieve this by employing a number of data, foremost the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow dataset,
and their combination with infrastructural data such as train station buildings, underground train
stations and railway links between these train stations. Together they provide information about
the relative mobile railway populations segregated both spatially and by time.
The introduction of the temporal dimension to the estimation of populations in public space
allows for a micro-scale analysis of the actual population figures according to the underlying
human activities and the datasets used in the process. I believe that this is the most interesting
characteristic of the proposed estimation methodology, since for the first time it allows for a
reliable estimation of mobile populations even for large study areas with justifiable requirements
in terms of both necessary input data and computational expense.
The  output  result  of  the  spatio-temporal  model  can  be  used  to  visualize  the  amount  of
passengers  moving inside  the  public  railway transportation  network  of  a  chosen study area.
While the data do not represent the absolute numbers of passengers, they do reflect the traffic
volumes and hence allow for a comparison among the train stations and the railway links. In
addition the output data can be used for further quantitative analyses, such as population density
calculations  for  certain  points  in  time.  In  this  study I  use  it  as  a  factor  that  heightens  the
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vulnerability to terrorist attacks, based on the assumption that highly populated places have a
greater attractiveness for attacks by terrorists (cf. Chapter 5.3).
Yet, the population estimation approach I introduced has several shortcomings inherent in the
model, that have to be kept in mind when using the output data in further analyses. Since the
volumes of passenger transfers were only given per train station in the MLIT dataset, I had to
make the generalizing assumption that these passenger volumes are distributed equally to all
affiliated train stations. This does not reflect the reality and will greatly over- and underestimate
certain train stations, but is impossible to overcome without the introduction of additional data.
As  I  use  the  same population  movement  dataset  as  in  the  preceding  chapters,  the  same
resulting  model  inaccuracies  can  be  attributed  to  this  data  (cf.  Chapters  5.3.1 and  5.3.2).
Generally, most shortcomings of the model in regard to the modeling precision can be attributed
to the underlying data and their deficiencies. While all datasets used in this area are amongst the
best available in their respective realms, they impaired the model calculation by missing and
incomplete data. I am confident that it can be improved if these deficiencies were amended.
5.3.4. Symbolic Value
Introduction
Apart from affecting a large number of people with their attacks, terrorists will generally also
strive for maximum attention about their actions. As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter
5.3,  the  symbolic  value  of  possible  attack  targets  therefore  serves  as  the  fourth  aggravating
terrorism vulnerability factor in the scope of this study.
The quantification of an abstract concept such as “symbolic value” is obviously significantly
more difficult than that of quantifiable measures such as stationary or mobile populations. The
main problem is the definition of what actually has a symbolic value. I understand the symbol-
ism of a place or an object  (cf.  Chapter  4.1) as the result  of two valuations:  1)  that  of  the
perpetrator, and 2) that of those under attack.
Terrorists will generally aim at targets that have some context with their ultimate political
goals  or  that  are  directly  involved  in  their  fight  for  these  goals.  Examples  are  al-Qaeda's
bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. On
August 7th, 1998, two truck bombs detonated simultaneously in front of the embassy buildings in
these two East African capital  cities.  The attacks left  235 people dead and more than 4,000
injured  (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013g;
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2013h). Since the date of the attack coincides with the anniversary of the American invasion in
Saudi-Arabia, the attacks are widely believed to be a response to these activities and also the
alleged mis-treatment of four members of an affiliate organization of al-Qaeda, the  Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, in American captivity:
On August  5,  1998,  […] in what  was beginning to take on the aura of  a very personal
vendetta,  an  Arab-language  newspaper  in  London  published  a  letter  from [al-]Zawahiri
threatening retaliation against the United States—in a "language they will understand." He
warned that America's "message has been received and that the response, which they hope
they will read carefully, is being prepared." Two days later the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania were blown up, killing 224 people. (Mayer 2008, 114)
In addition, terrorists will also aim to select targets that represent certain values amongst those
under attack. Again, one of the most well-known examples is an attack attributed to al-Qaeda,
namely the series of attacks on September 11th, 2001. On that day terrorists were able to hijack
four passenger planes and subsequently used them as missiles when flying them into the two
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, as well as the Pentagon and the United
States Capitol in Washington, D.C. Even though the last impact could be avoided, more than
3,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives as a direct result of the attacks, the number of
injuries and long-term damages is unknown (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism 2013i; 2013j; 2013k; 2013l). These attacks were aimed directly at US
American economic, military and political landmark buildings: the World Trade Center28, the US
Department of Defense and the meeting place of the US Congress.
Thornton was amongst the first political scientists and terrorism researchers to emphasize the
symbolism of terrorist activities in his definition of terrorism as “the deliberate creation of fear,
usually through the use (or threat of use) of symbolic acts of violence, to influence the political
behaviour  of  a  target  group.”  (1964,  73,  emphasis  added) These  dimensions,  the  deliberate
character, the violence and the inherent symbolism also help to discern terrorism from other
forms of political violence:
It highlights the violent quality of most terrorist acts, which distinguishes a programme of
terror  from  other  forms  of  non-violent  propagation,  such  as  mass  demonstrations  and
boycotts. It also stresses the particular quality of terrorist violence. Thornton referred to it as
'extra-normal';  that  is,  for  a  certain  level  of  organized  political  violence  to  be  called
terrorism, it must go beyond the norms of violent political agitation accepted by a given
society.  Finally,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  Thornton's  definition  emphasizes  the
symbolic nature of the violent  act.  An act  of  terrorist  violence will  attempt to  convey a
message to a target audience rather than secure a piece of territory (as in conventional war)
or extinguish a people or ethnic group (as in genocide). (Neumann 2009, 8, emphasis added)
In the  context  of  how contemporary terrorists  more  and more  effectively exploit  modern
communication technologies, Jenkins notes that
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for terrorists, the most significant technology is not weapons but direct communication with
their multiple audiences. Terrorism, to repeat, was originally aimed at the people watching.
Victims were threatened or killed to make a point, not only to the terrorists’ foes but above
all to the terrorists’ own constituents. Technological developments in the 1960s and 1970s—
the  ubiquity  of  television,  more  portable  television  cameras,  communications  satellites,
uplinks to remote news crews, global news networks—allowed terrorists to reach audiences
worldwide  almost  instantaneously.  By  carrying  out  visually  dramatic  acts  of  violence,
terrorists could virtually guarantee coverage, intensifying the terror and inflating their own
importance. (Jenkins 2006, 125)
As I explain in the course of the development of my  Human Activity Based Vulnerability
Concept in Chapter 2.3.3, the values of those threatened by a hazard are imperative in discerning
disasters from non-disastrous hazard events. The characteristic that differentiates terrorism from
natural hazards is the underlying malevolent intent, in other words the aim at harming people and
creating a disastrous outcome.
My  attempt  at  operationalizing  the  symbolic  value  of  places  follows  mostly  the  ideas
formulated by Caplan and Kennedy  (2010a) in their  Risk Terrain Modeling framework. There
they introduce a number of criminogenic features of spaces (e.g. bus stops, liquor shops, ATMs,
etc.) and methods to operationalize them as well as their spatial influences (cf. Chapter 4.2.3). As
opposed to the aforementioned population-based vulnerability factors (cf. Chapters  5.3.1 and
5.3.2),  which  used  density  maps  to  operationalize  the  spatial  influence  of  highly  populated
places,  I  use a  distance-based approach here.  This  allows to  rather  identify vulnerable  radii
around those places that carry a symbolic value than to identify their spatial agglomeration.
The first step, though, has to be the definition of what constitutes symbolic value and the
identification  of  the  associated  places  that  represent  these  values  in  the  study area.  In  the
following sections I describe the data I used and explain these steps in detail.
I want to mention at  this  point that this  vulnerability factor and its  operationalization are
highly subjective. The definition of “symbolism” in the upcoming sections follows my personal
perception of what constitutes a symbolic value in the context of terrorism attractiveness, based
on the published literature where referenced. Another researcher would possibly define it in a
different way, which would lead to the selection of different places that represent this symbolism.
As a result, the spatial distribution of “symbolic value” would also be different from that which I
develop in the following sections.
One might argue that this subjectivity introduces ambivalence in the quantitative analysis of
terrorism vulnerability, which I attempt to achieve with the approach and framework developed
in this study. I agree that there is some ambivalence inherent in this part of the analysis. But I am
strongly  convinced  that  this  ambivalence  is  ameliorated  by  the  conscientious  selection  of
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symbolic places by the person performing the analysis. This selection is optimally based on the
subject matter expertise, quantitative results and information about the respective perpetrator and
a precise attack scenario (cf. Chapter 4.2.1). Every analysis employing my framework therefore
not only will but  has to  produce a different result, since the underlying assumptions are also
different.
Data
All datasets required for the identification of the spatial distribution of symbolic value together
with their  required attributes are shown in  16.  These datasets  and their  attributes have been
explained in detail in the preceding chapters.
Methodology
I  defined  three  different  categories  of  places  that  carry  symbolic  values  for  the  public  for
different reasons, which I explain in the upcoming sections:
1) large train stations, 
2) symbolic institutions, and 
3) landmarks
In comparison to the methodologies for the estimation of stationary building populations and
mobile  populations,  the  processes  I  describe  here  are  largely  of  manual  nature,  albeit  they
obviously make use of various spatial analysis techniques.
Large Train Stations
Large Train Stations. The symbolism of large train stations originates not from the fact that
they are frequented by a large number of people, but rather from the degree of popularity that
arises out of those masses of users. This popularity can be more than local (i.e. known to the
surrounding population) or national (i.e. known all over Japan) and broaden to an international
level (i.e. known around the world).
I decided to operationalize this popularity by selecting those train stations that constitute the
95th percentile of the overall distribution of passenger volumes in the study area. To identify
these  I  used  the  2010 traffic flow volume data  by the  National  Land Information  Division,
National and Regional Policy Bureau, which contains the exact number of passenger transfers at
all train stations in Japan. The average passenger volume of all stations in the study area was
52,085 passengers with a standard deviation of 80,366. 39 train stations had passenger volumes
greater than the resulting passenger volume threshold per day of 132,451, as shown in 17.
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Table 16: Necessary datasets for the spatial identification of symbolic value and datasets used in this 
study.
Dataset Attributes Dataset name and source Date
building data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
footprint area
number of floors
Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
underground train 
station data
footprint area Zmap-TOWNII by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008/09
address point data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1)
spatial location of each address 
point
category of the person or 
business represented by each 
data point
Telepoint Pack! by Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2011
road network data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2)
linear representations of all road 
segments
Advanced Digital Road Map Database (ADF) 
by Sumitomo Electric System Solutions Co., 
Ltd.
2010
railroad data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2)
spatial locations of all train 
stations
linear representations of all 
railroad tracks
Railroads (time series data) by National Land 
Information Division, National and Regional 
Policy Bureau
2011
traffic flow volume 
data
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2)
number of daily passenger 
transfers per train station
Traffic flow volume (passenger transfers at 
stations) by National Land Information 
Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau
2010
Note:
Italics mark datasets explained in detail in preceding chapters.
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Table 17: Train stations within the study area constituting the 95th percentile of the passenger volumes of 
train stations within the study area as per the 2010 traffic flow volume dataset.
Station name
Affiliated 
stations
Daily passenger 
volume Station name
Affiliated 
stations
Daily passenger 
volume
Shinjuku†‡ 8 940,176 Nihonbashi‡ 3 178,154
Shibuya†‡ 7 638,872 Gotanda†‡ 3 176,468
Ikebukuro†‡ 7 595,866 Kinshicho†‡ 2 176,179
Tokyo†‡ 8 516,431 Kasumigaseki‡ 3 175,922
Shinbashi†‡ 5 422,530 Omori† 1 172,755
Shinagawa† 4 389,850 Osaki† 2 165,245
Tamachi† 1 290,354 Ogikubo†‡ 2 164,029
Otemachi‡ 5 260,861 Yotsuya†‡ 3 161,503
Akihabara†‡ 4 260,131 Nakano† 2 153,769
Iidabashi†‡ 5 248,332 Suidobashi†‡ 2 150,755
Ueno†‡ 4 222,926 Meguro†‡ 4 150,013
Yurakucho†‡ 2 221,048 Kitasenju†‡ 5 145,509
Kanda†‡ 3 220,130 Kayabacho‡ 2 144,491
Hamamatsucho† 1 216,396 Akabane† 2 144,222
Takadanobaba†‡ 3 208,347 Roppongi‡ 2 143,223
Ebisu†‡ 2 204,117 Toyocho‡ 1 139,204
Ochanomizu†‡ 3 197,836 Jinbocho‡ 3 139,031
Kamata† 3 196,783 Toranomon‡ 1 135,896
Ichigaya†‡ 4 194,502 Kudanshita‡ 3 134,929
Ginza‡ 3 179,378
Notes:
† Overground platforms.
‡ Underground platforms.
Data source: National Land Information Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau (2010)
Most of these stations are located along the Yamanote Line loop and inside of it, Others are
major  transit  points  and gateways  for  commuters  from the residential  areas  surrounding the
Tokyo Metropolis: Shinjuku and Shibuya Stations are fed mostly by commuters from the western
Tokyo Metropolis, Akabane and Ikebukuro Stations from the northwest (i.e. Saitama prefecture),
Kitasenju and Akihabara Stations from the northeast (i.e. Chiba and Ibaraki prefectures), while
Kinshicho and Toyocho Stations receive extensive amounts of commuters from the east  (i.e.
Chiba  prefecture),  and  Kamata,  Omori  and  Osaki  Stations  from  the  south  (i.e.  Kanagawa
prefecture including the nearby cities of Yokohama and Kawasaki),  respectively.  In addition,
most of these stations are located in areas with a large number of offices, shops and restaurants,
which serve as destinations for the commuter traffic.29
I related this  selection to the train station point dataset by the National Land Information
Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau. Among these 39 train stations Hamamatsucho,
Omori, Tamachi, Toranomon, and Toyocho Stations are served by only one train line30, while all
other stations consist of multiple affiliated train stations serving different train lines under the
same station name. It is also noteworthy that Akabane, Hamamatsucho, Kamata, Nakano, Omori,
Osaki, Tamachi, and Shinagawa Stations have exclusively overground platforms, while Ginza,
Jinbocho,  Kasumigaseki,  Kayabacho,  Kudanshita,  Nihonbashi,  Otemachi,  Roppongi,  Torano-
mon, and Toyocho Stations consist entirely of underground platforms.
As a next step I used a spatial join to extract all buildings from the 2008/09 Zenrin  Zmap-
TOWNII data that intersect with these train stations, represented by the point features from the
aforementioned railway dataset, marked red in Figure 29. Since the point features insufficiently
represent the actual shape of the trains stations I then had to manually extend these selections to
contain all buildings that belong to the train station buildings in the real world. I verified these
selections of buildings, marked blue in  Figure 29, using fieldwork in the study area. I did the
same with the underground train station data from the same Zenrin  Zmap-TOWNII dataset to
account for the underground portions of the train stations, which are marked green in Figure 29.
Finally I dissolved the multiple buildings and underground portions of each train station into
one feature per station, which allows for an easy creation of the straight-line distance buffer to
represent the nine station complexes' spatial influence later in the process.
Symbolic Institutions
Symbolic Institutions. Next I identified the locations of institutions that might have some kind
of symbolic value to either terrorists or the broad public. These institutions are shown in  18.
Overall I was able to extract twelve different categories of institutions matching this criterion.
Eight  of  these  represent  political  offices  of  any  kind.  In  addition  I  selected  all
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Figure 29: Semi-automated selection of over- and 
underground train station complexes from the train 
station point feature dataset using the example of 
Akihabara Station.
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Table 18: Categories of symbolic institutions and 
corresponding address points within the study area.
Institution Address points
airport (1)
cabinet, cabinet office* 20
court of justice* 281
fire department, fire station 68
foreign embassy, consulate* 228
ministry, state authority* 542
municipal authority* 1,891
parliament* 9
police department, police station, 
police box
189
political organization* 256
prefectural authority* 787
religious group 659
Note:
* Political office.
institutions related to the police, the fire department, offices of religious groups and airports.
These categories were taken directly from Zenrin's  2011  Telepoint Pack! dataset.  I  created a
group for all state authorities and ministries from the original twelve categories: “Ministry of
Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries  (MAFF)”,  “Ministry  of  Defense  (MOD)”,  “Ministry  of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)”, “Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT)”, “Ministry of Finance (MOF)”, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)”,
“Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare”, “Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
(MIC)”, “Ministry of Justice (MOJ)”, “Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism”
(MLIT), “Ministry of the Environment”, and “other state authority”.  18 also shows the number
of  address  points  within  each category,  4,931 in total.  At  81.4% most  of  them are  political
offices, marked with an asterisk in the table. Even though the complete area of  Tokyo Haneda
International Airport is located inside the study area, no address points of category “airport” are
contained in it. Therefore I manually added one address point.
Finally I used a spatial join to extract all buildings from the aforementioned building dataset
that intersect at least one of the filtered address points from the previous step. Since many of the
buildings contain more than office, this resulted in 2,361 buildings. As the address point category
“airport” was not present in the filtered institutions, I also manually added the two passenger
terminal  buildings  of  Haneda  Airport.  Thereby  I  identified  2,363  buildings  that  contain
institutions with some kind of symbolic value.
Landmarks
Landmarks. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary (2013) defines a landmark as “an object or
structure on land that is easy to see and recognize”. I identified three different categories of
landmarks: 1) economic, 2) political, and 3) touristic. In my selection of landmarks, which  19
shows, I tried to be as general as possible,  while still  establishing a meaningful selection of
features. One necessary requirement was that the landmarks have to have symbolic value both
for Japanese citizens and for people abroad, in order to be of interest for terrorists, given that
these pursue an international agenda.
Both the Bank of Japan, domicile of the central bank of Japan, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange
represent  institutions  with  significant  influence  on  the  national  and  international  economic
markets. Terrorist attacks in their immediate vicinity could be seen as a strong statement against
the finance and credit markets, globalized economies, and the monetary policies of the Japanese
cabinet and other governments abroad. In addition, successful terrorist activities in their vicinity
can and will lead to business interruptions that are most likely to have significant repercussions
on the Japanese economy and the global stock markets. This effect could be observed in the
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Table 19: 25 landmarks in the study area and their 
categories.
Category Landmark name
economic Bank of Japan (BOJ)
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)
political National Diet Building
Yasukuni Shrine†
touristic Asahi Beer Hall
Ginza‡
Meiji Shrine (incl. surrounding forest)†
Mori Tower (Roppongi Hills)
Rainbow Bridge‡
Sensoji Temple (incl. Nakamise Street)†
Shibuya Crossing†
Ryogoku Sumo Hall
Sunshine 60 Building
Tokyo Big Sight (Tokyo International 
Exhibition Center)
Tokyo Station Building
Tokyo Dome
Tokyo Imperial Palace (incl. outer 
gardens)†
Tokyo International Forum
Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale 
Market (Tsukiji Fish Market)†
Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
Building (Tokyo City Hall)
Tokyo Skytree
Tokyo Tower
Tokyo World Trade Center
Ueno Park†
Zojoji Temple†
Notes:
† Broad area, manually digitized.
‡ Linear feature, 15 m straight-line buffer around road.
Italics mark TripAdvisor (2013) as source.
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11th, 2001, which forced the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other stock market places in the world to close down
and adjourn trade for multiple days. The resulting economic damage can not be numeralized, but
is believed to be immense (Makinen 2002).
Most of the landmarks that carry a political  symbolism are already covered in the list  of
symbolic institutions in the previous section. For reasons of completeness I deemed it necessary
to complete these by landmarks that do represent some kind of political symbolism, yet do not
necessarily fulfill any political function at the same time. The National Diet Building serves as
the building where the Diet of Japan meets, including both the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors. Beyond that it also stands out by its unique architectural appearance which
makes it an easily recognizable building both for Japanese citizens and foreign tourists. Yasukuni
Shrine is a Shinto shrine that commemorates almost 2.5 million men, women and children who
died in the service of Japan during military conflicts, such as the Boshin War, the Seinan War, the
Sino-Japanese  and  Russo-Japanese  wars,  World  War  I,  the  Manchurian  Incident,  the  China
Incident and World War II (Yasukuni Shrine 2013). While religion and state are strictly separated
in  Japan by the model  of  State  Shinto,  this  shrine's  political  symbolism originates  from the
enshrinement  of  more  than  1,000 convicted  war  criminals  as  per  the International  Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE):
Analysts say that because the main wars it commemorates are those with China and the US,
it appears to the political left to symbolise foreign invasions. To the right, it is a symbol of
patriotism. (British Broadcasting Corporation 2012)
Regularly visits by members of the Japanese government, including the prime minister, are
causing tensions between Japan and its neighbors and former war enemies, especially China,
South  Korea  and  North  Korea.  These  governments  regard  the  visits  as  provocation,  since
according to their belief “the shrine represents Japan's past militarism–something for which they
feel it has not fully apologised.” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2012)
During the, admittedly very subjective, selection process I tried to employ third-party data to
derive a general idea about which landmarks carry a symbolic value. In the case of touristic
landmarks I consulted the list of attractions in Tokyo compiled by the users of TripAdvisor, one
of the biggest travel advice websites and communities on the internet (TripAdvisor 2013). The
landmarks I took from this list are written in italics in 19, the others are my personal, subjective
selection.
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I encountered three different spatial types of landmarks: buildings, broad areas, and areas that
are defined by a linear feature. As in the two previous cases of the large train stations and the
symbolic institutions I used a spatial join to identify the buildings that contained the 15 non-areal
landmarks. In addition I manually digitized the areas for the eight landmarks that comprise a
broad area: Yasukuni Shrine, Meiji Shrine, Sensoji Temple, Shibuya Crossing, Tokyo Imperial
Palace, Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market, Ueno Park, and Zojoji Temple. For the
two linear features, namely Ginza and the Rainbow Bridge, I created 15 m straight-line distance
buffers around the line features that symbolize the middle lines of the respective roads. Thereby I
created a total of 25 polygon features that represent the landmarks in my study area.
Summary
In this  chapter  I  introduce the operationalization of another  vulnerability factors,  that differs
greatly  from  the  three  previously  factors  (cf.  Chapters  5.3.1,  5.3.2,  and  5.3.3).  The  main
differentiator  is  that  it  is  a  highly  subjective  operationalization  that  follows  my  personal
perception of what constitutes a symbolic value in the context of terrorism attractive-ness. I want
to reiterate that I don't perceive the ambivalence this subjectivity introduces in the quantitative
analysis of terrorism vulnerability as a shortcoming, but rather a unique feature and advantage
over other estimation models, since it requires a very detailed and differentiated approach by the
respective analyst in the formulation of what constitutes symbolic value, the central element of
the underlying Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I introduce in Chapter 2.3.3.
The definition of three different categories of places that carry symbolic values for the public
for different reasons, namely large train stations, symbolic institutions, and political, economical
or touristic landmarks allows for the identification of the respective places in the real world (i.e.
buildings, streets, etc.) that represent these symbolic values.
I was able to identify 39 building complexes that represent large, and therefore well-known
train stations, 2,363 buildings that contain institutions with some kind of symbolic value, and 25
buildings or areas that represent landmarks in my chosen study area. Figure 30 shows the spatial
distribution of these symbolic places of all three categories within the study area.
5.3.5. Disregarded Vulnerability Factors
In the course of developing this approach and the selection of possible vulnerability factors I
developed a number of other factors. I will briefly explain why I did not end up using these in
my study.
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Figure 30: Spatial distribution of symbolic places of all three categories within the study area.
Infrastructural Networks
As I lay out in Chapter  4.1, infrastructural networks are an essential part of urban areas. They
provide services, without which the urban system can not function properly, hence their disrup-
tion  will  inevitably  cause  major  disutilities  to  the  affected  population.  The  provision  with
electricity,  gas, heat31 and water,  the drainage of wastewater,  as well  as the connections that
communication and transportation networks provide have become essential elements of modern
urban life.
All  the aforementioned infrastructural  networks,  in the form of pipes and cables,  and the
related plants,  distributors,  converters,  stops  and stations  are  located in the urban space and
integrated among other buildings. The effect of a malicious tampering is two-fold: first, an attack
on a building will inevitably also affect the infrastructural elements contained in, connected to, or
located close to this building  (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; Karydas and Gifun 2006; Lemon
2004; Michaud 2005; Patterson and Apostolakis 2007); second, an attack that is aimed primarily
on an infrastructural element will affect surrounding buildings and will also cause trickle-down
effects  within  the  affected  infrastructure  (e.g.  an  overload  in  the  electricity  network)  or  on
physically or logically interdependent infrastructural networks (e.g. a communication network
that needs electricity to work) (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001).
The reason for not analyzing the vulnerability of infrastructural networks in this study is to be
found in the data availability. In order to perform such kind of analysis it is necessary to have
access to detailed information about the network, both in terms of their functional connections
(i.e. a network graph or schema) and their actual locations in the real world (i.e. maps showing
the course of pipes and cables). Both are generally very difficult to obtain, since the network
operators have a legitimate interest in keeping such information from the broad public to protect
them from any malicious tampering. While I got in contact with the Bureau of Waterworks at the
TMG in a very early stage of my research, I have not been able to obtain the necessary datasets.
Building Attributes
The physical attributes of buildings have an effect on their resistance towards the forces they
might be exposed to. Kappes and colleagues (2012) point out the importance of a hazard-specific
approach when analyzing vulnerability indicators in the context of physical vulnerability. They
refer to a number of studies that concentrate on the development of such relative vulnerability
towards different hazards as a result of building characteristics (Birkmann, Schneiderbauer, and
Ehrlich 2013; Collins, Grineski, and de Lourdes Romo Aguilar 2009; Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott
2000; Dao and Peduzzi 2003; Dilley 2005; Granger et al. 1999; Lazarus 2011; Papathoma and
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Dominey-Howes  2003;  Papathoma-Köhle  et  al.  2007;  Puissant,  Malet,  and  Maquaire  2006;
United Nations Development Programme and Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 2004;
Wisner et al. 2003). Some of the building vulnerability indicators they developed for tsunami and
landslide threats are: material of the building, number of floors of the building, characteristics of
the slope side wall, condition of the ground floor, building surroundings, row of the building,
presence  of  sea  defense,  and  width  of  intertidal  zone  in  front  of  the  building  (Kappes,
Papathoma-Köhle, and Keiler 2012, 579).
In  the  context  of  terrorism  vulnerability  the  FEMA suggests  the  following  six  building
characteristics in its  Handbook for Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings to Evaluate Terrorism
Risks32 (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2009, 44–101):
• site  (e.g.  perimeter  boundary,  unobstructed  view,  storage  of  hazardous  materials,
adjacent structures)
• architecture  (e.g.  building  height,  footprint  area,  building  configuration,  lobby/retail
location, loading dock, vehicular penetration)
• building envelope (e.g. window support type, total percent of window area, glass type,
security film, wall type)
• structural components and systems (e.g. wall reinforcements, column spacing, column
height, column accessibility, structural enhancements)
• mechanical,  electrical,  plumbing (MEP) systems (e.g.  external  air  intake conditions,
internal air distribution system, location of critical utilities)
• security  (e.g.  intrusion  detection,  video surveillance,  security  guards,  vehicle  access
control, pedestrian access control)
I implemented features from the former two characteristics in my assessment framework by
the use of spatial  analysis  methodologies.  The latter  four require  either  a  detailed screening
procedure  (as  suggested  in  the  aforementioned  FEMA document)  or  documentation  by  the
building owners.
Yet again the security relevant nature of these kind of information made it impossible for me
to obtain them. In addition, the sheer number of ca. 1.9 million buildings in my study area (cf.
Chapter 5.2.1) made it impossible to inquire for the data from all related building owners. At the
same time, the amount of data that would need to be collected also made a fieldwork approach
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impracticable. As a result I had to leave the physical attributes of buildings outside the scope of
my analysis.
Temporary Building Population
In Chapter 5.3.1 I introduce a methodology for the estimation of building populations at different
times during the day. I labeled this the stationary building populations, since I can only regard
those periods of time where the individuals stay at one location to perform certain activities.
These activities are “being at home”, “working”, and “studying”. The methodological reasons for
this limitation are explained in detail in Chapter 5.3.1.
Yet, I do acknowledge that there is a large number of other activities that people pursue in
urban areas, apart from the three listed above. These activities are often characterized by a short
duration, such as “shopping”, “eating at a restaurant”, or “running an errand”. The data I am
using for the calculation in the stationary building population estimation does not allow this kind
of analysis on the required fine temporal scale.
Therefore I decided to take a different approach, as suggested by Bosserhoff (2005a; 2005b)
in his analyses of socio-demographic data for the estimation and prediction of traffic volumes. I
adapted the central idea of assuming a certain consumption of floorspace per usage category and
that the knowledge about the available floorspace and the usage type allow me to derive the
maximum number of temporary visitors (e.g. customers of a shop or restaurant). For example a
convenience store of a certain size can contain a certain maximum number of customers at a
time, while another convenience store of twice the size can contain twice as many customers at a
time.  Similarly,  a  restaurant  of  the  same size  as  a  convenience  store  will  contain  a  smaller
number of customers than the convenience store due to the different activities being pursued at
each, and the resulting different store layouts.
Based on these assumptions I  developed the following equation for  the estimation of the
temporary building population:
TBP i , c , t=FS c , i⋅γ c⋅β c ,t (6)
where TBPi,c,t is the temporary building population of building i in category c at time
t,  APAi,c,t,  Fsc,i is  the  cumulative  floorspace  of  category  c in  building  i,  γc is  the
customer floorspace ratio of category  c,  βc,t is a binary variable showing whether
category c is in operation at time t.
I developed a number of values for  γc based on the figures that Bosserhoff  (2005a; 2005b)
generated. Since these data were used in the context of traffic volume estimations in Germany I
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needed to transpose them to more realistic values for the use in Japanese urban areas. In addition
I was planning to derive the values for βc,t from clustered movement profiles as has been sugges-
ted in a number of publications (González, Hidalgo, and Barabási 2008; Horanont 2012; Jiang,
Ferreira,  and González 2012).  As a first  step I  defined some rough values myself,  based on
general observations I had made during the analysis of the movement profile data I am using in
Chapter  5.3.1.  20 shows the resulting preliminary data.  Experimental  calculations with these
values showed that the results did not provide any new insights, as the changes in the population
figures  did  not  vary  significantly  from  those  I  derived  using  only  the  stationary  building
population  estimation  methodology.  This  fact  together  with  the  enormous  computational
investment involved and the high degree of additional uncertainty introduced by the  a priori
estimations and guesses regarding the values of γc and βc,t led me to the conclusion to abandon
this subject and focus on other, more reliable vulnerability factors instead.
5.3.6. Spatial Influence Estimation
In Chapter 4.2.3 I introduce the concept of spatial influence (SI) as one of the main components
of the analysis framework I develop in the course of this study. It is a spatial representation of the
fact that objects influence their surroundings by their own attributes and states. This means that a
place that is otherwise not vulnerable towards being the target site of a terrorist attack can be
vulnerable nevertheless due to the fact that it is spatially close to a place of high vulnerability.
In Chapter 4.2.3 I also introduce two possible operationalizations of spatial influence: spatial
concentration and spatial proximity as suggested by Caplan and Kennedy (2010a, 25–26). In the
context of the attack scenario of a small explosive attack (cf. Chapter 5.2.2) and the four vulnera-
bility factors (cf. Chapters 5.3.1 through 5.3.4) I chose for the purpose of this study I use both of
these operationalizations, as 21 shows.
I selected the bandwidth of 250 m for the KDE smoothing following the argumentation by
Caplan and Kennedy in their operationalization of the spatial influence of criminogenic factors
for shootings in US american cities: “A 1,000 foot bandwidth was selected because it seemed a
reasonable sphere of influence for shooters—the average blockface is approximately 350 feet.”
(2010b, 48) Given the chosen attack scenario of a small explosive attack I also followed the
recommendations by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) and the FEMA for stand-off
distances  in  the  context  of  explosive  devices.  The  NCC  (2012) recommends  a  mandatory
evacuation distance of 46 m and a preferred evacuation distance of at least 564 m for explosive
devices up to 23 kg TNT equivalent, which constitutes a briefcase bomb. Similarly, the FEMA
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Table 20: Preliminary data for the estimation of temporary building populations.
Category c Ratio γc Hours (for βc,t) Category c Ratio γc Hours (for βc,t)
kindergarten 0.2 08:00 15:00 fitness center 0.2 08:00 22:00
library 0.4 08:00 20:00 hotel 0.2 15:00 10:00
school 0.1 08:00 15:00 movie theater 0.5 15:00 01:00
university 0.1 08:00 20:00 museum 0.2 10:00 19:00
convenience store 01 00:00 24:00 night club 0.5 22:00 06:00
department store 0.5 09:00 20:00 restaurant 0.5 11:00 22:00
retail 0.5 09:00 20:00 sport facility 0.1 08:00 22:00
service 0.2 09:00 17:00 theater 0.2 19:00 22:00
supermarket 1 09:00 20:00 governmental 0.15 09:00 15:00
entertainment 0.5 17:00 02:00 hospital 0.15 00:00 24:00
café 0.5 07:00 20:00 doctor 0.15 09:00 15:00
disco 1.5 22:00 06:00 religious 0.5 08:00 18:00
Notes:
The ratio γc denotes the number of people per m2 inside the respective usage category.
The hours show the opening and closing times of all outlets of the respective usage category.
Extended from original data sources: Bosserhoff (2005a; 2005b)
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Table 21: Operationalization of the spatial influence of the four vulnerability factors in this study.
Vulnerability factor SI operationalization Details
stationary building population spatial concentration • kernel density estimation (KDE)
• bandwidth of 250 m
• weighted by the estimated population per 
building
mobile pedestrian population spatial concentration • kernel density estimation (KDE)
• bandwidth of 250 m
• weighted by the NTSBCM per street segment
mobile railway population 
(train station usage & railway 
link importance)
spatial concentration • kernel density estimation (KDE)
• bandwidth of 250 m
• weighted by the usage per train stations and the 
riderhip per railway link, respectively
symbolic value spatial proximity • buffer
• euclidian distance of 100 m
• weighted by the symbolic relevance
(2003b) defines luggage bombs to contain ca. 26-100 lbs (11.8-45.4 kg) of TNT equivalent and
estimates minor wounds by glass fragments to be sustained from standoff distances between 67
and 122 m (220-400 ft) as Figure 31 shows. Since these values depend heavily on factors such as
size and characteristics of the explosive device as well as the location of the explosion inside or
outside of a building or within a confined space such as an underground train station, I opted for
a radius larger than these values and therefore settled at 250 m.
Since the spatial influence estimation will produce smooth raster surfaces over the complete
study area it is important to choose an appropriate cell size. Caplan and Kennedy remark in this
context:
100x100 foot cells were the smallest area that our computers could process reasonably fast
and, for the purposes of this risk terrain model, if a risk terrain map could assess the risk of
shootings at small (but reasonable) geographic units (e.g. 2 inches would be unreasonable
since a person cannot even fit in that space), it would provide the most utility for operational
policing compared to larger, less specific, units of analysis. (Caplan and Kennedy 2010b, 48)
I argue that in the context of a micro-scale analysis of a highly urbanized area such as the
study area of this study (cf. Chapter 5.2.1) a cell size of 30 m (≈ 100 ft) is still too generalized
and unspecific. Under the constraint of being able to do so within a feasible timeframe I decided
to calculate the spatial influence as raster surfaces with 10 * 10 m cells. Given the size of the
study area this results in raster datasets of 3,221x3,295 pixels (i.e. 10.6 megapixels), which can
easily be created and processed on a contemporary computer. In the following sections I explain
the details about the calculation of the spatial influence for each of the four vulnerability factors.
Stationary Building Population
In Chapter 5.3.1 I describe the process of calculating the estimated population of the buildings in
the study area in bespoke time steps over the course of a day. The output result is a table of 24
population figures for each building, one per hour, which can be visualized in thematic maps (cf.
Fig. 20 and Appendix A). Using the aforementioned KDE smoothing algorithm with a 250 m
bandwidth and these estimated hourly building population figures it is possible to produce raster
surfaces  of  the  study area  with  a  10 m cell  size  to  operationalize  and  visualize  the  spatial
influence of the buildings on their immediate surroundings.
In order  to  be able  to  compare  the  data  for  the  single  time steps  it  is  then  necessary to
normalize the raster surfaces to a scale of 0-100, where the maximum value of 100 represents the
maximum cell value over all 24 hourly raster surfaces. I call the resulting value the normalized
spatial  influence  (nSI) of  the  respective  vulnerability  factor.  Figure  32 shows a  side-to-side
comparison of the estimated building population values and the resulting nSI distribution for a
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Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003b, 4–11)
Figure 31: Recommended minimum standoff distances in relation to the size of an explosive device.
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Figure 32: Comparison of the estimated population figures per building (left) and the resulting raster 
surface representing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) (right) for a detail of the study area at 9am.
detail of the study area at 9am. It is obvious how the highly populated highrise office buildings in
Marunouchi, west of Tokyo Station, as well as west of Shinjuku and the large governmental
office  buildings  in  Hibiya,  south  of  the  Imperial  Palace,  have  a  great  influence  on  their
immediate surroundings. Appendix B contains all 24 maps of the study area showing the nSI
raster surfaces for each time step.
Mobile Pedestrian Population
The  process  of  calculating  the  spatial  influence  of  the  estimated  mobile  population  follows
mostly that of the estimated building population I outline  above. It starts from the pedestrian
volume per street segment, expressed by the normalized spatio-temporal betweenness centrality
measure (NSTBCM), whose calculation process I describe in Chapter 5.3.2. Since this vulnera-
bility  factor  also  has  an  inherent  temporal  dimension,  each  street  segment  is  assigned  24
population figures,  one per hour,  which can be visualized in thematic maps (cf.  Fig. 25 and
Appendix C). Once again the KDE smoothing algorithm with a 250 m bandwidth over these
estimated hourly mobile population figures produces raster surfaces of the study area with a
10 m cell size to operationalize and visualize the spatial influence of more or less crowded street
segments on their immediate surroundings.
Similarly  to  the  process  of  calculating  the  spatial  influence  of  the  stationary  building
population  it  is  necessary to  normalize  the  raster  surfaces  to  a  scale  of  0-100 to  allow for
comparisons over the temporal dimension. The end result are 24 raster surface maps showing the
normalized spatial influence (nSI) of the respective vulnerability factor. In the comparison of a
map of the original NSTBCM and the resulting nSI for a detail of the study area at 8am in Figure
33 it  can  easily  be  seen  how the  most  crowded street  segments  can  be  found around train
stations. This can be attributed to the fact that public train transportation is the most common
mode of transportation for people working in Tokyo and mostly commuting there from their
homes in the residential belt around the core city (cf. Fig. 13). Appendix D contains all 24 maps
of the study area showing the nSI raster surfaces for each time step.
Mobile Railway Population
The process of calculating the spatial influence of the mobile railway population follows those of
the estimated stationary building and mobile pedestrian population, since I used the operatio-
nalization of spatial concentration again. The initial values are the train station usage and the
railway link ridership, whose calculation I describe in detail in Chapter 5.3.3. Both components
of this vulnerability factor have an inherent temporal dimension, hence each train station and
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Figure 33: Comparison of the estimated population figures per street segment (left) and the resulting 
raster surface representing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) (right) for a detail of the study area at 
8am.
railway link is assigned 24 population figures, one per hour, which can be visualized in thematic
maps  (cf.  Figs. 27 and  28 as  well  as  Appendix  E  and  Appendix  G).  Once  again  the  KDE
smoothing algorithm with a 250 m bandwidth over these estimated hourly mobile population
figures produces raster surfaces of the study area with a 10 m cell size to operationalize and
visualize the spatial influence of more or less crowded train stations and railway links on their
immediate surroundings.
Following the examples of the processes of calculating the spatial influence of the stationary
building population ans mobile pedestrian population it is necessary to normalize the resulting
raster surfaces to a scale of 0-100 to allow for comparisons over the temporal dimension. This
results in 24 raster surface maps showing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) of the respective
vulnerability factor, namely the train station usage and the railway link ridership. The compari-
son between a map of the original estimated train station usage data and the resulting nSI for a
detail of the study area at 8am in Figure 34 shows how the most crowded train station complexes
have  quite  widespread  influence.  In  the  eastern  part  the  contiguous  underground  passages
connecting  Tokyo  Station  and  Yurakucho  Station  as  well  as  the  subway stations  Otemachi,
Nijubashimae, Hibiya, Ginza, and Higashiginza span an area of roughly 1.5 by 1km. Similarly in
the western part the station complex that connects Shinjuku Station as well as the train and sub-
way stations  Seibushinjuku,  Shinjukunishiguchi,  Nishishinjuku,  Tochomae,  and Shinjukusan-
chome comprise a nearly circular area of 1km diameter.
In contrast the comparison of a map of the railway link ridership and the resulting nSI for a
detail of the study area at 8am in Figure 35 shows how the linear railway tracks differ in their
estimated passenger volumes. The figures are the highest near major train stations such as Tokyo
Station and Shinjuku Station and along sections where multiple train lines run in parallel. This is
for example the case between Kanda Station, south of Akihabara Station and Tokyo Station, and
even more so between Shinbashi Station and Shinagawa Station where some of the most heavily
used train lines converge: the Chuo Main Line, the Yamanote Line, Keihin-Tohoku Line, and the
Tokaido  Main  Line  as  well  as  a  number  of  long  distance  trains  (the  Tohoku  Shinkansen,
Yamagata Shinkansen, Akita Shinkansen, Joetsu Shinkansen, and Nagano Shinkansen lines, and
the Tokaido-Sanyo Shinkansen, respectively). Appendix F contains all 24 maps of the study area
showing the nSI raster surfaces of the train station usage for each time step, Appendix H does the
same for the railway link ridership.
Since I divided the operationalization of the mobile railway population into two parts (i.e. the
estimated train station usage and the estimated railway link ridership) it also became necessary to
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Figure 34: Comparison of the estimated train station usage (left) and the resulting raster surface 
representing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) (right) for a detail of the study area at 8am.
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Figure 35: Comparison of the estimated railway link ridership (left) and the resulting raster surface 
representing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) (right) for a detail of the study area at 8am.
combine the two resulting nSI raster surfaces for each of the 24 time steps into one combined
map showing the normalized spatial influence of the mobile railway population. I did this by
using equation  (1),  which I  explain in  detail  in the context  of the overall  vulnerability map
creation. Here I assigned both components an equal importance, but the formula allows for a
weighting as deemed appropriate by the analyst  (cf.  Chapter  5.3.7).  Appendix I contains the
resulting  24  maps  of  the  study area  showing  the  nSI  raster  surfaces  of  the  mobile  railway
population.
Symbolic Value
The  process  of  calculating  the  spatial  influence  for  the  symbolic  value  differs  from  the
aforementioned processes for the other three vulnerability factors. The spatial operationalization
methodology in this case is not that of spatial concentration to evaluate the existence of hot spots
of highly accumulated features of a certain kind, but that of spatial proximity. This allows to
account for the fact that a terrorist attack is more likely to be associated with a certain symbolic
location or object the closer it happens to it.
The starting point are the locations of the symbolic places, which I describe in Chapter 5.3.4.
In addition I also included a dimension of symbolic relevance to account for the fact that not all
symbolic locations bear the same symbolic value. This measure of symbolic relevance allows for
a weighting of more or less symbolic relevance according to the subjective perceptions of the
analyst and of those under attack.
Just like the selection of symbolic locations in the first place, this weighting step is highly
subjective  since  the  definitions  of  symbolic  relevance  in  this  section  follows  my  personal
perception. Another researcher would possibly define it in a different way, which would lead to a
different weighting of places that bear more or less symbolic value. As a result, the distribution
of the symbolic locations' spatial influence would also be different from that which I develop in
this section. Again, one might argue that this subjectivity introduces ambivalence in the overall
quantitative analysis of terrorism vulnerability, and I cannot negate this fact. But I am strongly
convinced that this ambivalence is ameliorated by the conscientious selection of symbolic places
by the person performing the analysis. This selection is optimally based on the subject matter
expertise, quantitative results of questionnaires or an AHP-based process and information about
the respective perpetrator and a precise attack scenario. Therefore I postulate again that every
analysis employing my framework will inevitably produce a different result, since the underlying
assumptions are also different.
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In the case of the large train stations I assigned the symbolic relevance on the basis of the
actual numbers of passenger transfers at each of these 39 stations. Shinjuku Station, at 940,176
transfers the most highly frequented station, was assigned a value of 100, while the remaining
stations  were  assigned  their  relative  ratio  of  this  value.  For  example  Meguro  Station  with
150,013 transfers was assigned a symbolic relevance of 16. 22 shows the symbolic relevance for
all 39 stations.
For the remaining two categories of symbolic institutions and landmarks I decided to use a
tripartite scale of “low”, “medium”, and “high”. In order to be able to use this ordinal scale in the
quantitative calculation of the spatial influence I then assigned the actual weights on a scale of 0-
100 based on the relative rank of the ordinal scale values (i.e. at “low” at 33.3, “medium” at
66.7, and “high” at 100). For the scope of this study I decided to assume a perpetrator that aims
predominantly  at  high  value  targets.  Therefore  I  assigned  all  symbolic  institutions  a  “low”
symbolic relevance. These targets would more likely be attractive for terrorists who seek to have
an impact on the government, public services like the police or fire fighters, or religious groups.
To determine the values for the economic, political, and touristic landmarks I decided to use their
relative recognition in the local, national (i.e. Japanese), or international community I equated
these to the three aforementioned levels of symbolic relevance,  as  23 shows.  Figure 36 also
shows the symbolic places and their assigned symbolic relevance.
In contrast to the other three vulnerability factors the symbolic value of a location does not
change with the time of day, hence only one map of symbolic places is sufficient. This is due to
the fact that within the scope of this study and the analysis framework I developed (cf. Chapters
3.1 and 5.3) the symbolic value is an operationalization of the terrorists' aim to create attention
with their actions, whereas the other two vulnerability factors represent their goal to affect as
many people as possible. For example a terrorist attack near Tokyo Tower will create attention in
the national and international media irrespective of the actual time of the attack. Obviously the
perpetrators would be able to achieve both goals if they perform the attack at a time where they
can also affect a larger number of people, but this dimension of the decision making process is
covered  by  the  remaining,  population  based  vulnerability  factors.  In  order  to  keep  the
vulnerability  factors  independent  as  required  by  the  guidelines  for  electing  appropriate
vulnerability factors in Chapter 4.2.2 it is imperative to not erroneously introduce the temporal
dimension here in the context of the symbolic value.
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Table 22: Symbolic relevance of large train stations based on their daily passenger traffic volume.
Station name Daily passenger 
volume
Symbolic 
relevance
Station name Daily passenger 
volume
Symbolic 
relevance
Shinjuku 940,176 100 Nihonbashi 178,154 19
Shibuya 638,872 68 Gotanda 176,468 19
Ikebukuro 595,866 63 Kinshicho 176,179 19
Tokyo 516,431 55 Kasumigaseki 175,922 19
Shinbashi 422,530 45 Omori 172,755 18
Shinagawa 389,850 41 Osaki 165,245 18
Tamachi 290,354 31 Ogikubo 164,029 17
Otemachi 260,861 28 Yotsuya 161,503 17
Akihabara 260,131 28 Nakano 153,769 16
Iidabashi 248,332 26 Suidobashi 150,755 16
Ueno 222,926 24 Meguro 150,013 16
Yurakucho 221,048 24 Kitasenju 145,509 15
Kanda 220,130 23 Kayabacho 144,491 15
Hamamatsucho 216,396 23 Akabane 144,222 15
Takadanobaba 208,347 22 Roppongi 143,223 15
Ebisu 204,117 22 Toyocho 139,204 15
Ochanomizu 197,836 21 Jinbocho 139,031 15
Kamata 196,783 21 Toranomon 135,896 14
Ichigaya 194,502 21 Kudanshita 134,929 14
Ginza 179,378 19
Data source: National Land Information Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau (2010)
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Table 23: Symbolic relevance of the 25 economic, 
political and touristic landmarks.
Landmark name
Symbolic relevance
Rank Value
Asahi Beer Hall medium 66.7
Bank of Japan (BOJ) high 100
Ginza high 100
Meiji Shrine (incl. surrounding 
forest)
high 100
Mori Tower (Roppongi Hills) medium 66.7
National Diet Building high 100
Rainbow Bridge high 100
Ryogoku Sumo Hall medium 66.7
Sensoji Temple (incl. Nakamise 
Street)
high 100
Shibuya Crossing high 100
Sunshine 60 Building low 33.3
Tokyo Big Sight (Tokyo 
International Exhibition Center)
medium 66.7
Tokyo Dome medium 66.7
Tokyo Imperial Palace (incl. 
outer gardens)
high 100
Tokyo International Forum medium 66.7
Tokyo Metropolitan Central 
Wholesale Market (Tsukiji Fish 
Market)
high 100
Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
Building (Tokyo City Hall)
high 100
Tokyo Skytree high 100
Tokyo Station Building medium 66.7
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) high 100
Tokyo Tower high 100
Tokyo World Trade Center low 33.3
Ueno Park medium 66.7
Yasukuni Shrine high 100
Zojoji Temple high 100
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Figure 36: Spatial distribution of symbolic places within the study area and their symbolic relevance.
In  cases  where  the  spatial  influence  is  operationalized  as  the  spatial  proximity  from the
objects of interest it represents a linear function of the weighted inverse distance from the objects
as shown in equation (7):
nSI δ={ 0 ∀δ≥ρρ−δ⋅( ρδmax ) ∀ δ<ρ (7)
where  nSIδ is  the  normalized  spatial  influence  at  distance  δ,  ρ is  the  symbolic
relevance, δmax is the maximum distance.
This calculation process creates a raster surface as shown in Figure 37 which compares a map
of the original symbolic places and their symbolic relevance with the resulting normalized spatial
influence (nSI) for a detail of the study area. Appendix J contains the map of the complete study
area showing the nSI raster surface of the symbolic value.
5.3.7. Vulnerability Map Creation
In  the  preceding  chapters  I  introduce  the  operationalization  of  four  vulnerability  factors:
estimated  stationary  building  population  (cf.  Chapter  5.3.1),  estimated  mobile  pedestrian
population  (cf.  Chapter  5.3.2),  estimated  mobile  railway population  (cf.  Chapter  5.3.3),  and
symbolic value (cf. Chapter 5.3.4). These all produce spatial representations of their respective
features (i.e.  buildings,  street  segments,  train station complexes,  railway links,  and symbolic
places)  which  are  materialized  as  vector  objects  (i.e.  polygons  and  lines).  Subsequently  I
introduce  the  operationalization  of  these  vulnerability  factors'  spatial  influence  (cf.  Chapter
5.3.6), which denotes the influence objects have on their surroundings' vulnerability as a result of
their own vulnerability. This spatial influence, which needs to be normalized to a continuous
scale of 0-100 for comparison between factors, is materialized as continuous raster surfaces for
the complete study area. Furthermore, since the vulnerability factors can also have a temporal
dimension, multiple raster maps of their nSI at various times of the day can be produced.
The concept for the vulnerability map creation approach I present here originates from the
Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) methodology introduced by Caplan and Kennedy (2010a; 2010b).
There the authors use it for the combination of risk map layers, which represent the existence of
certain  criminogenic  factors  that  aggravate  or  mitigate  the  risk  of  a  certain  type  of  crime
evolving,  using  simple  raster  algebra.  The  approach  I  developed  in  this  study is  shown in
equation (1) and has a number of improvements over the methodology introduced by Caplan and
Kennedy:
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Figure 37: Comparison of the symbolic places including their symbolic relevance (left) and the resulting 
raster surface representing the normalized spatial influence (nSI) (right) for a detail of the study area.
1) a gradient between vulnerability values as compared to discrete classified values, 
2) the inclusion of the temporal scale where meaningful, and 
3) an improved methodology for the weighting of vulnerability factors.
The definition of the vulnerability factor weights is equally critical for the meaningfulness of
the overall analysis process as the selection of the vulnerability factors in the early steps of the
analysis framework (cf. Chapter 4 and Fig. 4). Yet, at the same time it is also highly subjective
since  it  is  based  solely  on  the  perceived  importance  of  the  vulnerability  factors  from  the
viewpoint of the analyst. One possibility to ameliorate this potential bias is the employment of a
standardized procedure to produce the factor weights, such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP)  as  introduced by Saaty  (1980;  2006;  2008) and,  in  the  context  of  GIS,  Malczewski
(1999). Yet, I argue that these methods would have only a limited influence on minimizing the
bias for four reasons: first, the samples for both regular questionnaires and those used for AHP
would have to be sufficiently large to be representative, which is at least a difficult undertaking
in the case of subject matter experts necessary for AHP. Second, in order to be able to represent
an overall perception of general values by the population the samples would also need to reflect
all perceptions of these values that exist among the population. I argue that such a generalized
overall  perception of values does neither  exist,  nor is  it  possible  to  guarantee that a sample
covers all its aspects. Third, the relevant perspective in the selection of the weights and thereby
the importance of the vulnerability factors should not be that of those under attack, but in turn
the perpetrators’ perception of these. In other words, terrorists will most likely not select their
targets by choosing something that represents a certain value in their own opinion, but rather
something they believe to represent a value in the eyes of those they aim to attack (McCormick
2003; Abrahams 2008; Bakker 2012). It is therefore imperative to ask the question “if I were a
terrorist, I would...” (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005, 365) and thereby to imitate the perpetrators’
mindset  and decision  making process.  Last,  all  these  considerations  abstract  away from the
moment of surprise that terrorists might use for their advantage, for example by doing something
that was not deemed to make sense from their perspective or that has not been evaluated as
providing them a benefit. Whichever standardized method is chosen to define these vulnerability
factor weights can therefore at best only provide a misleading sense of certainty, at worst it can
lead to bad decisions under the wrongful impression of being based on quantifiable facts.
For the scope of this study I defined the weights of the four vulnerability factors at my own
discretion as shown in 24. I derived them by following the scenario I defined for the scope of this
case  study  (cf.  Chapter  5.2.2):  a  twice  as  important  aim  at  affecting  as  many  people  as
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Table 24: Weighting of the four vulnerability factors 
for the scope of this case study.
Vulnerability factor Weight wi
estimated stationary building population† 0.22
estimated mobile pedestrian population† 0.22
estimated mobile railway population† 0.22
symbolic value 0.33
Note:
† Including temporal dimension.
possible than at attracting maximum attention. The 66.7% that the total weight of the population-
based vulnerability factors need to account for were split evenly between the three respective
factors (i.e.  stationary building population,  mobile pedestrian population,  and mobile railway
population),  as  the  scenario  provides  no  details  about  the  terrorists’ preferences  for  rather
attacking buildings, trains, or people on the streets.  These types of information exist for real
terrorist groups, and could therefore be implemented into the framework at this point to provide
an analysis tailored specifically at a certain group.
The weighted summation of the vulnerability factors needs to be performed for all cells of the
input raster surfaces. These have to have the same spatial resolution for this purpose, otherwise
they must be interpolated to line up with each other. The same holds true for those vulnerability
factors that include a temporal dimension. The time steps either have to be identical (e.g. hourly
as in the case of this study) or must be interpolated to line up.
In a last step the resulting vulnerability maps then have to be normalized once again to stretch
the  summarized  vulnerability  index  values  to  a  scale  of  0-100.  The  calculation  ultimately
produces one map of the overall weighted vulnerability index per time step, as can be seen in
Figure 38 for the example of 8am. Appendix K shows all 24 vulnerability maps for the complete
study area. In Chapter 6 I will discuss the hourly results in more detail.
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Figure 38: Spatial distribution of the overall vulnerability at 8am based on the four selected vulnerability
factors and their weights.
6 Interpretation and Discussion of Results
6.1. Introduction
Before going into the details of analyzing the quantitative result that the vulnerability assessment
produced in the case study in Chapter  5 I want to emphasize once again an important point I
already mentioned in the introduction of the conceptual framework in Chapter 4, namely that of
the inevitably inherent subjectivity. The subjective decision of the analyst applying this frame-
work come to play in four dimensions:
1) the selection of the scenario, 
2) the selection of vulnerability factors and their operationalization, 
3) the definition of the spatial influence and its operationalization, and 
4) the weighting of the vulnerability factors.
I mention this  again here,  since the statements I  make here are conclusions based on the
conscientious decision I made regarding these four dimension in the course of this study. I chose
the attack scenario of a small explosive attack for a number of reasons, which I explain in detail
in Chapter  5.2.2, the most important of them being that this is the most feared mode of attack
according to an opinion poll among citizens of the study area (Metropolitan Police Department
2007). The process of selecting appropriate vulnerability factors was lengthy and commanded by
three major criteria:
1) the independence of the vulnerability factors in order to avoid bias, 
2) the availability of appropriate quantitative data to operationalize the vulnerability factor
using appropriate spatial and temporal scales, and 
3) the  existence  or  possibility  for  development  of  quantitative  methodologies  for  the
computational of the operationalization of the vulnerability factors.
The  resulting  four  vulnerability  factors  (i.e.  estimated  stationary  building  population,
estimated  mobile  pedestrian  population,  estimated  mobile  railway population,  and  symbolic
value) as well as some other factors, which I rejected for one or many of the aforementioned
reasons,  are  explained in  detail  in  Chapters  5.3.1 through  5.3.4 and  5.3.5,  respectively.  The
operationalization of the symbolic value is particularly subjective, as I explain in the relevant
chapter. Along the same lines the assignment of weights for all four vulnerability factors, which I
elucidate in Chapter 5.3.7, bears a significant subjectivity, as it is based entirely on my personal
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perceptions. Therefore the results and their interpretations, which I present in this chapter, are
based on these circumstances. A different analyst, using different vulnerability factors, a different
operationalization of their spatial influence, and also a different weighting of the factor maps will
inevitably come to a different result, and therefore to different conclusions. I perceive this not as
a flaw of the framework I developed, but in contrast as one of its strengths. I strongly believe
that there can be no right or wrong in the scientific discussion of a topic as defined by subjective
perceptions and values as terrorism. Instead, this framework and its results should allow for the
first time for a thorough, quantitatively founded discussion of terrorism vulnerability in highly
urbanized areas.
In the context of my research objectives I mention in Chapter 3 the statement by Schmid who
had to say about the scientific engagement in the field of terrorism research that “in the absence
of empirical data, much of the literature is purely speculative and relies on secondary sources,
which are often unreliable” (Schmid 2011, 468). With the research I undertook in the course of
this dissertation I aim at ameliorating this shortage of empirical data and to discuss, to my best
knowledge for the first time33,  the topic of terrorism vulnerability from a spatial  micro-scale
perspective within urban areas. Thereby I hope to help overcome the scarcity in scholarly debate
and publications about the geographical analysis of terrorism vulnerability.
In Chapter 3.2 I postulate three hypotheses:
1) Vulnerability is not distributed equally over space and time.
2) Factors exist that enhance or mitigate vulnerability.
3) Vulnerabilities of objects influence their spatial surroundings.
The conceptual framework I developed on top of these hypotheses together with the empirical
operationalization I describe in Chapter 4 and 5 have produced an interdisciplinary methodology
to quantify how prone a location is to a certain kind of terrorist attack as a result of the attributes
of the objects at this location. This ultimately allows for the creation of micro-scale vulnerability
maps  to  visualize  the  spatial  distribution  of  single  vulnerability  factors  as  well  as  overall
terrorism vulnerability in highly urbanized areas.
These provide, to my best knowledge for the first time, a detailed overview and insight into
the rather abstract concept of vulnerability and its representation in the real-world, and therefore
are useful for all three target audiences I outline in Chapter 3.4: academia, involved stakeholders,
and the general public.
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In addition to their visual message these maps also allow for subsequent quantitative analyses.
Here I introduce two examples of how the vulnerability data produced by my framework and
model can help answer questions regarding the threat of terrorist attacks in highly urbanized
areas, more specifically within the study area I present in Chapter 5.
Limited resources at the hands of the perpetrators affect their decision making, as I mention in
Chapter 3.1. Therefore they will be driven to make conscious decisions about where, when and
how to attack.  The same is  true for the opposite side,  too,  where those in responsibility for
objects that might become the target of a terrorist attack, have to decide how to use the limited
funds at their hands to the optimal effect  (Willis 2005; Willis and Al-Shahery 2014). I believe
that the vulnerability-based approach presented in this study can help mitigate shortcomings of
the  current  risk-based  analyses  and  instead  allows  governments,  municipalities,  and  other
stakeholders to identify the most vulnerable elements and start mitigating their vulnerabilities.34
6.2. Quantitative Interpretation of Estimated Vulnerability
6.2.1. Identification of Vulnerable Areas
The  raster  surfaces  I  present  in  Chapter  5.3.7 and  Appendix  K  as  the  final  output  of  the
vulnerability assessment model provide a good visual overview and impression of the spatial
distribution  of  the  terrorism  vulnerability  over  the  study  area  based  on  the  four  selected
vulnerability factors, their operationalization and weighting. It is therefore worthwhile to analyze
how these estimated overall  vulnerability values  correspond with the spatial  structure of  the
study area.  For further quantitative analyses it is advisable to group the gradient vulnerability
values into five vulnerability levels: “low”, “rather low”, “medium”, “rather high”, and “high”.
Each vulnerability level makes up for 20% of the vulnerability index scale of 0-100. Appendix L
contains  maps  of  these  classified  vulnerability  indices  for  all  24  hours  of  the  day  for  the
complete study area.
Caplan and Kennedy suggest to test for the statistical validity of all maps that were produced
using their RTM methodology since “this gives [a] model empirical credibility and allows for the
estimation of future events with a certain degree of confidence”  (Caplan and Kennedy 2010b,
99). While I whole-heartedly agree with this aspect, it proves to be problematic in the context of
terrorism. The reason therefore lies in the necessity of existing data that describes past events of
the attack scenario of the respective study. While this is normally not an issue in the field of
crime analysis (where the RTM methodology originated), the situation is difficult in the case of
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terrorist attacks. It might be a feasible undertaking in areas with a high number of past events,
such as terrorism hot spots in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Syria, but is impossible in the study area for
this study, which has experienced only a small number of terrorist attacks in the past (cf. Chapter
5.1.1). While not empirically grounded, it is still worthwhile to put the quantitative findings of
the vulnerability analysis in context with other terrorist attacks in similar highly-urbanized areas
in industrial countries.
While maps provide a good overview of the spatial distribution of the vulnerability levels, a
quantitative analysis of the total area each vulnerability level comprises can reveal interesting
trends in the data. As  Figure 39 shows, the percentage of the relative area these vulnerability
levels comprise change over the course of the day. The first fact that strikes from these data is the
high percentage of areas in the lowest vulnerability level. The numbers are so high (97.3-98.3%)
that they are not shown in the graph for clarity. The remaining vulnerability levels account for
only 1.7-2.7%. It is only during the day, from 8am to 6pm, when areas with “high” vulnerability
exist.  Even  then  they  make  up  only  0.003-0.05% of  the  study area,  which  equals  18,800-
308,500 m2.
This can be explained by the higher absolute number of people inside the study area during
the day compared to the nighttime, which is a result of the spatial distribution of residential areas
in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. As I explain in Chapter 5.2.1, the 23 Special Wards of Tokyo,
which comprise the study area, are surrounded by a suburban residential belt that extends far into
the neighboring prefectures (Figs. 12 and 13). Therefore the three population-based vulnerability
factors,  which  together  account  for  66.7%  of  the  overall  vulnerability  index,  have  a  more
significant impact. This is especially true for the main commuting period in the morning around
8am and lesser so in the late afternoon and evening around 6pm, where spikes in the percentages
of all four vulnerability levels other than “low” emerge. It is especially the crowded morning
rush hour where the highest number of people on trains and walking on the streets occurs, which
results in the highest percentages within the aforementioned vulnerability levels. Particularly the
areas with “rather high” and “high” vulnerability are the largest at this time with 0.25% and
0.05%, respectively.
This result matches a number of terrorist attacks using the same attack scenario as in this case
study: the train bombings in Madrid on March 11th, 2004, a coordinated series of ten explosions
on commuter trains, which killed 191 people and wounded more than 1,800, occurred between
7:37 and 7:42am (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d); similarly four bombs detonated onboard trains and a bus in Lon-
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Figure 39: Percentage of the relative area of the study area over the course of 24 hours of four 
vulnerability levels (level “low” not shown).
don on July 7th, 2005 at 8:50 am and 9:47, respectively, and as a result killed 54 and left more
than 700 wounded in total  (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism 2013m; 2013n; 2013o; 2013p).
Another interesting fact is the almost constant area with “medium” vulnerability, which varies
only between 0.82% and 0.86%. This can be explained by the fact that all areas that represent
symbolic values fall in this level, unless their vulnerability is enhanced by other factors. This
especially  true  for  the  large  areas  of  Meiji  Shrine  (incl.  surrounding  forest),  the  Tokyo
Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market (Tsukiji Fish Market), Tokyo Tower with Zojoji Temple,
Ueno Park, Yasukuni Shrine,  and especially the Tokyo Imperial  Palace (incl.  outer gardens).
Figures 38, 40, and 41 show these large areas and also reveals that they are located mainly in the
center of the study area. As I explain in Chapter 5.3.4 the symbolic value of places does not vary
over time, hence these areas stay on the same vulnerability level throughout the day.
A spatial analysis of the distribution of highly vulnerable places for the time of the morning
commute  reveals  that  at  8am  the  major  railway  hubs  of  Ikebukuro,  Shibuya,  Shinagawa,
Shinjuku,  Tokyo,  and Ueno Stations  exhibit  the largest  clusters  of  “rather  high”  and “high”
vulnerability (cf.  Fig. 40).  In  addition  these clusters  also comprise  the office  districts  in  the
greater perimeter of these train stations. As Figure 41 shows these vulnerability clusters in areas
with a high density of offices buildings persist throughout the working hours of the day (i.e. from
9am to 5pm).  Figure 42 shows how the vulnerability level is “rather high” in the area east of
Shinjuku Station due to the number of people present in this well-known night life area, how it
reaches a  “high” level  during the morning commute as a result  of the enormous number of
people coming through Shinjuku Station, and how the vulnerability of the whole perimeter of
Shinjuku Station is “rather high” during the day as a result of the many workers present in the
numerous office buildings both east and west of the station.35
This matches the narratives of the terrorist attacks on the buildings of World Trade Center in
New York City on February 26th, 1993 and September 11th, 2001, and on the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19th, 1995, both characterized by a high number of
office workers present there at the time of the attacks. The attacks on the World Trade Center 36
occurred at  12:17pm  (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2008) and between 8:46am, when the
North Tower was hit, and 9:03am, when the South Tower was hit (National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013i; 2013j), the explosion in Oklahoma City
happened  at  9:02am  (National  Consortium  for  the  Study  of  Terrorism  and  Responses  to
Terrorism 2013q). It also matches the locations of the two largest terrorist attacks that took place
164
165
Figure 40: Spatial distribution of the vulnerability index at 8am in the center of the study area.
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Figure 41: Spatial distribution of the vulnerability index at 12pm in the center of the study area.
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Figure 42: Variation of the vulnerability index as a 
result of stationary and mobile populations in 
Shinjuku at a) 2am, b) 8am, and c) 12pm.
 within the study area in the past. The Tokyo head office of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries which
was attacked in a bombing by the EAAJAF on August 30th, 1974, an event that left 8 people dead
and 376 wounded is located in Marunouchi (Matsushita 1997). Also, while initiated in different
locations onboard a number of subway trains, the area most heavily hit, and also targeted by the
perpetrators  of  the  Aum Shinrikyo doomsday sect  was  the  area  around  the  subway stations
Kasumigaseki  and  Kokkaigijidomae  south-east  of  the  Imperial  Palace,  which  is  home  to  a
number  of  high-profile  political  institutions,  including  the  National  Diet  Building  and  the
Residence of the Prime Minister (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism 2013g).
The  vulnerability  maps  can  also  reveal  some  unexpected  findings.  As  an  example  the
combination of the politically symbolic landmark of Yasukuni Shrine, the underground tracks of
the Tokyo Metro Shinjuku Line and Hanzomon Line which exist in parallel, the nearby subway
station and the crowded Yasukuni Dori street running alongside it raise the vulnerability of this
area from the “medium” level to the “rather high” level during the morning rush hour between
8am and 10am (Fig. 43). Also, single crowded buildings or building clusters can generate a raise
in the vulnerability level. This can be seen in Figure 44 in three instances: on the left side of the
map the cluster of three buildings (Ote Center Building, Risona Maru Biru, and the Mitsubishi
Tokyo UFJ Bank Otemachi Building) maintains a “rather high” vulnerability level throughout the
day, from 8am to 6pm it raises the vulnerability of its surrounding to the “high” level (Fig.  44a);
in the center of the map the  Marunouchi North Building and the connected  Marunouchi Oazo
create an area of “rather high” vulnerability from 7am through 11pm and “high” vulnerability
from 8am to 9am (Fig. 44b); in the top right corner of the map the Bank of Japan (BOJ) raises
the “medium” vulnerability it generates by its symbolic value to a “rather high” level from 8am
to 6pm as a result of the number of people inside the building and passing it outside (Fig. 44c).
6.2.2. Total Population in Vulnerable Areas
In the previous section I outline the levels of vulnerability in highly populated areas, both in
terms of stationary populations inside buildings and mobile populations on foot or in trains. It
should not surprise that areas with higher populations also possess higher vulnerability, since
three of the four vulnerability factors I used in this case study refer to population figures and
their spatio-temporal fluctuations. Together these three factors account for 66.7% of the overall
vulnerability index.
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Figure 43: Raise of the vulnerability index as a 
result of overlapping vulnerability factor influences 
at Yasukuni Shrine at a) 8am, b) 9am, and c) 10am.
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Figure 44: Raise of the vulnerability index as a 
result of single crowded buildings and building 
clusters in Marunouchi and Otemachi at a) 3am, b) 
9am, and c) 7pm.
That said it is still worthwhile to examine the actual number of people present in the areas of
higher vulnerability. These data can shed light on the number of people to be possibly affected by
a terrorist attack in a certain location and at a certain time. This can ultimately help in the prepa-
ration for these disasters, for example by providing sufficient emergency routes from buildings
and underground walkways  and regarding the  establishment  of  shelters  and emergency care
institutions. In addition this information can be of great value in the event of an actual attack,
when it provides emergency services an understanding of the number victims to be expected.
Figure 45 shows how the  stationary building  population  figures  in  the areas  of  different
vulnerability levels change over the time of the day. As in the preceding analysis of the total area
of these vulnerable areas (cf. Fig. 39) it comes as no surprise that the highest numbers of people
are present in all four vulnerabilities other than “low” can be found between 7am and 8pm,
which comprises the regular working hours plus commuting times in the morning and evening.37
The absolute numbers are impressive nevertheless. Between 9am and 5pm, which equates
roughly the regular working hours in most Japanese offices, the estimated number of people
present in areas with “rather high” vulnerability is at around 200,000. The same holds true for the
estimated population of the “medium” high vulnerability level where the figures vary between
250,000 and 375,000 people. This number also stays higher than 100,000 until 8pm. The peak in
the curve for “rather low” vulnerability can be explained by the aforementioned morning rush
hour, which is characterized by a high number of people onboard trains and walking on the
streets of the study area to get to their offices, which elevates the vulnerability of the buildings’
surroundings. This also explains the peak of the population in “high” vulnerability areas at 8am.
Over the  course of  the  day the stationary building  populations  in  “high”  vulnerability areas
varies between 4,000 and 21,000 people between 8am and 6pm.
These high populations figures should come as no surprise if  one once again recalls past
terrorist attacks in similarly highly urbanized areas. The terrorist attacks on the buildings of the
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11th, 2001 alone killed 1,382 people and
wounded an unknown number (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism 2013i; 2013j). Similarly, the explosion in front of the  Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City left 168 dead and more than 650 wounded (National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2013q).
Due to  the  operationalization  methodology and constraints  of  the  available  data,  which  I
describe in detail in Chapter 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, I was not able to numeralize the actual estimated
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Figure 45: Total estimated stationary building population in the vulnerable areas of the study area over 
the course of 24 hours.
number of people walking on the streets and onboard trains. The numbers in Figures 46, 47, and
48 do therefore not show the absolute count of pedestrians and people at train stations or onboard
trains, but their respective dimensionless index values instead.
All three metrics show clearly the higher populations during the time period of the morning
commute between 7am and 9am. This matches the events of the attacks in Madrid and London,
where terrorists set off explosive devices onboard crowded commuter trains and a public bus. It
also matches the attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 where perpetrators released sarin gas in five
trains  of  the  Tokyo  Metro  subway and  ultimately  killed  12  and  injured  over  5,500  people
(National  Consortium  for  the  Study  of  Terrorism  and  Responses  to  Terrorism  2013g).  In
addition, all graphs also show a distinct peak during the evening rush hour from 5pm to 8pm,
albeit on significantly lower levels. This is due to the fact that while the beginning of the regular
working day in many Japanese offices starts at the same time, the ending times are more spread
out and after work activities are very common, which also disperses the pedestrians and train
passengers accordingly over time.
The morning rush hour is also the time that has the largest mobile populations in the areas
with a “high” vulnerability level. In addition the mobile pedestrian population reveals a small de-
gree of people present in areas of “high” vulnerability from the morning until the late afternoon.
Lastly, the null values of the train station usage and the railway link importance (Figs. 47 and
48) in the middle of the night from 2am to 3am are attributed to the closing hours of most
railway lines in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.
6.2.3. Sensitive Infrastructures in Vulnerable Areas
From a  risk  management  and emergency planning  perspective  it  is  critical  to  have  detailed
information not only about the number of people (possibly) affected by a certain incident, but
also the urban structure of the area of the attack. This is especially so in the case of so-called
sensitive  infrastructures.  I  coined  this  term  to  distinguish  these  institutions  from  critical
infrastructures.  The  latter  are  defined  by the  US President's  Commission  on  Critical  Infra-
structures (PCCIP) as
a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man- made systems and processes that
function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of
essential  goods  and  services.  […]  Certain  of  our  infrastructures  are  so  vital  that  their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic
security. (President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997, 3)
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Figure 46: Estimated mobile pedestrian population in the vulnerable areas of the study area over the 
course of 24 hours. The values do not represent absolute people but dimensionless index values.
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Figure 47: Estimated train station usage in the vulnerable areas of the study area over the course of 24 
hours. The values do not represent absolute people but dimensionless index values.
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Figure 48: Estimated railway link importance in the vulnerable areas of the study area over the course of
24 hours. The values do not represent absolute people but dimensionless index values.
This includes transportation networks as well as water, gas, electricity and communication
networks  (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; Haimes and Longstaff 2002; DHS 2007). I
outline in Chapter  5.3.5 why I did not focus on these types of infrastructural networks in this
study. Yet, above these infrastructures that are essential for the provision of services necessary
for the functioning of the city and its systems, the sensitive infrastructures which I focus on in
this section are of such nature that they are either 1) of great importance in the aftermath of a
disaster or represent something that is either highly valued by the public or necessary in the case
of a disaster, or 2) something that poses significant problems regarding the possible necessity of
an evacuation.
Examples of the former are hospitals, which can provide medical care for victims, as well as
police and fire stations, whose services are of critical importance in the immediate aftermath of a
terrorist attack. The hampering of these services can help to exacerbate the disastrous effects of a
terrorist attack, both immediately and in the long run. The most striking example are the over
400 members of the rescue authorities who were killed in the course of the attacks on the World
Trade Center in New York City on September 11th,  2001  (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks  upon the  United States  2004).38 This  number  does  not  account  for  the considerably
higher number of officers and fire fighting personnel who are suffering from the physical and
psychological  time dependent  effects  of  the  collapse  of  the  towers  to  the  degree  of  service
disability or death.
Examples  of  the  latter  are  nurseries,  kindergarten,  all  types  of  schools,  colleges  and
universities, cram schools39,  and homes for the elderly.  They are all  populated by population
groups which either require general support, such as in the case of nurseries for infants and
retirement homes for elderly people, or which are more heavily affected by the disturbing effects
a terrorist attack might have, such as school children.
The map in Figure 49 shows that these sensitive infrastructures are generally dispersed over
the whole study area. A closer analysis of the data reveals that there are some spatial characteris-
tics in the location and distribution of some of the infrastructure types (cf. 25).
Most nurseries, elementary, and junior high schools as well as schools for the disabled are
located in areas characterized by residential use. Since these areas are generally not distinguished
by large  working populations,  major  traffic  hubs or  railway lines,  or  symbolic  places,  their
vulnerability levels are comparatively low. As a result none of these institutions are located in
areas of “medium” or higher vulnerability levels. Similarly, at maximum only nine homes for the
elderly are located in areas with a higher than “rather low” vulnerability, that equals 1%. All of
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Data source: Zenrin Co., Ltd. (2011)
Figure 49: Spatial distribution of sensitive infrastructures over the study area.
Table 25: Number of various sensitive infrastructures within the vulnerable areas over the course of 24 hours.
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:0
0
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:0
0
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:0
0
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0
nursery
⊖⊖ 416 417 417 417 417 417 415 414 409 412 413 414 414 414 415 413 412 413 412 415 415 415 414 416
⊖ 71 70 70 70 70 70 72 73 78 75 74 73 73 73 72 74 75 74 75 72 72 72 73 71
⊙
⊕
⊕⊕
kindergarten
⊖⊖ 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,696 2,687 2,672 2,682 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,685 2,684 2,686 2,691 2,695 2,696 2,696
⊖ 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 91 102 93 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 93 92 87 83 82 82
⊙ 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 6 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 7
⊕ 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1
⊕⊕ 1
elementary school
⊖⊖ 1,320 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,320 1,318 1,314 1,317 1,318 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,319 1,318 1,320 1,318 1,318 1,318 1,318 1,320 1,320 1,320
⊖ 33 32 32 32 32 32 33 35 39 36 35 32 32 32 34 35 33 35 35 35 35 33 33 33
⊙
⊕
⊕⊕
Vulnerability level:  low;  rather low;  medium; ⊖⊖ ⊖ ⊙ ⊕ rather high; ⊕⊕ high
(continued on the following page)
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Table 25 (continued): Number of various sensitive infrastructures within the vulnerable areas over the course of 24 hours.
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junior high school
⊖⊖ 839 839 839 839 839 839 837 837 835 835 837 837 837 837 839 837 837 837 835 837 837 837 837 839
⊖ 19 19 19 19 19 19 21 21 23 23 21 21 21 21 19 21 21 21 23 21 21 21 21 19
⊙
⊕
⊕⊕
senior high school
⊖⊖ 557 557 557 557 557 557 555 553 544 549 551 551 551 551 553 551 551 551 549 553 553 554 555 557
⊖ 11 11 11 11 11 11 13 15 24 19 17 17 17 17 15 17 17 17 19 15 15 14 13 11
⊙ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
⊕ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
⊕⊕
college & university
⊖⊖ 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,817 1,816 1,795 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,796 1,798 1,798 1,816 1,817 1,817 1,817
⊖ 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 56 61 59 61 61 62 61 61 61 61 61 59 70 56 55 55 55
⊙ 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 9 19 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 10 36 36 36 37
⊕ 1 44 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 31 1 1 1
⊕⊕
Vulnerability level:  low;  rather low;  medium; ⊖⊖ ⊖ ⊙ ⊕ rather high; ⊕⊕ high.
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Table 25 (continued): Number of various sensitive infrastructures within the vulnerable areas over the course of 24 hours.
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school for the disabled
⊖⊖ 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
⊖ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
⊙
⊕
⊕⊕
vocational school
⊖⊖ 2,138 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,140 2,138 2,138 2,123 1,994 2,059 2,070 2,075 2,074 2,071 2,073 2,070 2,070 2,076 2,078 2,112 2,119 2,133 2,133 2,138
⊖ 120 122 122 122 122 120 120 128 232 173 164 166 166 168 167 169 166 162 159 135 133 121 121 120
⊙ 50 47 47 47 47 51 49 48 36 34 37 34 33 32 31 32 35 33 34 40 48 46 46 48
⊕ 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 12 46 44 40 36 38 40 40 40 40 40 40 24 11 11 11 5
⊕⊕ 3 1
cram school
⊖⊖ 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,977 2,967 2,896 2,940 2,948 2,950 2,950 2,949 2,949 2,949 2,947 2,946 2,940 2,958 2,970 2,973 2,973 2,974
⊖ 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 68 128 89 81 79 79 80 80 80 82 83 89 75 64 63 64 63
⊙ 29 29 29 29 29 29 30 24 21 22 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 22 24 26 26 28 30
⊕ 8 20 16 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 16 10 7 5 2
⊕⊕ 2
Vulnerability level:  low;  rather low;  medium; ⊖⊖ ⊖ ⊙ ⊕ rather high; ⊕⊕ high.
(continued on the following page)
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Table 25 (continued): Number of various sensitive infrastructures within the vulnerable areas over the course of 24 hours.
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hospital
⊖⊖ 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 366 370 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 378 382 383 383 383 383
⊖ 33 34 34 34 34 33 33 31 42 39 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 31 30 31 33 33 33
⊙ 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 8 6 6 7
⊕ 1 7 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1
⊕⊕
home for the elderly
⊖⊖ 838 838 838 838 838 838 838 834 819 830 835 835 835 835 835 835 834 834 835 835 836 837 837 838
⊖ 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 59 65 61 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 59 57 58 57 56 56 55
⊙ 9 2 1 1
⊕
⊕⊕
police station
⊖⊖ 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 6 6 6 6
⊖ 166 183 183 183 183 183 183 164 158 160 162 162 162 162 161 162 160 162 160 163 163 163 166 166
⊙ 17 19 26 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 26 24 26 22 20 20 17 17
⊕ 2 2
⊕⊕
Vulnerability level:  low;  rather low;  medium; ⊖⊖ ⊖ ⊙ ⊕ rather high; ⊕⊕ high.
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Table 25 (continued): Number of various sensitive infrastructures within the vulnerable areas over the course of 24 hours.
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⊕
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Vulnerability level:  low;  rather low;  m⊖⊖ ⊖ ⊙ edium; ⊕ rather high; ⊕⊕ high.
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these are located near train stations, which explains their elevated vulnerability levels between
8am and 9am as well as at 4pm and 6pm in the afternoon.
In contrast, several kindergartens, senior high schools as well as colleges and universities, and
vocational  schools are  located in  areas  with “medium”,  “rather high”,  or in  the case of one
kindergarten and up to three vocational schools even “high” vulnerability.  For institutions of
higher  education  easily  accessible  and  prestigious  locations  in  the  city  center  are  highly
desirable, while at the same time longer commuting times and farther distances from home have
generally lesser impact on these older students compared to elementary and high school students.
This in turn also puts them in areas that are crowded during the day, especially the morning rush
hour, which results in higher vulnerability levels in their vicinity.
Similarly, cram schools are oftentimes located near train stations, as can be seen clearly from
the map in Figure 49. While this makes them easily accessible for the students it also places them
in areas of higher vulnerability, due to the vicinity to highly populated train stations, the rail way
links leading to and from these, and also the roads that distribute the train passengers to and from
the  stations  as  pedestrians.  As  a  result  two  cram schools  are  located  in  areas  with  “high”
vulnerability, Late in the afternoon at 6pm, when the cram schools are very well frequented,
12.6% of those outside of areas with “low” vulnerability are located in areas with “rather high”
vulnerability.
For the analysis of medical institutions I focused exclusively on hospitals, since they play a
major role in the aforementioned scenario of medical assistance for victims of terrorist attacks.
While doctor’s offices are more common throughout the study area and both their medical staff,
facilities, and drugs can be of help in these cases, I don’t regard them as particularly sensitive in
the sense of my definition of sensitive infrastructures above. Most of the 423 hospitals in the
study area are located in areas with “low” to “medium” vulnerability. At maximum only 1.7% of
them are in areas with “rather high” vulnerability, none them in areas with “high” vulnerability. I
believe that this bodes well for the medical care within the study area in the case of a terrorist
attack, they are located in areas which appear not attractive for terrorists to attack.
Both police stations and fire stations are located mostly in areas of “rather low” vulnerability.
This differs from all other categories of sensitive infrastructures in introduce, which are all most
prevalent in the large areas of “low” vulnerability. This can be explained by the fact that both
police and fire fighters are purposefully positioned exactly where most people are, since lots of
people mean both a higher probability of crime and accidents. Both police and fire stations are
also classified as symbolic institutions (cf. 18) and hence contribute to the vulnerability of their
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surroundings themselves. Yet, only two police stations and none of the fire stations are in areas
with “rather high” vulnerability, none of them in areas with “high” vulnerability. This bodes well
for  the provision of their  services  after  an attack,  since they are not in  areas of  heightened
interest for terrorists and will hence be able to continue to work.
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7 Conclusion
In this study I introduced a methodology for spatio-temporal terrorism vulnerability analysis. Its
conceptual  framework  is  based  on  the  selection  of  appropriate  vulnerability  factors,  their
operationalization in measurable real-world phenomena, the calculation of their spatial influence,
and finally their weighted combination into an overall vulnerability index. I also presented an
exemplar application of this framework in a case study for an actual scenario in Central Tokyo,
Japan. In this conclusion I interpret the result of the case study and also discuss the usefulness of
the framework and its operationalization as well as their shortcomings and the opportunities for
future studies.
I started this research from the desire to develop a spatially grounded methodology to quantify
vulnerability in order to find out how prone a location is to terrorist attacks as a result of the
attributes of the objects at this location. My motivation stems from the belief that there is both a
scarcity of scientific activity in the micro-scale geographical analysis of terrorism and a need for
more insight into terrorism vulnerability and its spatio-temporal representation in the real world.
I am convinced that the three characteristics of terrorist attacks I elucidated in Chapter 3.1, the
underlying  terrorists'  decision  making,  the  communicative  dimension  of  terrorism,  and  the
terrorists' limited resources, are summarized in the Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept
I introduced in Chapter 2.3.3. The empirical results presented in Chapter 6 are testimony of the
successful quantifiability of the abstract concept of “vulnerability” by the use of the conceptual
framework  I  introduced  in  Chapter  4 and  its  operationalization.  The  model's  output  data
ultimately allowed for a detailed analysis of the distribution of vulnerabilities in highly urbanized
area, both spatially and temporally.
The framework's usefulness lies in its variability which allows for the implementation to the
desire of the analyst.  First of all the focus on a certain outcome event and scenario sets the
agenda for the upcoming steps of the analysis. In the case study in Chapter 5 I decided for the
analysis of the vulnerability to a terrorist attack using a small explosive device. Yet, any other
modus operandi of terrorists, for example large explosive devices like truck bombs, the release
of poisonous substances, or shootings can be analyzed, as long as they have measurable repre-
sentations in the real world. I also want to point out that the research framework can not only be
used in the context of terrorism, but all types of disasters, both anthropogenic and natural (cf. 2).
It should be kept in mind, though, that crime and terrorism are the only threats that follow a
malicious intent and therefore contain a component of attractiveness as part of their vulnerability.
As a result the disaster model and the derived  Human Activity Based Vulnerability Concept I
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develop in  Chapter  2.3.3 do  not  apply in  these  cases.  Similarly,  it  can  be  applied  to  lesser
urbanized  areas,  but  the  framework’s  computational  intricacies  would  probably  make  the
vulnerability evaluation more complicated than the results can justify.
Second, the selection of vulnerability factors to be represented in the vulnerability assessment
is at the analyst's discretion. This provides leeway in the provision for factors according to the
beliefs and perceptions of the analyst, but also demands extensive subject matter expertise on his
end regarding the factors' completeness, meaningfulness and independence.
Third, the operationalization of the chosen vulnerability factors poses both great freedom and
one of the biggest challenges in the use of this framework and hence is the central part of this
study.  It  requires  the  analyst  to  identify  real-world  phenomena  that  represent  the  selected
vulnerability factors,  to develop methodologies and algorithms to quantify them, and to find
reliable, complete and consistent data sources that can be used as input data for these calcula-
tions. Consequently the vulnerability of certain objects then also needs to be put in context with
the space these objects are located within, which requires the analyst do develop methods to
formulate their spatial influence.
Finally, the resulting vulnerability factor maps have to be combined into an overall vulnera-
bility map. This allows the analyst to account for the importance of each factor as opposed to the
other factors by the use of weights. These factor weights can be derived using a standardized
process like AHP to incorporate another level of expert knowledge into the analysis.
In addition to these aforementioned dimensions of how the analysis framework introduced in
this study is useful for the analyst, it also ultimately produces results that bear great value for a
number of audiences. These results can be used to communicate the topic of vulnerability to the
broad public and raise an awareness for and informed public discussion about this important
topic.  As outlined in  Chapter  6.2 the results  can also be used as input  data  for consecutive
analyses:  they  can  help  to  identify vulnerable  areas  in  their  spatio-temporal  context  and to
enumerate the number of people or sensitive infrastructures in these vulnerable areas.
In Chapter 5 I presented a case study of the framework’s application in Central Tokyo, Japan.
The interpretation of the empirical results I produced in Chapter  6.2 reveals several interesting
insights  into  the  connection  between  the  urban  spatial  structure  of  Central  Tokyo  and  its
terrorism  vulnerability.  These  findings,  which  are  only  possible  due  to  the  chosen  spatio-
temporal operationalization of vulnerability, are one of the most distinctive features of this study,
187
since for the first time they provide detailed insights into the spatio-temporal constraints between
terrorism vulnerability and the respective urban spatial structure.
First and foremost the commuting movements from the suburban belt of Tokyo into the city
center, i.e. into the study area from the outside, lead to a dramatically higher overall population
during  the  day than  at  night.  Owing to  the  three  population-based vulnerability  factors  this
results in generally larger areas of higher vulnerability during the day than at night. Over the
course of the day this also results in clusters of the highest vulnerability in areas with many large
office buildings, such as Ikebukuro, Kasumigaseki, Marunouchi/Otemachi, Roppongi, Shibuya,
Shinagawa, and Shinjuku. In contrast  the vulnerability levels at  night are overall  lower than
during the day.
In  addition,  the  concentrated  morning  commuting  period  causes  a  strong  impact  on  the
vulnerability  levels  surrounding  the  railway  transportation  network,  both  in  terms  of  train
stations and railway tracks. This effect together with the generally high building populations and
pedestrian volumes around the larger train station hubs create the overall highest vulnerability
index values.  This  is  especially true for  the  stations  along the Yamanote Line,  where many
commuters from the surrounding prefectures and the residential areas of western Tokyo arrive
and change trains. Also, the major train lines such as the Chuo Line, Sobu Line, Saikyo Line, and
Yamanote  Line  contribute  to  heightened  vulnerability  levels  during  the  day  by  their  high
passenger numbers. This is especially the case during the morning commute, but also late in the
evening, when many people are on the way back to their homes outside of the study area after
work or subsequent activities.
The monocentric urban spatial structure of Tokyo also manifests itself in the agglomeration of
most of the symbolic places with high symbolic relevance on the one hand, and most of the by
day highly populated office districts on the other hand.
Based on these observations and results the following conclusions can be made regarding the
vulnerability towards a terrorist attack with a small explosive device within the study area:
1) The most attractive time from a terrorist’s perspective would be during the day, preferably
the morning commute.
2) The most attractive location would be in the city center, preferably inside or near a major
train station or near railway tracks.
As  I  explained in  Chapter  6.2.2 these  findings  coincide  with the  occurrences  of  terrorist
attacks  in  highly  urbanized  areas  in  the  past.  While  this  must  not  be  misinterpreted  as  a
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validation of the model, it can be understood as a confirmation for the meaningfulness of the
output results.
There are also several shortcomings involved in the use of this framework. Most of these are
regarding methodological issues or shortcomings with the data as I explained in the correspon-
ding sections of Chapter 5.3. One of the most important aspects that should be discussed in this
context is the overall subjectivity of the analysis. As I stated repeatedly throughout this study I
don't understand this as a shortcoming of the framework but instead one of its biggest strengths.
It would be a fallacy to believe that there is one correct way to operationalize terrorism vulnera-
bility  and hence  one  universally  valid terrorism vulnerability  map.  Instead  I  understand  the
opportunity for the use of a cornucopia of possible vulnerability factors, their operationalization
and weighting as one of the most intriguing promising aspects on the way to a deeper overall
understanding of terrorism vulnerability. I believe that multiple perspectives from a variety of
cultural  and  scientific  backgrounds  as  well  as  different  experience  levels  are  an  essential
precondition for a holistic understanding of this phenomenon, which continues to pose one of the
biggest challenges of our time.
I therefore hope for the this spatio-temporal vulnerability analysis framework to be employed
in future studies. It will be very interesting to compare not only vulnerability assessments of
different scenarios of terrorist attacks, but also the selection, operationalization, and weighting of
other vulnerability factors than the ones introduced in this study and their spatial influence. Due
to the normalization inherent in the calculation of the overall vulnerability index it is possible to
compare these maps and quantify the difference that the aforementioned changes have on the
overall  result.  Lastly,  I  would  also  be  thrilled  to  see  this  vulnerability  analysis  framework
employed in different thematic contexts than terrorism and also in studies around the world.
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Notes
1) Officially over 15,850 were killed, over 3,250 are missing, and over 6,000 got injured
(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2012, 2).
2) The official tally is at 191 killed and over 1,800 injured.
3) This omission is ironic since the title of Reid and Chen's research paper is Mapping the
contemporary terrorism research domain.
4) For exceptions see Chapters 2.1.3 and 2.3.4.
5) Chapter 5.3.1 provides a deeper insight into the definition of these activity categories.
6) During the sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway system on March 20th,
1995, the spread of the gas was mostly confined to the train carriages, where it had been
released, and the platforms where the respective trains ultimately stopped for evacuation.
7) Caplan  (2011) provides  a  detailed introduction into the theoretical  underpinnings and
methodological implementations of spatial influence.
8) Unfortunately the incidents in the GTD are not geocoded. In addition the collection of
place  name  information  is  insufficient  and  erroneous,  which  makes  a  more  detailed
spatial analysis of past events based only on this dataset impossible.
9) This claim has originally been made by the MOFA in a position paper on Japan's inter-
national counterterrorism cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010b).
10) Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that Japan shall not maintain armed forces
and  renounces  war  and  the  threat  or  use  of  force  as  means  of  settling  international
disputes (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 1947).
11) The  original  Anti-Terrorism  Special  Measures  Law also  granted  the  participation  in
search and rescue activities as well as relief activities for affected people, which were
later revoked in the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law.
12) The  order  of  localized  names  of  these  territories  does  not  by  any  means  reflect  a
statement or sentiment on the disputes for my part and must not be interpreted as such.
13) The  total  area  of  the  Tokyo  Metropolis,  excluding  the  outlying  Izu  and  Ogasawara
Islands, amounts to 2,005 km2.
14) Although every location vulnerable to a small explosive attack is unequivocally vulner-
able to these modes of attack, too.
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15) This chapter has been published in a shortened form in Greger (2014).
16) Zenrin data is used by Google Maps and Microsoft BingTM Maps, amongst others.
17) Due to  a  particularity  in  the  data  the  actual  total  number  of  points  in  the  dataset  is
848,664,485. The reason is that every transfer from one mode of transportation to another
one consists of two points: one represents the last point of the ending trip and one the first
point of the beginning trip.
18) The Yamanote Line is one of the most important railway lines in Tokyo, connecting 29
major train stations and commuting hubs on a 34.5 km loop.
19) The area shown here comprises the three wards of Chiyoda, Chuo and, Minato.
20) In Japan the school year as well as the academic year at universities and the fiscal years
all begin on April 1st, making the weeks shortly before and after a very special period
during the year, marked by lots of people moving etc.
21) Japan has both a pronounced rainy season from June to July as well as a typhoon season
from August to October, which both regularly have severe effects on the public transport
systems.
22) For an additional concept of stationary activity categories cf. chapter 5.3.5.
23) In 1987 Hillier et al.  (1987) performed small-scale analyses for a number of very small
study areas (urban, suburban as well as residential estates) to examine the relationship
between observed movement patterns and the “space syntax”  (Hillier 1998), i.e. urban
structure.
24) In the terminology of the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow data a new trip starts, when the person
is pursuing a new purpose, while each trip can be subdivided into multiple subtrips when
the mode of transportation changes.
25) In the data model of the 2008 CSIS PersonFlow data these transportation modes are held
separately. The latter includes not only monorails such as the  New Transit Yurikamome
and the Tokyo Monorail Haneda Airport Line but also other private train lines such as the
Nippori-Toneri Liner and the Tsukuba Express. I will hitherto refer to these as “train”.
26) The UNA toolbox for ArcGIS offers a normalization option as well, but since this only
normalizes among street segments within the search radius r, I decided to implement my
own, overall normalization step.
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27) A specific encoding marks train stations that are still being served at the time of data
collection.
28) It is a widely unknown fact that almost one quarter of the immediate casualties resulting
from the collapse of the World Trade Center's twin towers were staff of the leading dealer
in US treasury securities, which hampered the US financial system significantly and on a
sustained basis (Makinen 2002, 4).
29) Obviously they serve as destinations during the morning commute, while they are the
origins of trips during the evening commute. Therefore I summed up the numbers for
arriving and departing passengers in the passenger transfer data.
30) Mita Station, which serves two underground train lines is only 150 from Tamachi Station,
but no connection between these two train stations exists.
31) There is currently no district heat distribution network in Tokyo.
32) The US Department of Defense (DoD) also released a similar document about minimum
antiterrorism building standards in the course of a governmental project, which was later
cancelled (Department of Defense 2007).
33) Two notable exceptions are the papers by Rusnak et al. (2012) and Perry et al. (2013).
34) Similar  approaches  have  been  presented  in  previous  studies  in  the  context  of  infra-
structural networks and nuclear power plants (Apostolakis and Lemon 2005; Karydas and
Gifun 2006; Lemon 2004; Michaud 2005; Morgan et al. 2000; Patterson and Apostolakis
2007).
35) This map also shows one of the shortcomings of the analysis framework as a result of the
available data: the 2011 Zenrin Telepoint Pack! dataset combines all offices of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government Building complex into the easternmost building, which makes
the office towers in the west appear to be empty.
36) It is worth noticing that the perpetrators at the World Trade Center on September 11th,
2001, used a different scenario and modus operandi for their attack than that which I
examine in this study.
37) In Figures 45,  46,  47 and  48 the data for vulnerability level “low” are not shown for
clarity. They make up the remainder to 100%.
38) The  official  numbers  according  to  the  final  report  of  the  National  Commission  on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States are 343 members of the New York Fire Depart-
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ment  (FDNY),  23  members  of  the  New  York  Police  Department  (NYPD),  and  37
members  of  the  Port  Authority Police Department  (PAPD)  (National  Commission  on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 311).
39) Cram schools in Japan are privately run but form an integral part of the education system.
They serve all levels of school education from elementary to senior high school. While
not mandatory, attendance rates are very high (Library of Congress 2010).
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———. 2012b. “テロ対策東京パートナーシッフ ゚[Anti-Terrorism Partnership, Tokyo].” 
http://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/sikumi/partner/partner.htm.
Metzger, M.J., R. Leemans, and D. Schröter. 2005. “A Multidisciplinary Multi-Scale Framework 
for Assessing Vulnerabilities to Global Change.” International Journal of Applied Earth 
Observation and Geoinformation 7 (4): 253–267.
Michaud, D. 2005. “Risk Analysis of Infrastructure Systems Screening Vulnerabilities in Water 
Supply Networks.”
Midford, P. 2006. Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism Implications for Japan’s 
Security Strategy. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington.
206
Mileti, D.S. 1980. “Human Adjustment to the Risk of Environmental Extremes.” Sociology and 
Social Research 64: 327–347.
———. 1999. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. 
Natural Hazards and Disasters. Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry Press.
Ministry of Defense. 2007. “For the Eradication of International Terrorism and for World Peace.”
———. 2008. “The Fight against Terrorism Self-Defense Force Activities.”
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2012. “Japan’s Challenges Towards Recovery.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2010a. “補給支援を通じた「テロとの闘い」への我が国の貢
献：補給支援特別措置法 [Our country’s contribution to the replenishment and support
of the ‘War Against Terrorism’: The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law].” 
April. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/terro/katsudou05.html.
———. 2010b. “Overview of Japan’s International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.” August. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/intl_coop.html.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2002. “公衆等脅迫目的の犯罪行為のため
の資金の提供等の処罰に関する法律 [Act on Punishment of the Provision of Funds 
etc. for Criminal Acts of Intimidation etc. of the General Public].”
Miyasaka, N. 2009. “Japan’s Counterterrorism Policy.” In Bridging Strategic Asia. The United 
States, Japan, and India, 242–254.
Morgan, M.G., H.K. Florig, M.L. DeKay, and P. Fischbeck. 2000. “Categorizing Risks for Risk 
Ranking.” Risk Analysis 20 (1): 49–58.
Moscovici, S., G. Mugny, and J.A. Perez. 1991. La Influencia social inconsciente: estudios de 
psicologia social experimental [Unconscious Social Influence: Experimental Social 
Psychology Studies]. Barcelona: Anthropos.
Moscovici, S., M. Olasagasti, J. Gonzalez-Anleo, and S. Barriga. 1996. Psicologia de las 
minorias activas [Psychology of Active Minorities]. Madrid: Morata.
Moxley, R.L., and N.F. Moxley. 1974. “Determining Point-Centrality in Uncontrived Social 
Networks.” Sociometry 37 (1): 122–130.
Mustafa, D. 2005. “The Terrible Geographicalness of Terrorism: Reflections of a Hazards 
Geographer.” Antipode 37: 72–92.
207
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States. 1st ed. New York: Norton.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 2012. “Global 
Terrorism Database: Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables”. National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park MD.
———. 2013a. “GTD Incident Summary 200403110001.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200403110001.
———. 2013b. “GTD Incident Summary 200403110003.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200403110003.
———. 2013c. “GTD Incident Summary 200403110004.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200403110004.
———. 2013d. “GTD Incident Summary 200403110007.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200403110007.
———. 2013e. “GTD Incident Summary 198812210003.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198812210003.
———. 2013f. “Global Terrorism Database [Data File].” http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
———. 2013g. “GTD Incident Summary 199503200014.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199503200014.
———. 2013h. “GTD Incident Summary 199808070003.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199808070003.
———. 2013i. “GTD Incident Summary 200109110004.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200109110004.
———. 2013j. “GTD Incident Summary 200109110005.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200109110005.
———. 2013k. “GTD Incident Summary 200109110006.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200109110006.
———. 2013l. “GTD Incident Summary 200109110007.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200109110007.
———. 2013m. “GTD Incident Summary 200507070001.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507070001.
208
———. 2013n. “GTD Incident Summary 200507070002.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507070002.
———. 2013o. “GTD Incident Summary 200507070003.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507070003.
———. 2013p. “GTD Incident Summary 200507070004.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507070004.
———. 2013q. “GTD Incident Summary 199504190004.” 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199504190004.
National Counterterrorism Center. 2012. “Bomb Threat Stand-Off Distances.” 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/technical/bomb_threat.html.
National Land Information Division, National and Regional Policy Bureau. 2010. “交通流動量 
駅別乗降数 [Traffic Flow Volume, Passenger Transfers at Stations] [Data File].” 
http://nlftp.mlit.go.jp/ksj/gml/datalist/KsjTmplt-S05-c.html.
National Police Agency. 2003. “警察の国際テロ対策 ― 米国同時多発テロ事件から１０年
の軌跡 [Police Counterterrorism Measures: The Trajectory 10 Years After the 
Coordinated Attacks in America].”
National Research Council. 1983. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press.
———. 2002. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering 
Terrorism. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press.
Neumann, P.R. 2009. Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the 
Transformation of Political Violence. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity.
O’Brien, K., S. Eriksen, A. Schjolden, and L. Nygaard. 2004. “What’s in a Word? Conflicting 
Interpretations of Vulnerability in Climate Change Research”. Center for International 
Climate  and Environmental Research.
O’Brien, K., R. Leichenko, U. Kelkar, H. Venema, G. Aandahl, H. Tompkins, A. Javed, et al. 
2004. “Mapping Vulnerability to Multiple Stressors: Climate Change and Globalization 
in India.” Global Environmental Change 14 (4): 303–313.
O’Brien, K., L. Sygna, and J.E. Haugen. 2004. “Vulnerable or Resilient? A Multi-Scale 
Assessment of Climate Impacts and Vulnerability in Norway.” Climatic Change 64 (1/2):
193–225.
209
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. 2012. “Timeline for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Accident.” March 7. http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/2011/NEWS-04.html.
Ozer, M., and H. Akbaş. 2011. “The Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Terrorism.” 
Turkish Journal of Police Studies 13 (2): 179–194.
Papathoma, M., and D. Dominey-Howes. 2003. “Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment and Its 
Implications for Coastal Hazard Analysis and Disaster Management Planning, Gulf of 
Corinth, Greece.” Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 3 (6): 733–747.
Papathoma-Köhle, M., B. Neuhäuser, K. Ratzinger, H. Wenzel, and D. Dominey-Howes. 2007. 
“Elements at Risk as a Framework for Assessing the Vulnerability of Communities to 
Landslides.” Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 7 (6): 765–779.
Pate, J., G. Ackerman, and K. McCloud. 2001. “2000 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents 
Involving Sub-National Actors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear 
Materials.” August 13. http://cns.miis.edu/reports/cbrn2k.htm.
Paté-Cornell, E., and S. Guikema. 2002. “Probabilistic Modeling of Terrorist Threats: A Systems 
Approach to Setting Priorities Among Countermeasures.” Military Operations Research 
7 (4): 5–20.
Patterson, S.A., and G.E. Apostolakis. 2007. “Identification of Critical Locations across Multiple
Infrastructures for Terrorist Actions.” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 92 (9): 
1183–1203.
Perry, W.L., Claude Berrebi, R.A. Brown, J.S. Hollywood, A. Jaycocks, P. Roshan, T. Sullivan, 
and L. Miyashiro. 2013. Predicting Suicide Attacks: Integrating Spatial, Temporal, and 
Social Features of Terrorist Attack Targets.
Peterson, G.D. 2002. “Estimating Resilience Across Landscapes.” Conservation Ecology 6 (1).
Piegorsch, W.W., S.L. Cutter, and F. Hardisty. 2007. “Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying 
Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents.” Risk Analysis 27 (6): 1411–1425.
Porta, S., V. Latora, F. Wang, E. Strano, A. Cardillo, S. Scellato, V. Iacoviello, and R. Messora. 
2009. “Street Centrality and Densities of Retail and Services in Bologna, Italy.” 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 36 (3): 450–465.
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 1997. “Critical Foundations: 
Protecting America’s Infrastructures.”
210
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1947. “The Constitution of Japan.” May 3. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.ht
ml.
———. 2001. “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.” October. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html.
Puissant, A., J.-P. Malet, and O. Maquaire. 2006. “Mapping Landslide Consequences in 
Mountain Areas: A Tentative Approach with a Semi-Quantitative Procedure.” In 
SAGEO’2006, 1–16. Strasbourg.
RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 2011. Seth Jones on Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Post–bin Laden. Events @ RAND.
Reid, E., and H. Chen. 2007. “Mapping the Contemporary Terrorism Research Domain.” 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65 (1): 42–56.
Rinaldi, S.M., J.P. Peerenboom, and T.K. Kelly. 2001. “Identifying, Understanding, and 
Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies.” IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21
(6): 11–25.
Rusnak, D.M., L.W. Kennedy, I.S. Eldivan, and J.M. Caplan. 2012. “Analyzing Terrorism Using 
Spatial Analysis Techniques: A Case Study of Turkish Cities.” In Evidence-Based 
Counterterrorism Policy, edited by Cynthia M Lum and Leslie W Kennedy, 167–185. 
New York, NY: Springer.
Saaty, T.L. 1980. The Analytic Hierarchy Process: Planning, Priority Setting, Resource 
Allocation. New York ; London: McGraw-Hill International Book Co.
———. 2006. Decision Making with the Analytic Network Process Economic, Political, Social and 
Technological Applications with Benefits, Opportunities, Costs and Risks. New York: 
Springer.
———. 2008. “Decision Making with the Analytic Hierarchy Process.” International Journal of 
Services Sciences 1 (1): 83–98.
Sabidussi, G. 1966. “The Centrality Index of a Graph.” Psychometrika 31 (4): 581–603.
Sacco, V. 2002. The Criminal Event: Perspectives in Space and Time. 2nd ed. The Wadsworth 
Series in Criminological Theory. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
Sandler, T., and W. Enders. 2007. “Applying Analytical Methods to Study Terrorism.” 
International Studies Perspectives 8 (3): 287–302.
211
Sassen, S. 2001. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press.
———. 2005. “The Global City: Introducing a Concept.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 
(2): 27–43.
Savitch, H.V., and G. Ardashev. 2001. “Does Terror Have an Urban Future?” Urban Studies 38: 
2515–2533.
Schmid, A.P. 2011. The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London: Routledge.
Schmitt, R.C. 1956. “Estimating Daytime Populations.” Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners 22 (2): 83–85.
Sekimoto, Y., R. Shibasaki, H. Kanasugi, T. Usui, and Y. Shimazaki. 2011. “PFlow: 
Reconstructing People Flow Recycling Large-Scale Social Survey Data.” IEEE 
Pervasive Computing 10 (4): 27–35.
Sevtsuk, A., and M. Mekonnen. 2012a. “Urban Network Analysis: A Toolbox for ArcGIS 10”. 
SIngapore University of Technology & Design in collaboration with MIT.
———. 2012b. “Urban Network Analysis. A New Toolbox for ArcGIS.” Revue Internationale de 
Géomatique 22 (2): 287–305.
Shahar, Y. 2005. “Toward a Target-Specific Method of Threat Assessment.” In Intelligence and 
Security Informatics, edited by Paul Kantor, Gheorghe Muresan, Fred Roberts, Daniel D. 
Zeng, Fei-Yue Wang, Hsinchun Chen, and Ralph C. Merkle, 3495:139–152. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Shaw, M.E. 1954. “Group Structure and the Behavior of Individuals in Small Groups.” The 
Journal of Psychology 38 (1): 139–149.
Shevky, E. 1972. Social Area Analysis: Theory, Illustrative Application, and Computational 
Procedures. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
Smith, B.L., J. Cothren, P. Roberts, and K.R. Damphouse. 2008. “Geospatial Analysis of 
Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory 
Behavior of International and Environmental Terrorists”. National Institute of 
Justice/NCJRS.
Statistical lnformation Institute for Consulting and Analysis. 2009. “平成 21 年経済センサス－
基礎調査 [2009 Economic Census (Basic Survey)] [Data File].” 
http://www.sinfonica.or.jp/topic/h21economic.html.
212
Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2010. “平成２２年国
勢調査（小地域）[2010 National Census (Small Areas)] [Data File].” http://e-
stat.go.jp/SG2/eStatGIS/page/download.html.
Steinhoff, P.G. 2007. “Radical Outcasts Versus Three Kinds of Police: Constructing Limits in 
Japanese Anti-Emperor Protests.” In New Perspectives in Political Ethnography, edited 
by Lauren Joseph, Matthew Mahler, and Javier Auyero, 60–87. New York, NY: Springer 
New York.
Sutton, P., D. Roberts, C. Elvidge, and K. Baugh. 2001. “Census from Heaven: An Estimate of 
the Global Human Population Using Night-Time Satellite Imagery.” International 
Journal of Remote Sensing 22 (16): 3061–3076.
Sutton, P.C., C. Elvidge, and T. Obremski. 2003. “Building and Evaluating Models to Estimate 
Ambient Population Density.” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing 69 (5): 
545–553.
Tetlock, P.E. 2005. Expert Political Judgment : How Good Is It? How Can We Know? Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
The National Archives. 2000. “Terrorism Act.”
Thornton, T.P. 1964. “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation.” In Internal War: Problems and 
Approaches, edited by Harry Eckstein. New York: The Free Press.
Tobler, W., U. Deichmann, J. Gottsegen, and K. Maloy. 1997. “World Population in a Grid of 
Spherical Quadrilaterals.” International Journal of Population Geography 3 (3): 203–
225.
Tobler, W.R. 1979. “Smooth Pycnophylactic Interpolation for Geographical Regions.” Journal of
the American Statistical Association 74 (367): 519–530.
Tokyo Metropolitan Area Transportation Planning Council. 2013. “パーソントリップ調査とは
[About the Persontrip Study].” http://www.tokyo-pt.jp/person/index.html.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 2012. Tokyo - City Profile and Government.
Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of General Affairs. 2010. “平成２２年度　学校基本
調査報告 [2010 Basic School Survey Information] [Data File].” 
http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.jp/gakkou/2010/gk10qg10000.htm.
213
TripAdvisor. 2013. “Things to Do in Tokyo: Attractions Travelers Recommend.” 
http://www.tripadvisor.com/Attractions-g298184-Activities-
Tokyo_Tokyo_Prefecture_Kanto.html.
Tsamboulas, D., and P. Moraiti. 2008. “Identification of Potential Target Locations and 
Attractiveness Assessment due to Terrorism in the Freight Transport.” Journal of 
Transportation Security 1: 189–207.
Turner, B.L., R.E. Kasperson, P.A. Matson, J.J. McCarthy, R.W. Corell, L. Christensen, N. 
Eckley, et al. 2003. “Science and Technology for Sustainable Development Special 
Feature: A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis in Sustainability Science.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (14): 8074–8079.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1998. “Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can
Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments”. General Accounting Office.
U.S. Government Printing Office. 2010. “United States Code, 2010 Edition. Title 22 - Foreign 
Relations and Intercourse.”
Uitto, J.I. 1998. “The Geography of Disaster Vulnerability in Megacities.” Applied Geography 
18: 7–16.
United Nations. 2012. State of the World’s Cities 2012-2013: Prosperity of Cities. [S.l.]: United 
Nations Publications.
United Nations Development Programme, and Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. 2004.
Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development. New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.
United Nations Disaster Relief Office. 1979. “Natural Disasters and Vulnerability Analysis.”
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2009. 2009 UNISDR Terminology 
on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction.
United Nations Security Council. 2004. “Resolution 1566”. United Nations Security Council.
United States Geological Survey. 2009. “Magnitude 7.1 - Izu Islands, Japan Region.” August 9. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2009/us2009kcaz/.
———. 2010. “Magnitude 7.0 - Haiti Region.” January 12. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/.
214
———. 2011. “Magnitude 9.0 - Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan.” March 11. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/.
———. 2013. “Magnitude 9.1 - Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra.” July 8. 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2004/us2004slav/.
Usui, T., T. Kanasugi, Y. Sekimoto, Y. Minami, R. Shibasaki, and A. Nanako. 2009. “Realization 
and implementation of Tokyo Metropolitan Area person-trip data spatio-temporal 
interpolation by a People Flow Analysis Platform.” In Papers and Proceedings of the 
Geographic Information Systems Association, 18:541–545.
Von Hippel, F.N. 2011. “The Radiological and Psychological Consequences of the Fukushima 
Daiichi Accident.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67 (5): 27–36.
Weil, R., and G.. Apostolakis. 2001. “A Methodology for the Prioritization of Operating 
Experience in Nuclear Power Plants.” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 74 (1): 
23–42.
White, G.F. 1986. Selected Writings of Gilbert F. White. Geography, Resources, and 
Environment v. 1-. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
White, G.F. 1994. “A Perspective on Reducing Losses from Natural Hazards.” Bulletin of the 
American Meteorological Society 75 (4): 1237–1240.
Wilkinson, P. 2011. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. 3rd ed. Milton 
Park, Abingdon, Oxon, [England] ; New York: Routledge.
Willis, H.H. 2005. Estimating Terrorism Risk. RAND Corporation.
Willis, H.H., and O. Al-Shahery. 2014. “National Security Perspectives on Terrorism Risk 
Insurance in the United States”. RAND Corporation.
Wilson, J. 2007. Securing America’s Passenger-Rail Systems. Santa Monica  CA: RAND Corp.
Wisner, B. 2002. “Is There a Geographical Theory of Terror?”
Wisner, B., P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and I. Davis. 2003. At Risk Natural Hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability and Disasters. London: Routledge.
World Bank, and United Nations. 2010. Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters: The Economics 
of Effective Prevention. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
World Nuclear Association. 2011. “Fukushima Faced 14-Metre Tsunami.” March 23. 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Fukushima_faced_14-
metre_tsunami_2303113.html.
215
Wu, S., X. Qiu, and L. Wang. 2005. “Population Estimation Methods in GIS and Remote 
Sensing: A Review.” GIScience & Remote Sensing 42 (1): 80–96.
Yabe, N., and Y. Kurata. 2013. “東京大都市圏における IC 乗車券を用いた訪日外国人の観
光行動分析 [An Analysis of the Behavior of Inbound Tourists in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area from the Data of IC Transit Cards].” GIS－理論と応用 [Theory and 
Applications of GIS] 21 (1): 35–46.
Yasukuni Shrine. 2013. “About Yasukuni Shrine.” http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/.
Zenrin Co., Ltd. 2008. “住宅地図データベース Zmap-TOWNII [Housing Map Zmap-
TOWNII] [Data File].” http://www.zenrin.co.jp/product/gis/zmap/zmaptown.html.
———. 2011. “テレデータ Pack！[TelePoint Pack!] [Data File].” 
http://www.zenrin.co.jp/product/gis/teldata/teldt.html.
216
